Professor O’Sullivan rejects the partnership doctrine of the Waitangi Tribunal as inherently hierarchical and limiting. He claims the Tribunal’s partnership model frames Maori and the Crown as distinct partners with reciprocal duties, but ultimately preserves the Crown as the senior authority. This entrenches inequality and prevents Maori from exercising full political agency inside the state. He instead claims that the Treaty is not a partnership between races or between the Maoris and the Crown; nor did it create one people, assimilating Maoris into colonial ways of governing.
Alternatively, O’Sullivan proposes to replace the present legal fiction of the Crown in our constitution with a republican commonwealth – a federation of political communities – as the state entity of Aotearoa New Zealand, founded in non-domination, shared sovereignty, and equal citizenship (equal tikanga). The commonwealth would comprise two complementary forms of political authority as established by te Tiriti o Waitangi: kawanatanga of Article 1 and rangatiratanga of Article 2 (p. 41). Whereas the Crown is presently the counterparty to te Tiriti, so as the State, the commonwealth would then become the constitutional partner.
He claims the republican commonwealth model provides for these authorities to coexist without domination, enabling Maori self determination to strengthen rather than weaken liberal democracy. He says, true equality arises not from sameness or partnership metaphors, but from shared, differentiated, and culturally grounded political authority. The proposition is laid out in an Introduction chapter, available here.
O’Sullivan’s Argument for a Republican Commonwealth
O’Sullivan claims that “Ti Tiriti was not a cession of sovereignty,” (p. 31) and his following argument is based on that claim. O’Sullivan does not make an argument against cession here, but quotes a few selected sources, including Anne Salmond, Ned Fletcher and of course the Waitangi Tribunal. He also usefully mentions that Chief Justice Elias remarks, “it can’t be disputed that the Treaty is actually the Maori text.”
However, Lord Normanby’s 14 August 1839 instructions included that the Queen authorized Hobson to treat with the Maoris for their free and intelligent consent to recognize Her Majesty’s Sovereign authority to govern New Zealand as a part of the Dominion of Great Britain. Hobson, therefore, would not have done something else.
Furthermore, there is Colenso’s recording of the speeches of the chiefs on 5 February, the day before the Treaty. O’Sullivan quotes from Claudia Orange and the Waitangi Tribunal (p. 80-1), who claim that “The Rangatira consented to the Treaty on the basis that they and the Governor were to be equals.” O’Sullivan also quotes from two of the speeches from Claudia Orange, which he implied meant that the chiefs understood that they expected equality.
I have previously reviewed the 16 speeches from Colenso’s recordings on Breaking Views (here); 10 were for signing and 6 were against, and all 16 signed the Treaty the following day. They have in common that the chiefs understood they would be under the Queen and her representative, the Governor. While they did not cede their chiefly power or territory, the Treaty is a hierarchical arrangement, like the Magna Carta.
O’Sullivan’s argument for co-ownership is based on te Tiriti o Waitangi and republican shared political authority within a commonwealth and runs as follows:
(1) Article 3 promises that “the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England.” Trans. I.H. Kawharu, 1989. (p. 38)
(2) O’Sullivan, after Anne Salmond (2022), reads that as “a promise of absolute equality with the people of England.” (p. 39).
(3) O’Sullivan argues that individual equality of Article 3 requires collective equality for Article 2: “Citizenship… is a cultural concept as much as a political one.” (p. 2) “Equal tikanga is required for participatory parity.” (p. 18) “Salmond’s (2022) further interpretation, that Article 3 committed the Queen to ‘take care of’ all the Maori people as she does her English subjects, makes Te Tiriti a promise to individuals as well as to their hapu (p. 13).” (p. 39) [Salmond actually writes “…this promise was made to them as tangata or persons, not as a collectivity (say, ‘te iwi Maori’)” See also p. 11.]
(4) Therefore, again after Salmond (2022), “It is a promise to deliver justice and equality in human dignity.” (p. 40)
(5) Equality cannot require Maoris to abandon their tikanga or political identity, because that would make Maoris equal only after becoming like someone else.
(6) O’Sullivan says, “It is a false equality if Maori people are not free to choose citizenship’s meaningful expression for themselves.” (p. 44) Therefore, true equality requires that Maoris be free to live as Maoris, and that their tikanga be recognized as having equal standing in public life.
(7) But Maori are not only citizens. Article 2 guarantees ‘tino rangatiratanga’, meaning Maori remain rangatira with authority over their own communities. So, “This book’s essential presumption is that Māori people are both citizens and rangatira.” (p. 40) A political system that treats them only as citizens (liberal assimilation) or only as rangatira outside the state (external partnership) fails to honour Te Tiriti’s structure.
(8) The current ‘Crown–Maori partnership’ model places the Crown as the senior partner who ultimately decides the scope of Maori authority. This creates domination, because one party holds the final say over the other. “True equality means that no population is subservient or dominated by another.” (p. 40)
(9) To remove domination, the state must be re-imagined as belonging equally to all, the state must be “constituted by everyone and for everyone” (p. 9) Replacing ‘the Crown’ with ‘the commonwealth’ expresses this shift: the state becomes a shared political community, not a hierarchical one.
(10) In a commonwealth, Maori are co-owners of the state, not outsiders negotiating with it. Being co-owners of the state means that Maoris, as Maoris, share in constituting and authorizing the state’s institutions and purposes.
(11) A republican commonwealth best fulfils Article 3’s promise of equal citizenship and Article 2’s guarantee of rangatiratanga.
O’Sullivan’s Republican Sovereignty and the Waitangi Tribunal Partnership both ignore an underlying problem, which is that they both differentiate on a racial basis. In 1840 there were two distinct races, the Maoris and the British. Today some are trying to prolong that distinction as tangata whenua and tangata te Tiriti; that is, those with or without a Maori ancestor. But, as we interbreed, it is becoming more indistinct over time, until eventually it will become meaningless. Any constitutional model that relies on race-based ethnic categories must recognize that the phenomena of race-based ethnicity is tenuous and disappearing.
Republican Rangatiratanga and Authority
Authority: The power or right to give orders and enforce obedience (Oxford Concise)
O’Sullivan’s theory is fundamentally about political motivation – what drives people, groups, and institutions to act in certain ways within a democratic system shaped by Te Tiriti. That relates to David McClelland’s Three Need’s Theory of Power, Achievement and Affiliation. The strongest alignment is with Need for Power (nPow). O’Sullivan describes republicanism as institutional, collective, non-dominating power – what McClelland called socialized power, as compared to personal power. These characteristics are expressions of collective empowerment (Article 2), not the individualistic affiliation of subjecthood or citizenship (Article 3).
O’Sullivan says that rangatiratanga is an inherent political authority that is original, independent and pre-state: “Rangatiratanga is an inherent authority, not one that is secondary or subservient to the powers and responsibilities of government. It is an authority that belongs to Māori persons individually and collectively and reflects hapū as spaces of political authority that predate the state and are also independent of it.” (p. 2) So rangatiratanga originates in the political authority of hapu which are constituted by genealogy (whakapapa); therefore, O’Sullivan’s rangatiratanga is inherited through descent.
O’Sullivan is proposing that rangatiratanga is a political authority that will share authority with the people (kawanatanga). He says this is because Maoris were the indigenous political communities of the land and their authority was recognized in a constitutional document – te Tiriti. Justice requires honouring those obligations. Note that is based on his claim that the constitutional relationship with the Crown was not hierarchical and on his argument for co-ownership outlined above. O’Sullivan’s logic is basically the same as that used in Canada (First Nations), the US (tribal sovereignty), and Scandinavia (Sámi parliaments).
However, when 80 percent of the Maori population undertook the Second Great Migration from their traditional environment (in what had by then become the countryside) into the towns after the Second World War, they left behind the dominion of rangatiratanga. Urbanization disrupted Maori customs and dispersed the hapus; the concept of rangatiratanga was largely forgotten and the hapu chiefly power waned if not lapsed.
Around the turn of the millennium a faction of mixed European and Maori ancestry pretenders claimed to succeed to Maori chieftainship as tribal leaders. To declare the continuance of powers does not constitute or create them, but for some reason which is not entirely clear, our Parliament, egged on by the judiciary, has given Maori entities of the order of $100 billion worth of assets for claiming they are the inheritors of Maori chieftainship. Consequently, those pretenders are now the six-figure CEOs of large corporate companies, which pay no tax.
Furthermore, as part-Maoris and non-Maoris continue to interbreed, the proportion of Maori ancestry in part-Maori individuals is decreasing, while the proportion of part-Maoris in the total population is increasing. Already there are no full Maoris and inevitably the phenomenon of race, including Maoris, will pass from sight. Because rangatiratanga is inherent in the individual, it is reducing and will eventually disappear. Therefore, making rangatiratanga a distinct authority is not looking to the future, but regressing into the past. Rangatiratanga as a source of authority is a sham and it will become even more so.
A first cause of rangatiratanga in Maoris has not been identified and it has not been explained why an equivalent authority is not recognized in other races. If there is a political authority of ‘rangatiratanga’, it is likely a legal fiction, shaped by urbanization and vested in Maoris as a right or privilege. Whatever authority part-Maoris may have today it is not the chieftainship of 1840 Maoris, but a partial reconstruction which is said to represent it.
The rangatiratanga organization and the institutions it gives rise to would need to be funded. O’Sullivan says there is a requirement for ‘participatory parity’, which means that Maori institutions have the material resources to act independently and exercise meaningful authority (pp. 3, 101-4). Furthermore, if Maoris are co-owners of the state, then Maori institutions must receive a share of the resources of the state and funding must be built into the constitutional order. Funding would therefore come from a share of public revenue.
Liberal Democracy Comparison
To evaluate O’Sullivan’s republican commonwealth, I will compare it to three principles of a liberal democracy: Sovereign power, taxation and representation, and universal suffrage.
Principle 1. Sovereign Power
Power comes from the work of the people which is acknowledged by payment, and governments obtain their power by taxing the people. We need a body politic to organize and bound us, so we employ and empower a government and judiciary to fulfil that function.
O’Sullivan agrees that power comes from the people but adds a second source of authority. He argues that rangatiratanga is an inherent authority, not derived from taxation or employment of government, just financed by it. For O’Sullivan, there are two domains of authority and decision making within the commonwealth: the people (kawanatanga) and Maori political communities (rangatiratanga). Maori authority exists independently of the taxation and democratic representation of the people.
Whereas the people pay tax to empower their source of authority, the Maoris get their inherent rangatiratanga authority for free, which is not compatible with Principle 1.
Principle 2. No taxation without representation.
In return for taking our taxes, our Parliament has a responsibility to represent us. That requires they find out from us what we want and, with some qualification, they endeavour to obtain it for us.
O’Sullivan agrees that representation is necessary, but representation cannot substitute for Maori self-determination. Representation alone is not sufficient for Maoris as it does not ensure that Maori values “count the most” (p. 2). He claims that representation does not eliminate domination, and majoritarian democracy can still marginalize Maoris. Citizenship alone cannot protect rangatiratanga and Maori require distinct political authority, not just representation. Therefore, Maoris must have their own political authority (rangatiratanga), and Maoris must also co-author kawanatanga (i.e., Parliament must be defined by part-Maori and non-Maori).
For liberal democracy, representation is the mechanism of democracy; but for O’Sullivan, Maori self-determination is also a shareholder in representation. That reduces the democratic sovereign power of tax paying citizens, which is incompatible with the principle of representation in return for taxation.
Principle 3. Universal suffrage
Universal suffrage entails that all eligible voters have a vote of the same power.
O’Sullivan agrees that all voters have the same power but says equal votes do not guarantee equal power. He argues that Maoris can be outvoted and majoritarianism can dominate minorities. Equal votes do not produce equal outcomes and Maori require institutionalized rangatiratanga to prevent domination. O’Sullivan supports dual universal suffrage, not unitary suffrage.
O’Sullivan’s model requires differentiated political authority with an exclusive authority for Maoris in addition to the equal votes of Maori citizens. That means the voters are sharing their decision-making power with another authority. The Maori voters (tangata whenua) therefore have decision-making power with their vote and with their rangatiratanga authority. That is greater voting power than non-Maori voters (tangata te tiriti), so it is not compatible with the universal suffrage of a liberal democracy.
Summary
O’Sullivan’s model has two sources of authority (rangatiratanga and kawanatanga) and two political communities (Maoris and general citizenry including Maoris). There is one shared state with two sites of authority. The three principles given above are liberal democratic and O’Sullivan’s model is republican pluralist. While they are logically incompatible, nevertheless, they have significant similarities: They agree that power comes from the people, that Parliament (kawanatanga) represents the people, and that all voters have the same power.
But for O’Sullivan, there is also a rangatiratanga authority that exists within the same democracy. He says that Maoris have inherent power, rangatiratanga, but does not say why other races do not have an equivalent inherent power. He says that democracy can marginalize Maoris, but does not say that same issue applies to other races, such as Samoans. O’Sullivan’s arrangement is based on a belief that Maoris, individually and collectively, have an inherent quality – rangatiratanga – that distinguishes them as being entitled to greater democratic power than other races. That contradicts O’Sullivan’s rejection of domination.
Local Government in the Commonwealth
O’Sullivan tells us, “Chapter 8 argues for reimagining local government as a system with councils (kāwanatanga) and hapū and other Māori entities (rangatiratanga) playing complementary but distinctive roles. It proposes that when Māori people participate in council affairs, they do so as both citizens and rangatira, not as stakeholders in a senior partner’s project. Tikanga is, therefore, central. The chapter examines some of the preliminary principles and practices that would allow local government to function as part of a broader commonwealth, guided by the essential republican principle of non-domination.” (p. 17)
At Chapter 8 (p. 139), O’Sullivan says, “in 2021, the Ardern government (2017-23) commissioned the Ministerial Review into the Future of Local Government. Nania Mahuta, who held a Maori seat in Parliament, was the Minister of Local Government. … The Ministerial Review’s terms of reference included examining what the Treaty of Waitangi partnership principle would look like for local government. … In itself this was a radical step, as local government was not formally a treaty partner…”.
O’Sullivan was commissioned by the Department of Internal Affairs to write a discussion paper for the Ministerial Review in 2022 (p. 140):
“Rangatiratanga, Citizenship and the Crown That is ‘Maori Too’: Boldness and the Future of Local Government” (O’Sulivan, 2022) informed the panel’s discussion with fifty-five iwi, twenty hapu and other Maori groups. The discussion paper followed How Would Local Government Arrangements Need to Change to Promote Tino Rangatiratanga/Mana Motuhake? (O’Sullivan, 2021a), which I delivered to the panel, and which it published in 2022. These were among its ‘key resources’, meaning that they ‘substantially informed the Panel’s thinking’ (Department of Internal Affairs, 2023b, p. 3).”
“More specifically, my discussion paper for the review panel made substantive recommendations for strengthening the system by recognizing that rangatiratanga is an inherent authority, not an authority that is negotiated with a senior partner. There may, therefore, be no partnership; rather there may be a more clearly defined Maori share in the sovereignty.” (p. 166)
He says, the 2022 draft report of the Ministerial Review “is a comprehensive examination of what differentiated citizenship and participatory parity could mean for local government, not just as councils collecting rubbish, but as a political system where different participants contribute to local community well-being through rangatiratanga (hapu and other Maori entities) and kawanatanga (councils) or through both.” (p. 216)
The draft Report has five Key Themes, one of which is “Partnership with Māori: Embedding Te Tiriti o Waitangi principles into governance structures and decision-making”. It has 29 Recommendations, including 5 which contribute to the above theme: 7. Embed Te Tiriti o Waitangi in local government law; 8. Require councils to develop Tiriti-based partnership frameworks; 9. Strengthen Maori ward and constituency provisions; 10. Resource Maori participation; and 11. Establish a national Maori Local Government Ropu.
“The final report was presented to the government in June 2023, just four months before the general election, which the government was expected to lose.” However, the review panel’s recommendations were not accepted. Nevertheless, O’Sullivan claims, “the draft report is instructive for discussions about what Te Tiriti could mean for future organization of government.” (p. 140)
We have seen that Prime Minister Luxon has been in discussion with iwi leaders for the past 12 months (here), and there have been multiple instances of unelected iwi representatives voting on local body committees; for example, the Wellington Water board (here). Now, one of the main proponents of the arrangement has published a book giving us an insight as to what is driving it. Yet We the people have had little if any involvement, presumably because they know we do not want it.
Conclusion
By denying the hierarchy of the Treaty agreement and arguing for a republican commonwealth O’Sullivan has moved the discussion into the community. He is instigating dissenting groups of exclusively Maori ‘rangatiratanga’ in the community and “argues for reimagining local government as a system with councils (kawanatanga) and hapu and other Maori entities (rangatiratanga) playing complementary but distinctive roles.” (p. 17) That will increase the divide between part-Maoris and non-Maoris and further reduce social cohesion in New Zealand.
The Waitangi Tribunal will continue to take advantage of arguing for ‘partnership’ and co-governance, and I assume O’Sullivan knows that. Those Maori rivals to liberal democracy are therefore using conflicting interpretations of the Treaty to assail our democracy from outside and now from inside. Even so, their arguments do not stand up to scrutiny and the relevant facts, and they select and distort phrases from the Treaty to suit their purpose.
O’Sullivan’s republican commonwealth is still largely aspirational, but significant aspects of it have been realized already. Our local and national government and the media are participating to suppress public knowledge and involvement in the process of its implementation. On the present trajectory, O’Sullivan’s model, or something like it, is inevitable.
O’Sullivan’s book gives us some insight into the thinking around He Puapua.
Barrie Davis is a retired telecommunications engineer, holds a PhD in the psychology of Christian beliefs, and can often be found gnashing his teeth reading The Post outside Floyd’s cafe at Island Bay.
References
Dominic O’Sullivan, Te Tiriti, Equality and the Future of New Zealand Democracy, Auckland University Press, 2026.
https://aucklanduniversitypress.co.nz/content/2026-O%27Sullivan-Te%20Tiriti-sample.pdf
Auckland University Press
Te Tiriti, Equality and the Future of New Zealand Democracy
https://aucklanduniversitypress.co.nz/te-tiriti-equality-and-the-future-of-new-zealand-democracy/
Anne Salmond (2022), “Where Will the Bellbird Sing? Te Tiriti o Waitangi and ‘Race’,” Vol. 18 No. 4 (2022): Policy Quarterly, University of Auckland
https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/pq/article/view/8019/7127
DOI: https://doi.org/10.26686/pq.v18i4.8019
I.H. Kawharu (ed), Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi, 1989, Appendix: “Texts of the Treaty of Waitangi”; “Translation of Maori text by I. H. Kawharu” p. 319-321.
https://www.tepapa.govt.nz/discover-collections/read-watch-play/maori/treaty-waitangi/treaty-close/full-text-te-tiriti-o
5 comments:
Our local and national government and the media are not participating to suppress public knowledge. What a silly thing to say.
Barry, Please understand that the word Maori and the meaning of the word Maori were not known until the 1950's.
Maori , the word was not used in the Treaty of Waitangi . the TOW referred to "all people in New Zealand"
refer to the Dictionary of Maori Language H.W. Williams MA
Ooops that should read - Maori was not a known word until the 1850's - Apologies BW.
Bring it on, tomorrow would be good.
Actually, Basil that's not quite correct. The Treaty referred to them as "tangata maori" (the common or ordinary people) and the phrase I think you are referring to is Article the Second's reference to the Chiefs, hapu and ALL THE PEOPLE of New Zealand - being those to enjoy tino rangatiratanga, the protection of their property, which, incidentally, again is conveniently overlooked by O'Sullivan and others of his ilk.
That aside, Barry, you deserve a medal for wading through yet another academic's twisting of the Treaty. If O'Sullivan's take had any merit, why wasn't this discussed by the Chiefs at Kohimarama in 1860? It only proves what a load of convoluted cobblers O'Sullivan espouses.
The only good thing is, he is in Australia and hopefully he'll stay there and keep company with that other unwanted export or ours, the recent former PM.
Post a Comment
Thank you for joining the discussion. Breaking Views welcomes respectful contributions that enrich the debate. Please ensure your comments are not defamatory, derogatory or disruptive. We appreciate your cooperation.