Sir Douglas Graham warns that ACT’s “one law for all” agenda is foolish and likely to provoke protest.
But there is a rather revealing assumption behind his argument: that seeking equality before the law is somehow an attack on Māori.
It isn't.
The real question is whether New Zealand should continue developing a legal and political framework in which some rights, powers and forms of political participation depend on ancestry — or whether citizenship should ultimately mean equal rights and responsibilities under one law.
The real question is whether New Zealand should continue developing a legal and political framework in which some rights, powers and forms of political participation depend on ancestry — or whether citizenship should ultimately mean equal rights and responsibilities under one law.
That is a perfectly legitimate question for a democracy to debate.
Graham points to Māori customary rights and asks whether it is really necessary to interfere with Ngāi Tahu rights such as gathering tītī or exercising customary fishing rights.
But this is where his argument conflates different things.
Ngāi Tahu's customary tītī rights are specifically protected in the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998. The Act vested the Crown Tītī Islands in Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu and expressly preserved the customary rights of Rakiura Māori to take tītī sustainably.
Those are specific statutory and settlement rights. They are not evidence that every modern law must perpetually maintain different legal rights for people according to ethnicity.
And this distinction matters enormously.
The ‘Treaty Principles Bill’ proposed three principles: the Government and Parliament would have full power to govern and make laws; the Crown would recognise, respect and protect the rights hapū and iwi Māori had under the Treaty at the time they signed it, with different rights protected where they were agreed in settlements of historical Treaty claims; and everyone would be equal before the law.
That may be controversial. People can certainly disagree with it.
But describing it as an attempt simply to “extinguish” Māori customary rights does not accurately describe what the Bill actually said. It expressly provided that it would not apply to the interpretation of Treaty settlement Acts.
And there is one important fact Graham’s article cannot change: the Bill is dead — for now. The political debate that produced it, however, is very much alive.
Parliament rejected the Bill at its second reading in April 2025.
So the current argument is not really about whether that particular Bill will become law. It is about the broader constitutional direction ACT advocates — including equality before the law and opposition to ethnicity-based co-governance.
Graham then turns to the Waitangi Tribunal, calling it a necessary “safety valve”.
There is certainly a legitimate case for having an institution that investigates Treaty claims. But Graham's statement that the Tribunal exists precisely to “influence decisions of elected governments and Parliament” deserves scrutiny.
The Tribunal is a commission of inquiry. Its principal function is to inquire into claims and make findings and recommendations. Its recommendations do not generally bind the Crown, although there are specific statutory circumstances in which it has binding powers concerning certain categories of land.
So whether the Tribunal should continue in its present form is a question of constitutional policy — not a choice between the Tribunal and Māori having nowhere to take grievances.
Nor does questioning the Tribunal's role mean denying historical grievances.
New Zealand has already spent decades investigating historical Treaty claims and negotiating settlements. Parliament has enacted numerous settlement Acts, including the Ngāi Tahu settlement. Those settlements are part of New Zealand's law and should be treated seriously.
But a settlement of a historical grievance is not necessarily an argument for creating an ever-expanding system of separate political rights for future generations.
That is the uncomfortable issue Graham's article largely avoids.
He says Māori have a “special place” because they are New Zealand's indigenous people. But even if you accept that description, cultural or historical status does not automatically establish a case for different legal or political rights today.
Cultural distinction and legal privilege are not the same thing.
New Zealand can acknowledge Māori culture and language, protect legitimate customary practices and honour historical settlements without concluding that modern political authority should be allocated according to ancestry.
And there is an important irony in Graham's warning about protest.
Democratic protest is legitimate. Māori have every right to protest policies they oppose — just as opponents of co-governance, race-based policies or constitutional change have the same right.
But the possibility that a policy might provoke protest cannot itself determine whether that policy is right or wrong.
Otherwise the loudest protest becomes a veto over democratic debate.
The central question is therefore much simpler than Graham presents it:
Can New Zealand acknowledge its history and Māori culture while also insisting that every New Zealander is equal before the law?
There is nothing inherently anti-Māori about answering yes.
Indeed, if “one law for all” means that every citizen is entitled to the same fundamental rights and responsibilities regardless of ancestry, then it is not an attack on Māori.
It is an argument about equality.
And that debate deserves something better than warnings about who might take to the streets.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.
Graham points to Māori customary rights and asks whether it is really necessary to interfere with Ngāi Tahu rights such as gathering tītī or exercising customary fishing rights.
But this is where his argument conflates different things.
Ngāi Tahu's customary tītī rights are specifically protected in the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998. The Act vested the Crown Tītī Islands in Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu and expressly preserved the customary rights of Rakiura Māori to take tītī sustainably.
Those are specific statutory and settlement rights. They are not evidence that every modern law must perpetually maintain different legal rights for people according to ethnicity.
And this distinction matters enormously.
The ‘Treaty Principles Bill’ proposed three principles: the Government and Parliament would have full power to govern and make laws; the Crown would recognise, respect and protect the rights hapū and iwi Māori had under the Treaty at the time they signed it, with different rights protected where they were agreed in settlements of historical Treaty claims; and everyone would be equal before the law.
That may be controversial. People can certainly disagree with it.
But describing it as an attempt simply to “extinguish” Māori customary rights does not accurately describe what the Bill actually said. It expressly provided that it would not apply to the interpretation of Treaty settlement Acts.
And there is one important fact Graham’s article cannot change: the Bill is dead — for now. The political debate that produced it, however, is very much alive.
Parliament rejected the Bill at its second reading in April 2025.
So the current argument is not really about whether that particular Bill will become law. It is about the broader constitutional direction ACT advocates — including equality before the law and opposition to ethnicity-based co-governance.
Graham then turns to the Waitangi Tribunal, calling it a necessary “safety valve”.
There is certainly a legitimate case for having an institution that investigates Treaty claims. But Graham's statement that the Tribunal exists precisely to “influence decisions of elected governments and Parliament” deserves scrutiny.
The Tribunal is a commission of inquiry. Its principal function is to inquire into claims and make findings and recommendations. Its recommendations do not generally bind the Crown, although there are specific statutory circumstances in which it has binding powers concerning certain categories of land.
So whether the Tribunal should continue in its present form is a question of constitutional policy — not a choice between the Tribunal and Māori having nowhere to take grievances.
Nor does questioning the Tribunal's role mean denying historical grievances.
New Zealand has already spent decades investigating historical Treaty claims and negotiating settlements. Parliament has enacted numerous settlement Acts, including the Ngāi Tahu settlement. Those settlements are part of New Zealand's law and should be treated seriously.
But a settlement of a historical grievance is not necessarily an argument for creating an ever-expanding system of separate political rights for future generations.
That is the uncomfortable issue Graham's article largely avoids.
He says Māori have a “special place” because they are New Zealand's indigenous people. But even if you accept that description, cultural or historical status does not automatically establish a case for different legal or political rights today.
Cultural distinction and legal privilege are not the same thing.
New Zealand can acknowledge Māori culture and language, protect legitimate customary practices and honour historical settlements without concluding that modern political authority should be allocated according to ancestry.
And there is an important irony in Graham's warning about protest.
Democratic protest is legitimate. Māori have every right to protest policies they oppose — just as opponents of co-governance, race-based policies or constitutional change have the same right.
But the possibility that a policy might provoke protest cannot itself determine whether that policy is right or wrong.
Otherwise the loudest protest becomes a veto over democratic debate.
The central question is therefore much simpler than Graham presents it:
Can New Zealand acknowledge its history and Māori culture while also insisting that every New Zealander is equal before the law?
There is nothing inherently anti-Māori about answering yes.
Indeed, if “one law for all” means that every citizen is entitled to the same fundamental rights and responsibilities regardless of ancestry, then it is not an attack on Māori.
It is an argument about equality.
And that debate deserves something better than warnings about who might take to the streets.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Thank you for joining the discussion. Breaking Views welcomes respectful contributions that enrich the debate. Please ensure your comments are not defamatory, derogatory or disruptive. We appreciate your cooperation.