David Farrar: The Attorney-General gets it in one

Attorney-General Chris Bishop had made a hugely important speech. He politely but firmly pushes back against the courts making law, rather than interpreting law. He notes:

Roger Partridge: Who makes the law? The Attorney-General answers

Outside Chris Bishop’s office in the Beehive hangs a framed copy of a court judgment. Last week, in a speech to the Law Association, the Attorney-General explained why he keeps it there.

The case is Fitzgerald v Muldoon, a judgment now fifty years old. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon had announced, without asking Parliament, that New Zealanders could stop paying into the previous Labour government’s compulsory superannuation scheme. A man named Fitzgerald took Muldoon to court and won. Chief Justice Wild ruled that a Prime Minister cannot switch off a law by announcing it. Only Parliament can do that.

Sandra Goudie: What Treaty Principles

What Treaty Principles? There are none.

The Attorney General responded to my request for a copy of the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by saying that there is no ‘authoritative copy’ of the Treaty Principles, but he said they have been ‘explored and discussed’ by the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal. (Letter available from the Attorney General’s office – just write and ask him for it.)

Exploration and discussion does not a principle make.

Graeme Reeves: Report of the Attorney General on the Rotorua Council Bill

Report of the Attorney General of 21 April 2022 Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Rotorua District Council (Representation Arrangements ) Bill (A.G.)

The Rotorua District Council (Representation Arrangements) Bill (the Bill) seeks to override the provisions of the Local Electoral Act 2001 (LEA) by substituting the formula set out in the LEA by another formula which would allow for Council representation to be over represented by Maori.

The A.G sets out in clauses 10 to 13 the following analysis of the effect of the proposed representation arrangements in answer to the question, “Does the legislation draw a distinction on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination?”