We asked Scott Lucas, an expert in the Middle East conflict at University College Dublin, to explain the key issues that have led to the agreement and what it means for the future of the region.
What do we know about this ceasefire deal?
Despite hopes for several days that a ceasefire might finally be agreed, there are still twists, turns, and uncertainty. Even as Qatar was announcing that its prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed al-Thani – who is also the country’s foreign minister – would hold a press conference, the Associated Press announced that the talks had hit a last-minute snag with Israel blaming Hamas.
Just after 5pm GMT, Israeli as well as Hamas and Qatari officials said Israel and Hamas had accepted a three-stage deal. But an hour later, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said the agreement was still not confirmed.
Under the agreement, in the first, six-week stage around 1,650 Palestinians will be released from Israeli prisoners. Meanwhile 33 of around 95 hostages – some alive, some dead – will be freed by Hamas and other groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israeli forces will withdraw from population centres, Palestinians will be allowed to start returning to their homes in northern Gaza. And there will be a surge of humanitarian aid, with around 600 trucks entering each day.
In the second stage, Hamas has pledged to release the remaining living captives, most of them male soldiers, in exchange for release of more Palestinians and the “complete withdrawal” of Israeli forces from Gaza. In the third phase, the bodies of remaining hostages would be returned in exchange for a three to five-year reconstruction plan in Gaza under international supervision.
At 5.02pm GMT, Donald Trump posted on his Truth Social website confirming that a deal had been agreed:
We’ve been here before – what has changed?
The three-stage proposal was put forward last May and discussed through the summer. In September, one of Israel’s lead negotiators, Mossad head David Barnea, returned to Qatar amid hopes for a resolution. But Netanyahu then publicly imposed the condition that Israeli troops continue their occupation of two areas in Gaza, the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egypt border, and the Netzarim Corridor across the centre of the Strip.
It is unclear why Netanyahu appears to have now decided to accept a ceasefire. Some reports cite a meeting with Steve Witkoff, the envoy of incoming US president Donald Trump. But Trump effectively gave Netanyahu a blank cheque in October, saying: “Bibi, do what you have to do”.
The Israeli political environment is far more likely to be instrumental. Netanyahu has been under pressure for months from former members of his war cabinet, Benny Gantz and the now-dismissed defence minister, Yoav Gallant as well as from opposition parties and from sections of Israeli society, notably the families of hostages.
Netanyahu had long resisted that pressure, preferring the “open-ended” war with the quest to “absolutely destroy” Hamas. He may now calculate that his agreement to stop, with Hamas far from destroyed now does not look like a capitulation to Hamas, the Biden administration, or his domestic foes. He may present the agreement as a pragmatic step, given the change of power in the US with a new president who will sing his praises.
Still, he faces the risk that a ceasefire could mean early elections as his government fractures. That could mean a return of focus to his trial on bribery charges. And so, up to the last minute, he will hesitate, waver, and confuse.
Israeli and Arab officials may be flattering Trump’s ego with the portrayal of Witkoff’s intervention swaying the prime minister. There has been no indication of what pressure or incentive that the envoy brought Netanyahu.
One possibility is that the incoming Trump administration has signalled that it will accept an expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian West Bank. This would reinforce the position taken by Trump in his first term, and the hard-right Israeli ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich could drop any ceasefire objections in return for an assurance of Washington’s support.
Can Netanyahu make this deal stick at home?
If Netanyahu’s cabinet votes to accept the agreement, the Israeli prime minister should be able to ride out the immediate opposition from the right-wingers. Opposition leaders have already backed the deal, and much of the Israeli population is weary of the military campaign and just wants the violence to end.
Although Netanyahu cannot claim “absolute victory” over Hamas, which is his long-stated goal, he can point to the decimation of the organisation’s top ranks. Since the latest round of the conflict began in October 2023, Hamas has lost its military leader, Yahya Sinwar, its political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, and Mohammad Deif, the planner of Hamas’ mass killings inside Israel on October 7, 2023.
Most importantly, Netanyahu can present the return of all of the hostages. He’ll hope for a boost, but just from the celebrations of the families of those still alive, but also from the families of the dead, who will have a chance at closure.
How about the future of Hamas and Gaza?
Hamas will have to rebuild, probably with Yahya Sinwar’s brother Mohammed as the new leader. Its political and military commands will have to reestablish themselves. But the group has survived inside Gaza. Not only has it not been expelled, but at this point there is no apparent alternative to its governance. So it will have to be involved at some level not only in the maintenance of the ceasefire but in the reconstruction operations.
As for Gaza’s civilians, they have long been the expendable pawns in this conflict. They are the large majority of the more than 46,000 killed – which is a conservative figure. At least 1.9 million, out of a population of around around 2.2 million, are now displaced and in dire humanitarian conditions.
While the ceasefire would halt Israeli attacks and allow some people to return to their homes, the situation is likely to be precarious. The Netanyahu government could always threaten a resumption of airstrikes, if not ground assaults, or obstruction of humanitarian aid.
Hamas, which was not enthusiastically supported before October 7 by many civilians because of economic and social issues, appears to have sacrificed most of Gaza’s civilians for its headline moment on October 7, 2023. It is not clear what long-term future they can offer those who have survived.
Donald Trump’s about to take power – did that change things?
Whether or not Trump’s envoy Witkoff had a direct role in the move towards a ceasefire, the advent of Trump 2.0 could have mobilised all those involved in the talks to make a final push for a settlement.
Given the unpredictable and often incoherent approach of Trump, and his propensity to sideline and dismiss senior advisors, there is no assurance over future direction of US policy after January 20. Netanyahu might have benefited from Trump’s blank cheque, but all others – Hamas and other groups in Gaza as well as the Arab States – would likely be operating in a sphere of uncertainty.
Meanwhile, as headlines swirled about the politics and the personalities, the 15-month reality continued. In the 48 hours leading up to the agreement being signed, at least 123 people have been killed and several hundred others injured by Israeli attacks across Gaza.
Does the killing finally end? And for how long?
Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article
Despite hopes for several days that a ceasefire might finally be agreed, there are still twists, turns, and uncertainty. Even as Qatar was announcing that its prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed al-Thani – who is also the country’s foreign minister – would hold a press conference, the Associated Press announced that the talks had hit a last-minute snag with Israel blaming Hamas.
Just after 5pm GMT, Israeli as well as Hamas and Qatari officials said Israel and Hamas had accepted a three-stage deal. But an hour later, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said the agreement was still not confirmed.
Under the agreement, in the first, six-week stage around 1,650 Palestinians will be released from Israeli prisoners. Meanwhile 33 of around 95 hostages – some alive, some dead – will be freed by Hamas and other groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israeli forces will withdraw from population centres, Palestinians will be allowed to start returning to their homes in northern Gaza. And there will be a surge of humanitarian aid, with around 600 trucks entering each day.
In the second stage, Hamas has pledged to release the remaining living captives, most of them male soldiers, in exchange for release of more Palestinians and the “complete withdrawal” of Israeli forces from Gaza. In the third phase, the bodies of remaining hostages would be returned in exchange for a three to five-year reconstruction plan in Gaza under international supervision.
At 5.02pm GMT, Donald Trump posted on his Truth Social website confirming that a deal had been agreed:
Click to view - The Guardian
But if Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu — the long-time obstacle to a final agreement — dropped his objections, he could face unrest within his cabinet from hard-right members. National security minister Itamar Ben Gvir has called on finance minister Bezalel Smotrich to join him again in thwarting an agreement.
So the important caveat to any celebration is that the deal still has to be approved by Israel’s ministers.
But if Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu — the long-time obstacle to a final agreement — dropped his objections, he could face unrest within his cabinet from hard-right members. National security minister Itamar Ben Gvir has called on finance minister Bezalel Smotrich to join him again in thwarting an agreement.
So the important caveat to any celebration is that the deal still has to be approved by Israel’s ministers.
We’ve been here before – what has changed?
The three-stage proposal was put forward last May and discussed through the summer. In September, one of Israel’s lead negotiators, Mossad head David Barnea, returned to Qatar amid hopes for a resolution. But Netanyahu then publicly imposed the condition that Israeli troops continue their occupation of two areas in Gaza, the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egypt border, and the Netzarim Corridor across the centre of the Strip.
It is unclear why Netanyahu appears to have now decided to accept a ceasefire. Some reports cite a meeting with Steve Witkoff, the envoy of incoming US president Donald Trump. But Trump effectively gave Netanyahu a blank cheque in October, saying: “Bibi, do what you have to do”.
The Israeli political environment is far more likely to be instrumental. Netanyahu has been under pressure for months from former members of his war cabinet, Benny Gantz and the now-dismissed defence minister, Yoav Gallant as well as from opposition parties and from sections of Israeli society, notably the families of hostages.
Netanyahu had long resisted that pressure, preferring the “open-ended” war with the quest to “absolutely destroy” Hamas. He may now calculate that his agreement to stop, with Hamas far from destroyed now does not look like a capitulation to Hamas, the Biden administration, or his domestic foes. He may present the agreement as a pragmatic step, given the change of power in the US with a new president who will sing his praises.
Still, he faces the risk that a ceasefire could mean early elections as his government fractures. That could mean a return of focus to his trial on bribery charges. And so, up to the last minute, he will hesitate, waver, and confuse.
Israeli and Arab officials may be flattering Trump’s ego with the portrayal of Witkoff’s intervention swaying the prime minister. There has been no indication of what pressure or incentive that the envoy brought Netanyahu.
One possibility is that the incoming Trump administration has signalled that it will accept an expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian West Bank. This would reinforce the position taken by Trump in his first term, and the hard-right Israeli ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich could drop any ceasefire objections in return for an assurance of Washington’s support.
Can Netanyahu make this deal stick at home?
If Netanyahu’s cabinet votes to accept the agreement, the Israeli prime minister should be able to ride out the immediate opposition from the right-wingers. Opposition leaders have already backed the deal, and much of the Israeli population is weary of the military campaign and just wants the violence to end.
Although Netanyahu cannot claim “absolute victory” over Hamas, which is his long-stated goal, he can point to the decimation of the organisation’s top ranks. Since the latest round of the conflict began in October 2023, Hamas has lost its military leader, Yahya Sinwar, its political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, and Mohammad Deif, the planner of Hamas’ mass killings inside Israel on October 7, 2023.
Most importantly, Netanyahu can present the return of all of the hostages. He’ll hope for a boost, but just from the celebrations of the families of those still alive, but also from the families of the dead, who will have a chance at closure.
How about the future of Hamas and Gaza?
Hamas will have to rebuild, probably with Yahya Sinwar’s brother Mohammed as the new leader. Its political and military commands will have to reestablish themselves. But the group has survived inside Gaza. Not only has it not been expelled, but at this point there is no apparent alternative to its governance. So it will have to be involved at some level not only in the maintenance of the ceasefire but in the reconstruction operations.
As for Gaza’s civilians, they have long been the expendable pawns in this conflict. They are the large majority of the more than 46,000 killed – which is a conservative figure. At least 1.9 million, out of a population of around around 2.2 million, are now displaced and in dire humanitarian conditions.
While the ceasefire would halt Israeli attacks and allow some people to return to their homes, the situation is likely to be precarious. The Netanyahu government could always threaten a resumption of airstrikes, if not ground assaults, or obstruction of humanitarian aid.
Hamas, which was not enthusiastically supported before October 7 by many civilians because of economic and social issues, appears to have sacrificed most of Gaza’s civilians for its headline moment on October 7, 2023. It is not clear what long-term future they can offer those who have survived.
Donald Trump’s about to take power – did that change things?
Whether or not Trump’s envoy Witkoff had a direct role in the move towards a ceasefire, the advent of Trump 2.0 could have mobilised all those involved in the talks to make a final push for a settlement.
Given the unpredictable and often incoherent approach of Trump, and his propensity to sideline and dismiss senior advisors, there is no assurance over future direction of US policy after January 20. Netanyahu might have benefited from Trump’s blank cheque, but all others – Hamas and other groups in Gaza as well as the Arab States – would likely be operating in a sphere of uncertainty.
Meanwhile, as headlines swirled about the politics and the personalities, the 15-month reality continued. In the 48 hours leading up to the agreement being signed, at least 123 people have been killed and several hundred others injured by Israeli attacks across Gaza.
Does the killing finally end? And for how long?
Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article
9 comments:
Israel should pull out, then close the border completely. Leave Gaza and the Palestinian people to it. The rest of the world that loves them so much can feed and water them.
Israel did precisely that as part of the settlement of the Six Day War. The Gazans squandered their opportunity to build a peaceful society and enabled the victory of HAMAS in local elections which lead directly to the events of October 7 and Gaza's present demise. Next clever idea please.
Meanwhile, among Netanyahu's most provocative words on Saturday was his claim that he has the support of President-elect Trump in the scenario Israel feels it must abandon the ceasefire and keep fighting. He says he has Trump's full backing to resume the war, and has claimed further that Trump too agreed that the truce is just "temporary".
Netanyahu says Trump "emphasized" to him that the ceasefire is "temporary," and Israel will have "full backing" to resume the war in Gaza. He says Trump has decided to "lift all the remaining restrictions" on US munitions, allowing Israel to resume the war with "tremendous force".
Does the killing finally end? (No) And for how long? (Weeks not months before the genocide resumes)
Why do none of the Muslim majority countries want to take the Palestinians?
Israel's top priority should be that an attack like on 7 October can never happen again.
Chuck Bird's question is one that has often been asked over many years.
In a sense, taking the Palestinians in means tacitly acknowledging the legitimacy of their displacement. The Arab countries (and others) have argued from Day 1 that the creation of the Jewish state was illegitimate. Indeed it is difficult to make a case for it in international law.
I think it is safe to say that most Arab governments now acknowledge the State of Israel as a fait accompli and one that will not go away. What they do not accept is the Zionist claim to lands outside the 1948 borders based on the areas controlled by the Kingdoms of Israel and Judea at their peak. And you'll be hard-pressed to find anyone knowledgeable in international law who would defend that position.
The 1948 borders were established by the United Nations which seems to me to be pretty good legal authority. When the Muslim world tried to overturn those borders by invading territory legally allocated to Israel, Israel was perfectly entitled to redraw the map to their advantage as a spoil of war. And it was the Muslim world that vigorously encouraged the so-called Palestinians to leave because they knew that would create an everlasting political crisis that played right into their hands. One that has been successful beyond their wildest dreams. Pity those who didn't flee turned out the winners with full citizen rights in a prosperous, first world nation unimaginable to those now trapped on the wrong side of the border.
But it was no ordinary UN resolution, Jones Boy. The establishment of a Jewish state largely came about as a result of active US policy. See https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel.
As for "Israel was perfectly entitled to redraw the map to their advantage as a spoil of war", that was definitely not associated with any UN resolution and is indefensible in international law!
Oh come on Barend. You can't cherry-pick the UN Resolutions you approve of and disregard the rest. Of course those post-war territorial gains by Israel were "associated" with the UN Resolution to partition Mandatory Palestine. Any territory gained by Israel outside that allocated by the Resolution was a direct consequence of the assault on Israel by Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq in their failed attenpt to defy the Resolution.The post-war boundaries (known as the Green Line) were the result of armistice agreements negotiated with each aggressor, and whose legality under international law is undoubted. The various armistace agreements were then supervised by UN peacekeeping forces pursuant to another resolution of the UN. Seems all very legal to me. But of course none of that would have been necessary if the original Resolution had been honoured in the first place.
We are mostly in agreement, Jones Boy, but will have to agree to disagree about the legitimacy of at least some of the territory seized and occupied by Israel. You mention the Green Line, but as Wikipedia points out, "The Green Line was intended as a demarcation line rather than a permanent border. The 1949 Armistice Agreements were clear (at Arab insistence) that they were not creating permanent borders." There is more than just a hint of fuzziness about exactly where Israel's borders lie. In the case of the Golan Heights, fuzzy becomes blurry as even the Lebanon/Syria border is not well defined, relying a sit does on 19th century French maps.
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