Audrey Young’s piece in today’s New Zealand Herald is typical of the partisan posturing we have come to expect from the New Zealand media class in relation to the conflict in Israel/Palestine (and other issues). She assumes an artificial high ground from which she announces New Zealand must instantly repent for failing to join the “morally correct” grand gesture of recognising Palestinian statehood. She treats statehood recognition as an absolutely unassailable right, a meaningful virtue signal, delivered in the name of justice. But New Zealand’s role is not to play moral extras on the world stage. It is to navigate realpolitik, international law, and the messy realities of a fraught conflict and represent our people in measured and responsible ways.
There is a difference between virtue and viability. Young’s column dismisses the government’s cautious and responsible approach as timidity or cowardice. But what she ignores is that, in matters of recognition, timing and conditions matter enormously, much more than the rhetorical flourish of a flounce at the United Nations.
Young argues that New Zealand applies “traditional tests for recognition” as though it were the 1960s. That is precisely what responsible states do. Recognition of states is not an arbitrary signal. It carries legal, diplomatic, and political consequences. One cannot simply wave the wand of recognition and imagine peace will follow.
The international law framework, as encapsulated in the Montevideo criteria (permanent population, defined territory, effective government, capacity to enter into relations), exists for a reason. Recognition is not unconditional. An entity must sufficiently meet these thresholds before other states can responsibly extend that status.
Young is correct that the Israel-Palestine situation is “uniquely complicated,” but complexity does not absolve responsibility. If anything, it heightens it. If New Zealand were to recognise a “state” that lacked effective governance, internal cohesion, or credible institutions, it could risk legal incoherence and diplomatic backlash and diminish the important distinctions that uphold international order.
Moreover, recognition of Palestine as a state in its current form (run by terrorists and geographically fragmented) is a political act, not a neutral legal declaration. Each state has discretion to assess whether, given current conditions, recognition will be constructive or merely symbolic. It is not scandalous to withhold recognition when it may do more harm than good.
The New Zealand Government’s “soon, but not now” approach is strategically wise. First of all because there is no clear, unified, legitimate governing authority in Palestine. One of the stated concerns is that Hamas remains the de facto power in Gaza, and that there is no unified legitimate authority over all the territory claimed by “Palestine.” New Zealand rightly fears that recognition in this context might implicitly confer legitimacy on a group engaged in armed conflict which would be a dangerous precedent.
Young dismisses that as an apologist’s dodge. But it is a serious legal and diplomatic concern. What does recognising a “state” mean when part of its supposed territory is governed by an entity unwilling to disarm, determined by most Western nations to be a terrorist entity, and not subject to standard international norms?
If recognition is given under these conditions, it can be used as propaganda, by both sides, without actually improving prospects of peace. Young herself concedes that “whatever way New Zealand decided to go … it was going to be used as propaganda.” So surely a prudent state must ask “how will our recognition be interpreted, leveraged, or misused and will it strengthen, or weaken, New Zealand’s negotiating space?” This is not a question Young seems willing to ask.
Recognition of statehood also risks hardening maximalist positions. In the current context of violence and polarisation, recognition might entrench intransigence rather than openness. If Israel views recognition by middle powers as moral encouragement for its terroristic enemy, it could double down. If Hamas views it as reward, it might reject any moderation. The New Zealand Government reasonably fears that recognition now could inadvertently reduce incentives on both sides toward compromise. That is not cynicism, that is realism. It should be applauded as adult, pragmatic decision-making under immense political pressure.
Despite her acknowledgement that propaganda would have been generated regardless, Young accuses the New Zealand Government of making a propaganda gift to Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu. But the risk is symmetrical. A government must avoid being a pawn in rhetorical escalations whether that be by actively feeding into propaganda or actively avoiding feeding into one-side or the other’s propaganda.
All of the hysteria distracts from the the reality that diplomatic capital should not be compromised by symbolic performativity. Young chastises the Government, but it is correctly recognising that once it grants recognition, it surrenders diplomatic leverage and it cannot later add conditions or retract it easily. Recognition is not just a pronouncement. It is a long-term commitment. The Government is wise to reserve its recognition for a moment when it can tie it to democratic elections, security guarantees, and meaningful accountability.
Young invokes the South Africa analogy that isolation and recognition eventually made a difference. But that analogy is incomplete. South Africa had a clear, stable regime to oppose and a well-understood international consensus on sanctions. The Israel/Palestine case has far more moving parts, ongoing conflict, and internal fragmentation. You don’t replicate the anti-apartheid playbook simply by declaring recognition.
The New Zealand media has taken the kind of populist stance that they usually condemn on this matter. Everyone likes polling when it suits their particular political stance, but polls are snapshots and weak moral compasses. Young cites the 42.5% support number from one poll as evidence for moral urgency. But Winston Peters’ counter read is that since 35.4% “don’t know,” support is at less than half of the population. The Government should apply caution and not be swayed by noisy media commentators and selective polling. Governments should not run on unmoored sentiment; they should run on reason, risk assessment, and diplomatic prudence.
Looking abroad, Singapore’s approach to Palestinian statehood is a clear-headed, criteria-based, and morally serious example that underscores that New Zealand is not some rogue hold-out but rather is acting in line with a cohort of thoughtful, law-abiding democracies. Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and most Pacific neighbours have taken “not yet” stances that understand symbolism without substance can do more harm than good.
Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan’s statement last week was exemplary in this regard. He reminded his Parliament that recognition of Palestine must be based on conditions, not sentiment and that the defining threshold is an “effective government that accepts Israel’s right to exist and categorically renounces terrorism.” This recognises that true statehood requires not just suffering or sympathy but governance, legitimacy, and a commitment to peace.
It mirrors New Zealand’s position almost entirely. Both governments affirm the right of Palestinians to self-determination and the necessity of a two-state solution, but both reject the notion that premature recognition somehow accelerates peace. On the contrary, both recognise that empty gestures, untethered from reality, can harden divisions and embolden extremists.
Singapore’s leadership understands that in the volatile politics of the Middle East, good intentions are not enough. Clarity and caution are the true virtues. Its insistence on credible governance and renunciation of terrorism is exactly the framework New Zealand has adopted. In choosing prudence over populism, both countries show respect for international law and moral seriousness. We are, in short, in good company among nations that know the difference between moral vanity and moral responsibility.
What we are witnessing from Britain, Australia, and others rushing toward recognition is not principled leadership, it is populist posturing dressed up as moral courage. These governments are pandering to domestic sentiment, eager to be seen “doing something” without regard for whether that “something” advances peace or simply feeds the cycle of grievance. Their timing is driven less by sober assessment than by the demands of social media outrage and political trendiness. In their haste to signal virtue, they have abandoned the very caution that foreign policy demands. Recognising a state that remains divided, infiltrated by terror, and lacking coherent governance is not solidarity, it is indulgence. It sends precisely the wrong message: that legitimacy can be claimed through suffering alone, not earned through responsibility. Such immaturity may win applause from activists and editorial pages, but it cheapens the currency of recognition and undermines the prospects of a genuine, lasting peace.
Like many commentators, Young leans heavily on the moral framing that our failure to recognise Palestine’s statehood immediately will see New Zealand condemned by history. But that framing is facile. The thing about being “on the wrong side of history” is that no one a hundred percent knows how history will reflect on today’s actions. And history does not reward empty symbolism; it rewards impact. If recognition today merely cements polarisation and yields no real protection or progress for Palestinians, then history might judge those who virtue signal harsher.
New Zealand’s aim should not be to avoid the disapproval of media and celebrities, but to act effectively and in our best interests. That might mean waiting until recognition can be meaningful and tied to ceasefire, institution building, credible governance, and a framework that includes security guarantees for Israel. That is moral responsibility.
Young’s final invocation of former diplomat Colin Keating’s view that recognition is incremental and may shift the status quo is not wrong in principle. But she assumes that any recognition is better than delay. That is not the case in contexts where recognition given too early becomes ineffectual, or worse, accelerates collapse rather than compromise.
Audrey Young’s op-ed is earnest and rhetorically polished. But it errs by treating recognition as an ideological act of virtue rather than a tool of statecraft. The New Zealand Government’s decision to say “not yet” is not betrayal; it is cautious diplomacy. It acknowledges that state recognition is not a panacea and that timing, conditions, and credibility matter.
If New Zealand is going to recognise Palestine, and it seems clear the Government sees recognition as inevitable, “when,” not “if”, then it should be done in a way that empowers peace, not posturing. And in that sense, the Government’s reluctance today may yet prove the more responsible course, rather than the moral vanity Young demands.
Ani O'Brien comes from a digital marketing background, she has been heavily involved in women's rights advocacy and is a founding council member of the Free Speech Union. This article was originally published on Ani's Substack Site and is published here with kind permission.
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