Pages

Friday, December 19, 2025

Dr Michael John Schmidt: Why the Quiet on This?


Australia’s renewable energy sector has recently been jolted by the discovery of asbestos in the imported components of wind turbines. The material identified is ‘white asbestos’, banned in Australia since 2003. It is found in the brake and clutch pads used in the internal service lifts of turbine towers – the elevators that carry technicians up for maintenance. While the contamination is confined to a specific subsystem rather than blades or towers, the implications are serious. More seriously, ‘white asbestos’ was banned in New Zealand in 1984. It has long been recognised in this country that the substance is harmful.

In Australia, the scope of the issue is wide. Wind farms across Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia have all reported asbestos‑containing parts. Goldwind Australia, which operates 16 sites nationally, and Vestas with 44 wind farms, both confirmed the presence of asbestos in imported lift brake pads. The contaminated components were traced back to a Chinese supplier, 3S Industry, and were first detected in shipments intercepted at Geelong Port in Victoria before being confirmed at the Cattle Hill Wind Farm in Tasmania. It seems unthinkable that this dangerous occurrence of white asbestos was until now not known throughout Australasia.

Because of deep concerns, regulators in Australia responded swiftly. WorkSafe Victoria, SafeWork NSW and Workplace Health and Safety Queensland suspended turbine lift operations until inspections and testing were complete. The Clean Energy Council coordinated testing across projects. Political pressure mounted and calls for a nationwide audit of all turbines has been requested in order to restore public confidence.

Australian authorities stressed that even though public health risks were contained (the asbestos was sealed within lift systems, meaning no airborne risk to surrounding communities), for workers the risk was real if components were disturbed during servicing. Unions described the discovery as shocking and unforgivable. Importing asbestos is a breach of law and the episode underscores vulnerabilities in renewable energy supply chains.

This is not a design flaw in turbine technology, but what is called ‘supply chain integrity failure’. Renewable projects are vulnerable when relying on overseas manufacturers (particularly China), and the case highlights the need for stronger auditing of imported parts. In Australia, operational delays have followed, since lifts are critical for safe turbine maintenance and suspensions have affected turbine reliability. Public confidence depends on visible enforcement and remediation and the discovery undermined trust in procurement processes and regulatory oversight. In Australia the matter was covered publicly by much of the media, so it is not as if the matter is now ‘undiscovered’.

New Zealand’s wind sector is smaller but also strategically important. Wind currently generates just over six per cent of the country’s electricity, with 1,059 MW of installed capacity. But expansion is underway with new projects and offshore potential being explored.

The sector is dominated by a handful of utilities: Mercury NZ Ltd, Meridian Energy and Tilt Renewables. Mercury is the most visible example, contracting Vestas for both stages of the Kaiwera Downs Wind Farm in Southland, including a 155 MW order in 2024 for 36 Vestas V136 turbines. Mercury also operates Mahinerangi Wind Farm, which uses 12 Vestas V90 turbines commissioned in 2011.

Meridian Energy, New Zealand’s largest renewable generator, operates Te Āpiti and West Wind near Wellington, with Vestas among its suppliers. Tilt Renewables has Waipipi Wind Farm in South Taranaki, sourcing from Vestas and Siemens Gamesa.
  • Goldwind, the Chinese OEM directly implicated in the Australian asbestos issue, is present in New Zealand’s market, though less dominant than Vestas.
The common thread is clear: Vestas and Goldwind supply turbines to both Australian and New Zealand utilities.
  • That overlap means the asbestos issue in Australia has direct relevance for New Zealand operators.
Even if contamination has not been confirmed locally, the shared procurement channels make proactive auditing of lift components in New Zealand wind farms prudent, if not essential.

Despite the overlap, no New Zealand utility companies have publicly announced asbestos investigations in their wind farms. The findings and safety responses remained confined to Australia. In New Zealand, regulators and utilities made no statements and mainstream media has not raised the issue.

This absence of announcements does not mean there is no risk. Australia only uncovered asbestos because inspections were triggered after contaminated shipments were intercepted. Once testing began, asbestos was found across multiple sites. New Zealand has not reported findings because inspections have not been undertaken. Until regulators or utilities initiate testing, the situation remains unknown. This is unacceptable.

From a governance perspective, the duty of care is clear.
  • Importing asbestos is illegal.
Service lifts are used daily by technicians and the exposure risk is real if asbestos is present. Silence or delay undermines public trust in renewable projects. If contamination is later discovered reactively, turbines could be taken offline suddenly, disrupting generation schedules.

The silence is not only regulatory but also media‑driven. New Zealand mainstream media has reported extensively on wind energy expansion, offshore prospects and climate leadership, but nothing on asbestos contamination. No calls for investigation have been made despite the newsworthiness and wide dissemination of information about the issue.

One reason could be commercial. Utilities invest tens of millions of dollars annually in advertising, making them heavy investors relative to their sector. For financially strained media outlets, these accounts are strategically important. Losing them could be harmful, exacerbating fragility in an advertising market already facing consolidation and declining revenues.

Another reason could be ideological. New Zealand mainstream media broadly advocate renewables and climate action, reflecting their policy priorities and their interpretation of public sentiment. Coverage emphasises benefits and leadership and tends to ignore the downsides – such as increased energy costs and the disruption of the continuity of base load power.
  • A scandal involving asbestos contamination would cut against their preferential narrative, undermining the image of renewables as ‘always clean, safe and reliable’.
For outlets reliant on utility advertising and ideologically invested in promoting renewables, there is a disincentive to amplify such a story.

The result is silence. The asbestos issue was reported in Australia because regulators forced disclosure. In New Zealand, without a trigger event, the media does not press the issue. This absence is not neutral – it reflects both commercial choices and ideological leanings. Consequently, potential scandals that cast renewables in a negative light appear will be under‑reported (as is the case here) or framed to minimise reputational damage.

The asbestos contamination in the Australian-based wind turbines is a contained but significant problem. It affects internal lift components but not the turbines themselves, yet, still, it triggered audits, suspensions and political scrutiny. The episode has underscored the importance of supply chain vigilance in renewable energy. Yet here in New Zealand we don’t see the same ‘zeal’ despite that the overlap in suppliers means the risk is shared. The absence of investigations regarding NZ’s energy utilities is evidence of inaction: possibly deliberate inaction. Given the statutory duty of care, the daily reliance of technicians on turbine lifts and the reputational stakes of renewable expansion, proactive audits are not just prudent – they are critical.

The silence of New Zealand’s mainstream media compounds the risk. Utilities are heavy advertisers and outlets are ideologically aligned with renewables. Together, these pressures create a disincentive to publicise potential scandals. Yet avoiding scrutiny does not eliminate risk, particularly for those who work on and in the turbine towers. If contamination is later confirmed, the fallout will be greater for having been ignored.

In short, New Zealand faces a choice: lead with proactive investigation or wait for crisis management. The Australian precedent shows the cost of waiting. Worker safety, public trust and the credibility of the renewable transition depend on acting sooner rather than later. That is a story that responsible NZ media should already have picked up and run with – but it is not too late.

Dr Michael John Schmidt left NZ after completing postgraduate studies at Otago University (BSc, MSc) in molecular biology, virology, and immunology to work in research on human genetics in Australia. Returning to NZ has worked in business development for biotech and pharmacy retail companies and became a member of the NZ Institute of Directors. This article was first published HERE

2 comments:

Anonymous said...

Be interesting in a few years as the blades de-laminate and shower micro particles all around. These turbines and solar panels have quite a short life, 15-20 years. The (mostly Chinese made) components will not be made to last.

Anonymous said...

Then of course there is the (unspoken) blade construction issue...
https://wattsupwiththat.com/2025/11/11/shock-cop-dirty-secret-at-least-half-the-balsa-wood-in-wind-turbine-blades-is-illegally-logged-in-amazonian-rainforests/

Post a Comment

Thank you for joining the discussion. Breaking Views welcomes respectful contributions that enrich the debate. Please ensure your comments are not defamatory, derogatory or disruptive. We appreciate your cooperation.