Ron Smith: Iran, Israel and Nuclear Weapons

A couple of critics of my recent posting (29 September) on the Iranian nuclear weapon programme commented that I had failed to notice the already existing substantial arsenal possessed by Israel.  There are a number of observations that might be made about this criticism and the most obvious of these is that they represent the classic ‘change the subject’ move.  The fact that Israel has a substantial nuclear arsenal, and has had such weapons for nearly fifty years, is quite beside the point.

Iran is not saying that it ought to be allowed to develop nuclear weapons because another party in the region has such weapons.  It is saying that it has no nuclear weapon programme and that its present nuclear activities are entirely peaceful. 

That is the point that I was addressing and it is significant that neither of the critics commented on this beyond (in one case) suggesting that I hadn’t ‘proved’ my point.  Readers may judge this latter assertion for themselves.  It is clear from the insistence of the international community (as represented through the UN Security Council by the P5+1 group) that there is a case to answer, and the UN group are presently in Geneva putting it to Iranian representatives.

It is also noteworthy that Iran is a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, through which it unequivocally committed itself (under Article II of the treaty), ‘not to manufacture, or otherwise acquire’ nuclear weapons.  It thus cannot claim a ‘right’ to engage in such activities, whether or not there are other parties that have such weapons.  By contrast, Israel, like India and Pakistan, did not sign the Treaty and is thus not in breach of it by the development of a nuclear arsenal. 

On the other hand, Iran can claim a right to engage in certain of what are called ‘dual-use’ technologies.  These include the sorts of process (such as uranium enrichment) that was the focus of my previous posting.  However, the point to be noted here is that a state may only claim such a right (and engage in such activity) if it accepts certain protocols to the 1968 treaty, which provide for thorough reporting and periodic inspection of its nuclear establishment.  This includes acceptance of the principle of ‘no-warning’ inspections. 

As noted in the previous blog and other blogs as far back as 2009 (6 & 19 September), Iran is manifestly in breach of these obligations.  In major part, this is the reason why Iran has been the subject of persistent sanctions over recent years.

Of course, Iran could ‘tidy-up’ many of these matters by repudiating its membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It would thus relieve itself of its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Authority and its inspectorate.  This is just what North Korea did a few years ago.  Iran could then proceed with its nuclear weapons programme, without these annoyances, although it might be expected that this would only intensify the sanctions regime. 

So what should be our view of this?  Should we see an Iranian programme as no worse than the Israeli nuclear programme, as my critics seem to imply?  Well, perhaps not!  The problem is not only that Iran might actually use any nuclear weapon capacity it had but also that it might provide weapon’s grade material, or a weapon, to third parties. 

In regard to the first of these possibilities, one of my critics is dismissive, ‘Does anyone really think that Iran would use one of these devices when they know that next day the world would respond and their country would be toast.’  I am not at all sure about the ‘world’ here but given that the actual target was nuclear-capable, the argument is plausible.  It is, in fact, the usual understanding of deterrence, and, of course, it works both ways.  If, as I presume, we are talking about Israel, it seems very likely that they would strike back and they have the capability to do so, but there may be some question as to whether Iran is deterrable in the usual way.  It would depend upon how important they considered the destruction of Israel to be and what they might be prepared to sacrifice to achieve it.  The two states differ in their ‘strategic depth’ (effectively, the size of the country), so the calculation is patently different for the two sides.

There is another aspect to all this and that is the possibility that, once it has it, Iran might give weapons-grade nuclear material, or a made-up device, to a third-party: a terrorist group.  This is what former president, Ahmadinejad, is quoted as having said, six years ago:

‘Iran will place its nuclear technology at the service of those determined to confront the US and other Western countries’.

(I first discussed this in a series of blogs in September of 2011)

As many commentators have pointed out, terrorists are not at all deterrable in the conventional way.  They have no reciprocal target that might be attacked by way of retaliation.  The only way to re-introduce the deterrent principle is to say that, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack, the retaliation would be against the party that supplied the weapons-grade material (nuclear forensics would make this a plausible project).  Of course, if we are thinking of Iran here, the earlier doubt about Iran’s deterrability re-emerges.

This leads me back to the conclusion of my previous posting: either Iran gives up its nuclear weapons programme, or there is a serious risk of a preventative strike by Israel on the infrastructure of that programme, with all that that would entail.