Peter Winsley: How to defend New Zealand without killing anyone (if possible)

War is older than all human cultures. It pervades human history in all regions and epochs. When the first oral histories were composed war was among the most pervasive themes. Yet war is horrible. It is also extremely expensive both for the “winners” and “losers”. Sometimes it seems a fine hair trigger is tripped or mass psychosis arises from some flimsy pretext and otherwise rational people are sucked into it.

New Zealand is now under pressure to join new alliances and spend more on defence without being told who the enemy might be.

New Zealand became an independent country from 4 February 1985 when David Lange banned nuclear-capable warships from New Zealand, against strong opposition from America, Britain and Australia. The 1986 NZ Constitution Act conferred supreme power on our elected Parliament. The Crown’s role was limited to the symbolic and procedural. New Zealand had been decolonised!

In 2003, Helen Clark resisted pressures to join a US-led invasion of Iraq. In contrast, Australia participated and was rewarded with trade advantages in the US market. We declined to value blood cheaper than gold. We undertook peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, albeit with mixed results. Afghanistan is now under Taliban rule, and our SAS’s reputation is tarnished.

New Zealand has no territorial disputes with any other nation. We are the most isolated and difficult to invade of all developed countries.

New Zealand does face international challenges. However, they are less daunting than those we faced from Japan in 1941-45, and from communist aggression on the Korean peninsula, in Malaysia and in Vietnam from the 1950s through to the Vietnam war ending in 1975.

North Korea’s leadership has been unhinged for decades without causing us any trouble. The major Asian powers such as China, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia are more stable and prosperous than ever.

Why then is New Zealand contemplating increasing its defence expenditure and aligning more closely with US-led alliances aimed at “containing” China? These alliances include AUKUS and “the Quad”, and they may be complemented with informal links with NATO.

AUKUS is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US, announced in September 2021. Under this pact, the US and the UK

will help transition Australia from its current diesel-electric submarines to Virginia class submarines and finally to SSN-AUKUS – Australian-built nuclear-powered submarines. The Australian Navy would operate eight nuclear-powered submarines by the 2050s. The programme’s total forecast costs range between A$268B to A$368B. This is a huge financial risk because it assumes away advances in anti-submarine technologies that may make nuclear-powered submarines easier to detect and deal with. It also carries the opportunity costs of alternative technologies that Australia may have invested in more productively.

The AUKUS pact also includes cooperation on advanced military capabilities including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonics, and electronic warfare capabilities. New Zealand will not participate in nuclear-related AUKUS activities. However, it should engage with advanced defence technologies under AUKUS Pillar Two. This would help us stay in touch with leading edge technology, including to underpin possible entrepreneurial opportunities in civilian markets.

The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is made up of India, Australia, Japan and the United States. It began as a loose partnership to provide humanitarian assistance after the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami. It was formalised in 2007 by the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, however it lay dormant amid concerns it could harm relations with China. It was reactivated in 2017, with both the Trump and Biden administrations placing more focus on the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s increasing assertiveness.

What are New Zealand’s given assumptions?

There are some broadly accepted given assumptions in New Zealand’s defence and security policy. New Zealand and Australia are closely linked through history, economic and family ties. So many New Zealanders live in Australia that an attack on Australia is an attack on New Zealand(ers).

Given Australia’s importance to us we must offer a credible combat capability to help defend it on its own territory. However, we have no obligations to engage in combat operations in, for example, the Middle East or the South China Sea. The current Plan is to grow the New Zealand Defence Force by around 1500 service personnel.

The Australian and New Zealand armies are working together under the “Plan ANZAC” framework. One outcome sought is that our army will be “capable of contributing a Motorised Infantry Battle Group in an Australian-led Brigade within an integrated ABCANZ (American, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand) Division”. The new personnel needed for this Battle Group have been budgeted for, with the Army’s size growing to 6000 personnel by 2035.

There is emphasis on adopting Australian Army training doctrine. New Zealand is also likely to adopt Australian combat equipment where it is effective and affordable, such as the Bushmaster armoured vehicle purchase.

Other givens include New Zealand’s membership in the “Five Eyes” intelligence gathering arrangements with America, Australia, Britain and Canada. The $2.4B cost for the P-8A Poseidon aircraft is part of the price we pay for Five Eyes membership. It is a good investment given the critical role intelligence plays.

Another given for New Zealand is our legal ban on nuclear weapons, and on nuclear-powered ships (including submarines) entering New Zealand waters. This will come under attack and it needs to be defended with moral clarity and strategic acuity. Specifically, our stance differentiates us from the nuclear powers in AUKUS and may give us an intermediator role with powers such as China.

Way forward for New Zealand

If we agree on the above “givens” for New Zealand, the way forward includes:

• Taking a wider (non-violent) view of different lines of defence
• Leveraging innovation in defence technology
• Using defence procurement to develop New Zealand industry

Different lines of defence

Combat operations must be a last resort and not the first line of defence. Trade, student exchanges, international education, tourism, diplomacy, multi-national institutions, and international rules of law are the first defensive lines. Global issues such as climate change and pandemics require international responses and countries such as China, the United States and India must engage cooperatively.

Trade is a positive not a zero-sum game. However, America and China are competing over intellectual property, key technologies and the interpretation of international laws and rules. From time-to-time New Zealand may offer a still, small voice of calm and respect for others that may tone down big power posturing.

Trade also makes countries dependent on each other in a healthy way. The world semiconductor industry is dominated by Taiwan, and Taiwan’s industry is dependent on one company in Eindhoven in the Netherlands that supplies devices used in the industry. Chinese action against Taiwan could do China a lot of economic damage through the disruption to its many industries that depend on semi-conductors.

Some international laws and institutions such as the WTO have strong deliberative and enforcement rules. Politicians and other powerful people can also be called to account through other international mechanisms. In 2012, the United States Congress passed the Magnitsky Act, which imposed sanctions on foreign individuals who have committed human rights abuses or been involved in significant corruption.


The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued warrants for the arrest of Vladimir Putin and one of his officials in relation to the forced deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia. One might ask whether the ICC should have considered charging George W Bush and Tony Blair for their roles in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The second line of defence can be cultural, ranging from popular culture and its memes right through to the Abrahamic religions, and more liberal strands and spinoffs such as Quakerism and Baha’i. We must keep cultural exchanges unimpeded by politics. For example, Russian language is a world treasure and must not be weaponised or cancelled.

The New Zealand cartoonist David Low ridiculed Hitler in his cartoons and Charlie Chaplin also did so in his films. These did not stop Hitler. However, the American Government in 1941 sent Walt Disney on a goodwill tour of Latin American countries to successfully help counter Nazi influences.

The third line of defence includes social media, NGO and individual activism, investigative journalism such as Nicky Hager’s sterling work, and media-facing academic research, for example Anne-Marie Brady’s work on China’s use of “soft power”.

The Putin regime has actively used social media to back favoured politicians such as Trump, to promote separatist far right movements and generally to undermine democracy. It can bring a state’s resources to bear and is difficult and dangerous to counter – key journalists and opposition politicians in Russia can end up dead.

The Netherlands-based Bellingcat journalism group specialises in investigating atrocities and human rights abuses using open-source intelligence, fact-checking and other techniques. One key achievement was demonstrating that Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down on 17 July 2014 by a Russian Buk surface to air missile launcher that had been moved to occupied Ukraine to launch a missile and then returned to Russia. A Dutch court convicted two Russians and a Ukrainian separatist for the murders.

A fourth line of non-lethal defence sits in a grey area between “cold” and “hot” war. It potentially includes cyber “warfare”, and bloodless interventions in communications, infrastructure, and key “pinch points” in a target country’s supply chain or production or innovation systems. For example, in 2010 the Stuxnet computer malware did a lot of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and slowed its nuclear programme.

Leveraging innovation in defence technology

Over the last forty or so years low-cost weapons have been able to inflict disproportionate losses on high-cost combat systems. Precision targeting is cost effective as well as lethal. Shoulder-launched Stinger missiles proved devastating against the Soviet air force in Afghanistan. The Falkland’s war showed how vulnerable large, high-cost warships were to subsonic, low cost anti-ship missiles.

The Ukraine war has unleashed innovation that integrates understanding of problems to solve, design of solutions, and manufacture and delivery of them. Most of the innovations use information technology, often to repurpose existing equipment.

Drone technology enables fast-moving innovation such as combat drones being developed from non-military models. Software used in readily available tablets and smartphones can be converted into sophisticated targeting tools. Simple 3D printers can make spare parts to repair heavy equipment in the field. Technicians can convert pickup trucks into missile launchers.

Ukraine has developed a whole new weapon system: surface and submarine maritime drones. These range from weaponised jet skis to quite large drone submarines. The combined effect of these drones and of air launched cruise missiles has been to render much of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea irrelevant.

Ukrainian sources suggest that <10% of tanks destroyed are hit by opposing tanks – 90% are destroyed by drones, mines, anti-tank missiles or artillery. A single American-made F-35 can cost $100M, and so much depends on how effective its stealth and other survival properties will be over the longer term.

Emerging technologies such as rail guns and high energy lasers may change defence and its economics fundamentally. This reinforces the case to engage with AUKUS Pillar Two to stay abreast of technological change.

Using defence procurement to develop New Zealand industry

New Zealand could use its defence and security investment to grow more knowledge intensive businesses and lift New Zealand’s productivity. For New Zealand businesses to succeed in defence or dual-purpose technologies requires several conditions to be met. There must be a clear understanding of the problem and how it can be addressed. The business needs a strong design capability. It does not need to manufacture complex parts so long as it controls the core design and build functions – and knows where all the complex parts fit.

It makes sense for New Zealand to invest more in dual-purpose technology that serves both civil and security and defence markets. Examples might relate to drones used for environmental monitoring, search and rescue, and fisheries protection. Such drones could be repurposed for combat roles in an exigency.

The Australian firm Sypaq, an engineering and solutions company, created the Corvo Precision Payload Delivery System (PPDS) for use in asset inspection, search and rescue, border security, emergency services, law enforcement, food security as well as military purposes.

The Corvo drone is made of waxed cardboard and comes as a fold-out flatpack. It is difficult to detect with radar and it can deliver a 5kg payload 120km. It costs around US$3,500 and has already hit high-cost Russian targets such as jet aircraft on the ground, and surface to air missile systems.

There are some interesting businesses in New Zealand that largely serve the civil, non-military markets but have military or security niches. HamiltonJet makes patrol craft water jet propulsion systems. Rocket Lab makes New Zealand one of a small number of countries that launches satellites.

We have some innovative emerging companies. Kea Aerospace is working on stratospheric aviation that can facilitate data acquisition and communications for environmental monitoring, precision agriculture, disaster management and maritime domain awareness. Dawn Aerospace is pioneering space plane technology.

Learning may be drawn from international work in such fields. BAE Systems has designed a lightweight solar-powered Unmanned Aerial System that can stay aloft for weeks or months and fulfil at lower cost the imagery and communications function that satellites and conventional aircraft currently provide. This is the level of technological ambition that New Zealand could aspire to, drawing on for example light weight construction materials and aerodynamic knowledge built up in competitive yacht racing and in businesses such as Rocket Lab.

Small UAVs with both civil and military applications have been developed in New Zealand at a fraction of the cost of overseas equivalents. It is understood that the New Zealand Konihi can be built for around $5000 – much cheaper than the $85,000 for the American Dragon Eye system.

New Zealand is on the cusp of investing billions of dollars on military equipment that will determine for decades ahead what we can and cannot do militarily, in disaster relief, Antarctic operations, hydrography, resource protection and other civil as well as military functions.

The Defence Capability Plan 2019 envisaged a decision being made by 2028 for the replacement of the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels, with the Anzac frigates being replaced in the 2030s “with modern surface combatants relevant to New Zealand’s prevailing strategic environment.”

In 2023 the Government published New Zealand’s inaugural National Security Strategy, Policy and Strategy Statement, and the Future Force Design Principles that set the scene for the reconfiguration of the country’s combat capabilities. The Statement focuses on the Pacific, however it anticipates contributing globally to collective security efforts. This seems rather ill-defined and unbounded.

For the air force the “big ticket” P-8A Poseidon purchase has been made and the existing C-130H Hercules will be replaced by a new fleet of Hercules C-130 (J) in 2024.

Except for the ice-strengthened naval tanker and support ship HMNZS Aotearoa, all ships in our existing fleet will reach the end of their economical service life in the mid-2030s. Around $5-8B of new naval capital investment may be committed from now to the 2030s. Examples include around $1B to replace maritime helicopters, up to $600M to $1B to replace the two Offshore Patrol Vessels with ships better suited to difficult maritime environments, and at least $3B to replace two frigates. Other investments include a second sealift vessel to complement the HMNZS Canterbury.

In my view New Zealand should not replace the current frigates and their helicopters with more modern versions. Even the most sophisticated warships are too vulnerable to attack from UAVs, stealth missiles and hypersonic missiles.

The Navy should be made up of logistic support ships and long-range offshore patrol ships suited to New Zealand’s difficult conditions. As one example, the Castle class patrol ship used by the Royal Navy at the time of the Falklands war had a terrific range (10,000nm) and far better seakeeping qualities than patrol vessels that New Zealand sailors have had to put up with.

The ice-capable Danish Thetis class patrol vessel would be much cheaper than a frigate designed for front-line combat operations as part of a US carrier-led operation. The Thetis class is capable enough to replace both the ANZACs and the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels. A successor ship type, the MPV 80 class, is being planned to carry out civilian as well as military functions. Compared to new combat frigate purchases, the ocean patrol vessel option could free up hundreds of millions of dollars to invest in other technologies such as UAVs.

New Zealand should deliberately configure its armed forces to make it difficult for them to integrate into confrontational multi-lateral operations outside our region. The average cruising speed of an American carrier fleet is between 20 to 30 knots, and so offshore patrol ships would not be able to keep up with such a fleet in fast moving operations.

A much higher proportion of New Zealand’s defence budget could be spent domestically or in Australia. The Australian government has signalled interest in developing Australia’s own arms industries, with emphasis including missile manufacturing. New Zealand could invest in skill development in fields such as design, AI, imaging, 3D engineering, and aerospace and marine precision engineering. Some of these are enabling technologies that can deliver wider spill-over benefits.


New Zealand’s Defence Assessment 2021 had concluded that the two principal challenges to New Zealand’s defence interests are strategic competition and the impacts of climate change. “Strategic competition” (uncoded) means competition between an increasingly assertive China and incumbent power(s), notably the United States. At worst this can create a “Thucydides trap” (Allison 2017) that turns into a “hot war” we want no part of.

New Zealand should not buy into America’s characterisation of China as an expansionist power that must be contained. Since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from the late 1970s, China has lifted hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty. Its trade and investment performance has lifted living standards in many countries, including New Zealand.

However, we should not see China as an economic saviour. China may lose its relative dominance among the Asian economies. It faces demographic decline, natural resource limitations, and macroeconomic imbalances associated with its high savings rates and low consumption. Its autocratic leadership system has few checks and balances, political and economic power are conflated, and regulatory settings may dampen private sector entrepreneurship.

India is now more populous than China and it is developing strategically important industries, including defence. Like India, Indonesia has many of the preconditions for sustained economic growth and therefore market diversification opportunities for countries such as New Zealand.

Under all scenarios New Zealand should deepen its relationship with Australia. We should reaffirm our commitment to liberal democracy, which is being eroded in New Zealand. Our defence investment should be more focused on supporting New Zealand’s technology-intensive industrial development. This will often be done jointly with Australia. However, in defence matters we must also be prepared to exercise our sovereign self-determination rights, including from time-to-time the right to say no.

References and other reading
Allison, G. 2017: Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin.

DPMC, National Security Group 2023: Aotearoa’s National Security Strategy: Secure together .
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 2023: New Zealand’s security threat environment 2023. An Assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.

New Zealand Ministry of Defence 2023. Defence Policy Review: Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023.

Dr Peter Winsley has worked in policy and economics-related fields in New Zealand for many years. With qualifications and publications in economics, management and literature. This article was first published HERE