Last week’s emails settled it. They show that in the days after the United States and Israel attacked Iran, the Prime Minister wanted New Zealand standing publicly with Washington. He was talked out of it, on the documentary record, by his Foreign Minister, by senior MFAT officials, and by his own department.
The public record now contains all of this, and it ought to change how the Government is read on foreign policy for the rest of the year.
The Pagani indictment
Of the columns published this week, Josie Pagani’s in the Post on Saturday is the one that has cut deepest. Pagani is not really a National-baiter. She has, on her own account, wanted Luxon to succeed. The opening line of her piece summarises the column, and everything that follows is evidence: “Christopher Luxon is not capable of leading New Zealand in dangerous times.”
Her column has two arguments. The first is that Luxon either started off wanting to provide more “explicit public support” for Trump’s war and lost his nerve, or actually meant it. “Both options find Luxon woefully inadequate for this fractured moment.” There is no charitable reading. Lack of clarity, she writes, comes from a lack of conviction, and his support for the war was “skin deep”.
The second argument is the more substantive, and the one National’s caucus should be reading carefully. Luxon, Pagani argues, “actively wanted the wrong choice against advice.” Not a misjudgement under uncertainty. An instinct, exercised against the unanimous view of the people paid to give him advice. Pagani itemises the case: “No imminent attack coming from Iran, so no recall to ‘self-defence’ under international law. No attempt to build a coalition with other countries. Negotiations were ongoing when Trump decided to wage this war of choice.”
Pagani’s verdict on the war itself is unsparing. She calls it “geopolitically infantile, growth-destroying, security-smashing”, a war of choice started by “the malignant narcissist in the White House, who continues to actively undermine the world order we in New Zealand depend on.”
Her closing line is the one National should worry about most: this incident shows that “they should know by now they can’t win with Luxon at the top.”
The American patrimony problem
The Post’s senior political reporter Anneke Smith got to the same place differently. Smith locates the source of the problem in Luxon’s biography: “Luxon spent much of his adult life in the United States and seems to identify, at least instinctively, with US patrimony more than New Zealand’s.”
It is not a sentence that could have been written about any of his predecessors as National Party leader since at least Don Brash. Even Brash, who wanted us back inside ANZUS, didn’t give the impression of a man whose first instinct, in a crisis, was to check what Washington thought. Luxon, on the evidence of the past two months, does.
Smith’s verdict on the emails was, if anything, blunter than Pagani’s: “This situation could reflect two things; either a complete relationship breakdown between Luxon and Peters or a staggering lack of political judgment on Luxon’s part. It could be both.”
Read alongside Pagani, this is the heart of the foreign policy problem. Luxon’s instinct, on this evidence, was American first. It wasn’t the instinct of a New Zealand prime minister facing a clearly illegal use of force, considering New Zealand’s own legal commitments and tradition of independent judgement. It was the reflex of a man checking what Albanese and Carney had said and assuming we should be there too.
The “challenging advice” defence falls over
The Prime Minister’s office has tried, repeatedly, to spin the Luxon-Peters emails as routine. The PM was just doing his job, challenging the advice he received. Matthew Hooton, in his paywalled Patreon column, took that defence apart with characteristic vigour.
Hooton explains that by the time the emails were written, the careful joint position drafted by DPMC chief executive Ben King had already been agreed by Luxon and Peters and issued to the world. The drafting choices, including the now-famous “acknowledge” rather than “support”, had been made and signed off. To then start changing the position after his shocking Monday performance, says Hooton, served no diplomatic purpose. He says that “any offence the Americans would have taken from the first statement had already occurred”. Pivoting to “support” later in the week would just have made New Zealand look “flakey” as well as have damaged National’s standing with its own voters at the same time.
Hooton’s conclusion: “Forget the bullshit about him just doing his job. He had done his job, for better or worse, on the Sunday. After that, he was just being the complete clown that he is.”
You can take Hooton’s tone or leave it. The substantive point is hard to dispute. The “I was just challenging advice” line only works if you ignore when the challenges were happening and what diplomatic damage they would have done.
Dr Bryce Edwards is a politics lecturer at Victoria University and director of Critical Politics, a project focused on researching New Zealand politics and society. This article was first published HERE
The Pagani indictment
Of the columns published this week, Josie Pagani’s in the Post on Saturday is the one that has cut deepest. Pagani is not really a National-baiter. She has, on her own account, wanted Luxon to succeed. The opening line of her piece summarises the column, and everything that follows is evidence: “Christopher Luxon is not capable of leading New Zealand in dangerous times.”
Her column has two arguments. The first is that Luxon either started off wanting to provide more “explicit public support” for Trump’s war and lost his nerve, or actually meant it. “Both options find Luxon woefully inadequate for this fractured moment.” There is no charitable reading. Lack of clarity, she writes, comes from a lack of conviction, and his support for the war was “skin deep”.
The second argument is the more substantive, and the one National’s caucus should be reading carefully. Luxon, Pagani argues, “actively wanted the wrong choice against advice.” Not a misjudgement under uncertainty. An instinct, exercised against the unanimous view of the people paid to give him advice. Pagani itemises the case: “No imminent attack coming from Iran, so no recall to ‘self-defence’ under international law. No attempt to build a coalition with other countries. Negotiations were ongoing when Trump decided to wage this war of choice.”
Pagani’s verdict on the war itself is unsparing. She calls it “geopolitically infantile, growth-destroying, security-smashing”, a war of choice started by “the malignant narcissist in the White House, who continues to actively undermine the world order we in New Zealand depend on.”
Her closing line is the one National should worry about most: this incident shows that “they should know by now they can’t win with Luxon at the top.”
The American patrimony problem
The Post’s senior political reporter Anneke Smith got to the same place differently. Smith locates the source of the problem in Luxon’s biography: “Luxon spent much of his adult life in the United States and seems to identify, at least instinctively, with US patrimony more than New Zealand’s.”
It is not a sentence that could have been written about any of his predecessors as National Party leader since at least Don Brash. Even Brash, who wanted us back inside ANZUS, didn’t give the impression of a man whose first instinct, in a crisis, was to check what Washington thought. Luxon, on the evidence of the past two months, does.
Smith’s verdict on the emails was, if anything, blunter than Pagani’s: “This situation could reflect two things; either a complete relationship breakdown between Luxon and Peters or a staggering lack of political judgment on Luxon’s part. It could be both.”
Read alongside Pagani, this is the heart of the foreign policy problem. Luxon’s instinct, on this evidence, was American first. It wasn’t the instinct of a New Zealand prime minister facing a clearly illegal use of force, considering New Zealand’s own legal commitments and tradition of independent judgement. It was the reflex of a man checking what Albanese and Carney had said and assuming we should be there too.
The “challenging advice” defence falls over
The Prime Minister’s office has tried, repeatedly, to spin the Luxon-Peters emails as routine. The PM was just doing his job, challenging the advice he received. Matthew Hooton, in his paywalled Patreon column, took that defence apart with characteristic vigour.
Hooton explains that by the time the emails were written, the careful joint position drafted by DPMC chief executive Ben King had already been agreed by Luxon and Peters and issued to the world. The drafting choices, including the now-famous “acknowledge” rather than “support”, had been made and signed off. To then start changing the position after his shocking Monday performance, says Hooton, served no diplomatic purpose. He says that “any offence the Americans would have taken from the first statement had already occurred”. Pivoting to “support” later in the week would just have made New Zealand look “flakey” as well as have damaged National’s standing with its own voters at the same time.
Hooton’s conclusion: “Forget the bullshit about him just doing his job. He had done his job, for better or worse, on the Sunday. After that, he was just being the complete clown that he is.”
You can take Hooton’s tone or leave it. The substantive point is hard to dispute. The “I was just challenging advice” line only works if you ignore when the challenges were happening and what diplomatic damage they would have done.
Dr Bryce Edwards is a politics lecturer at Victoria University and director of Critical Politics, a project focused on researching New Zealand politics and society. This article was first published HERE
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