With Syria dominating the news from the Middle East, there has been relatively little news in the main-stream media about what might be happening in other places of earlier great interest, such as Tunisia, Libya, and, particularly, Egypt. Of course, there have been some incidents that have commanded attention, such as the occasional arrests of the remaining Muslim Brotherhood leadership, following the violent suppression of the anti-coup protests, and the recent events in the northern Sinai in which Brotherhood activists, supported by Hamas from Gaza, captured a busload of Egyptian police officers and executed them one by one. This was swiftly followed by an Egyptian military operation which resulted in the death of most of those responsible. Other than these events (and the very recent assassination attempt on the Egyptian Interior Minister) Egypt has been relatively quiet since the protests following the overthrow of President Morsi, nearly two months ago.
The crucial question now is, will this relative quiet
persist, or will the two violent incidents noted above be a harbinger of
substantial insecurity to come? Time
will tell. But what is now beyond doubt
is that the de facto ruler of Egypt is now Army Chief of Staff, General Said El
Sisi. As noted in my earlier posting,
this is manifestly a challenge to our central notions about democracy,
especially those concerning the primacy of free elections (‘Experiments in
Democracy’, 5 July). It also raises the
possibility that Egypt’s future is nothing more than a return to the past, i.e.
indefinite military dictatorship. On the
other hand, it may be that El Sisi is to be taken at his word: that he does
intend to stabilise the situation with a view to re-establishing democratic
institutions, through an appropriate process.
The Egyptian ‘street’ seems to support him in this, or, at least, they
have conspicuously failed to support Brotherhood protest activity. They also clearly desire quiet and the
restoration of some sort of economic normality.
So what does El Sisi intend? What
might be his vision for a future Egypt?
Interestingly, we have some clues about this. Seven years ago,
then Brigadier-General El Sisi, was a student at the US Army War College, at
Carlisle, Pennsylvania. In the course of
his studies, he wrote an academic essay on the problems of bringing democracy
to the Middle East. This is now in the
public domain. In 5,000 words, under the
title “Democracy in the Middle East”, the General identifies many of the
commonly-perceived challenges to the advancement of this project, such as lack
of education, and traditional religious and governmental practices, including
the impulse to dominate and control the economy (El Sisi favours free
markets). Because of these difficulties,
he concludes that bringing democracy to a country in the Middle East (he
doesn’t specifically refer to his own) ‘will take time’ and that the security
forces of the nation will have a crucial role to play in the process. The following is from page 2 of his paper:
“(I)n essence the security forces of a nation need to develop a culture that demonstrates commitment to a nation rather than a ruling party. Furthermore regime populations need to be prepared to assume a participatory role in a democratic form of government. This will require time to educate the population as well as develop the democratic processes that will enable democracy to gain traction.”
And later (page 3):
“It will take time for people and the nation’s systems to adjust to the new form of government and free market system that will emerge.”
All this is reminiscent of the reform programme carried
through in Turkey in the 1920s and 30s by Mustapha Kamal, after the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire, following their defeat in WW1. Many rude political words were spoken about
this highly autocratic regime at the time but it was subsequently recognised as
having created the basis of the modern Turkish state, through its
enfranchisement of women and its assault on religious and aristocratic
privilege.
The General is certainly well aware of the ‘religious’
problem in bringing ‘democracy’ to the states of the Middle East. Democracy, as a ‘secular entity’, he says,
‘is unlikely to be favourably received by the vast majority of Middle
Easterners, who are devout followers of the Islamic faith’. He has clearly given the matter some
thought. Taking the US Constitution as a
model, he envisages three branches of government (Legislative, Executive and
Judicial), with the major tenets of the Islamic faith, ‘represented in the
constitution or similar document’. How
this latter might be done and, particularly, what it might specify, he does not
say. Given the problems that western
nations historically have had in separating church and state, we might
recognise the difficulties here. But,
certainly, he does not seem to favour the theocratic state.
If the programme laid out in ‘Democracy in the Middle East’
is what General Sisi has in mind for Egypt, we might wish him well with
it. And we might even give him ‘time’ to
enable ‘democracy to gain traction’.
Whether his fellow citizens do so, remains to be seen. Particularly, we shall see whether the
extremist minority will be able to successfully undermine reform by creating
perpetual disorder.
1 comment:
So what you're trying to say in too many words is that Islam and democracy is "incompatible" ..... HELLO .... show me one islamic democracy. Dictatorships are the only thing they understand (or respect) .... the guy who swings the biggest stick. What more can you expect from tribal Arabs. Egypt(under military rule)has, for the past 50 years, enjoyed freedoms only dreamed of in 95% of the islamic world (women able to attend school, wear clothes other than a burqa, drive a car and men allowed to shave and wear trousers) and thats why they support the military .... to keep the islamic fundamentalists OUT. We in the west should applaude their front line efforts. The Egyption islamic moderates are just ordinary people like all NZ'ers who value their freedom and a secular state. Morsi and the muslim brotherhood are the tip of a frighteningly big wedge which will render Egypt another islamic basket case.
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