Yet that is what Mark Rutte has chosen to do. He formally started his new job on 1 October – and he has inherited a military alliance facing its most significant challenges since the Cold War.
Russia wages its war in Ukraine. China expands its global influence. Within NATO itself, political tensions threaten its future. Yet Rutte, in his first statements, appears undaunted by the task ahead.
Maybe his confidence stems from NATO’s renewed sense of purpose. The alliance has not seemed this relevant in decades. But relevance does not guarantee effectiveness.
In his first press conference at NATO Headquarters, Rutte made his position clear: “To do more, we must spend more. There is no cost-free alternative if we are to rise to the challenges ahead and keep our one billion people safe.” This statement sets the tone for his tenure, emphasising the urgency of NATO’s mission and the practical steps needed to fulfil it.
Rutte brings a wealth of political experience to the role. As the Netherlands’ longest-serving prime minister, he managed four coalition governments, often involving parties with conflicting ideologies. His experience in finding common ground among diverse political actors could prove invaluable in building consensus among NATO’s 32 member states.
Still, leading NATO is a job like no other. As Secretary-General, Rutte becomes the alliance’s chief spokesperson and its most senior international civil servant. He will chair meetings of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, and oversee the organisation’s international staff.
Rutte holds no military command; his role is primarily diplomatic, focused on building consensus and articulating NATO’s strategic vision.
If Rutte needed a brief on the complexities of the role, he could talk to his predecessor. Jens Stoltenberg led NATO for a decade, during which time it expanded to include Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland and Sweden. He also navigated the turbulent years of the Trump administration, which brought NATO’s very existence into question.
In his first few weeks, Rutte has already demonstrated a sense of purpose. He made a symbolic visit to Kyiv, underscoring NATO’s commitment to Ukraine.
Rutte also outlined three priorities for his tenure. First and foremost, NATO must maintain its strength and credibility against all threats (read Russia and China). Second, he aims to increase support for Ukraine and bring it closer to NATO membership (which is less than a promise of membership). Third, Rutte emphasises the need to strengthen NATO’s global partnerships (which can only mean the Indo-Pacific).
Rutte has echoed his predecessor’s calls for increased investment in defence spending, aiming for NATO’s longstanding 2% of GDP target. In a way, lifting European defence spending to that level would be the best insurance policy against the United States’ reorientation of its defence and security commitments away from Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The challenges facing Rutte are thus manifold. The ongoing war in Ukraine remains NATO’s most pressing concern, requiring a delicate balance between support for Kyiv and avoiding direct conflict with Moscow. But this is by no means the only challenge. There are also Turkey’s ongoing diplomatic tensions with Greece. There is Hungary and its position is soft towards Moscow. There is also the varied positioning of NATO members on the Israel-Iran conflict.
However, the most significant wild card in Rutte’s tenure is the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House. Trump’s previous term saw unprecedented tension between the United States and its NATO allies to the point that Trump was reportedly considering pulling the US out of the alliance.
The recent revelations from Bob Woodward’s book, which highlight Trump’s seven phone calls with Putin after the conclusion of his presidency, raise more concerns about the potential impact of a second Trump administration on reshaping NATO. Would Trump (again) push for increased European defence spending? Or might he go further, this time explicitly questioning the alliance? Would Trump do a deal with Putin on Ukraine, bypassing NATO?
Rutte will be prepared for this possibility. In his first press conference as NATO Secretary-General on 2 October, Rutte was asked about it. “He was the one pushing us to spend more,” Rutte said, quickly adding that NATO member countries are now at much higher spending levels than when Trump took office in 2017. It sounded like a well-prepared talking point, specifically anticipating Trump’s next attack on NATO.
His experiences as an international networker may help Rutte in his dealing with people like Trump, Orban and Erdoğan. When he was Dutch Prime Minister, he had an international profile larger than the size of his country might have suggested.
Rutte’s immediate challenges are daunting. His first big test is already on the horizon: the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, to be held in late June next year. The location is probably not coincidental because in more than 70 years of membership, the Netherlands has never hosted a NATO Summit.
Rutte’s hosting of NATO’s members (and approximately 8,500 attendees, including 45 heads of state and government) in his home country will occur at a crucial time. There will be a new US president. Nobody knows whether the Ukraine war will still be ongoing. And who would dare guess how China will have responded to the new US President and the situation in Ukraine by then?
This will be a crucial time for NATO and its future. Rutte will hope that this Summit (the largest ever hosted by the Netherlands) will put the alliance on a path to dealing with the geopolitical challenges of the 21st century.
NATO is a product of the First Cold War. It is also a relic of an era in which the US looked to defend Europe and Europeans looked to America for guidance and support.
Whether you want to call it multipolar or see it as a Second Cold War, today’s world is different. Rutte’s job will be to define NATO’s role in these circumstances, unite its diverse membership and keep it relevant to new challenges.
It is not the easiest job in world politics, but at least with Rutte, NATO seems to have found the right kind of person for it.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
In his first press conference at NATO Headquarters, Rutte made his position clear: “To do more, we must spend more. There is no cost-free alternative if we are to rise to the challenges ahead and keep our one billion people safe.” This statement sets the tone for his tenure, emphasising the urgency of NATO’s mission and the practical steps needed to fulfil it.
Rutte brings a wealth of political experience to the role. As the Netherlands’ longest-serving prime minister, he managed four coalition governments, often involving parties with conflicting ideologies. His experience in finding common ground among diverse political actors could prove invaluable in building consensus among NATO’s 32 member states.
Still, leading NATO is a job like no other. As Secretary-General, Rutte becomes the alliance’s chief spokesperson and its most senior international civil servant. He will chair meetings of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal political decision-making body, and oversee the organisation’s international staff.
Rutte holds no military command; his role is primarily diplomatic, focused on building consensus and articulating NATO’s strategic vision.
If Rutte needed a brief on the complexities of the role, he could talk to his predecessor. Jens Stoltenberg led NATO for a decade, during which time it expanded to include Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland and Sweden. He also navigated the turbulent years of the Trump administration, which brought NATO’s very existence into question.
In his first few weeks, Rutte has already demonstrated a sense of purpose. He made a symbolic visit to Kyiv, underscoring NATO’s commitment to Ukraine.
Rutte also outlined three priorities for his tenure. First and foremost, NATO must maintain its strength and credibility against all threats (read Russia and China). Second, he aims to increase support for Ukraine and bring it closer to NATO membership (which is less than a promise of membership). Third, Rutte emphasises the need to strengthen NATO’s global partnerships (which can only mean the Indo-Pacific).
Rutte has echoed his predecessor’s calls for increased investment in defence spending, aiming for NATO’s longstanding 2% of GDP target. In a way, lifting European defence spending to that level would be the best insurance policy against the United States’ reorientation of its defence and security commitments away from Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The challenges facing Rutte are thus manifold. The ongoing war in Ukraine remains NATO’s most pressing concern, requiring a delicate balance between support for Kyiv and avoiding direct conflict with Moscow. But this is by no means the only challenge. There are also Turkey’s ongoing diplomatic tensions with Greece. There is Hungary and its position is soft towards Moscow. There is also the varied positioning of NATO members on the Israel-Iran conflict.
However, the most significant wild card in Rutte’s tenure is the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House. Trump’s previous term saw unprecedented tension between the United States and its NATO allies to the point that Trump was reportedly considering pulling the US out of the alliance.
The recent revelations from Bob Woodward’s book, which highlight Trump’s seven phone calls with Putin after the conclusion of his presidency, raise more concerns about the potential impact of a second Trump administration on reshaping NATO. Would Trump (again) push for increased European defence spending? Or might he go further, this time explicitly questioning the alliance? Would Trump do a deal with Putin on Ukraine, bypassing NATO?
Rutte will be prepared for this possibility. In his first press conference as NATO Secretary-General on 2 October, Rutte was asked about it. “He was the one pushing us to spend more,” Rutte said, quickly adding that NATO member countries are now at much higher spending levels than when Trump took office in 2017. It sounded like a well-prepared talking point, specifically anticipating Trump’s next attack on NATO.
His experiences as an international networker may help Rutte in his dealing with people like Trump, Orban and Erdoğan. When he was Dutch Prime Minister, he had an international profile larger than the size of his country might have suggested.
Rutte’s immediate challenges are daunting. His first big test is already on the horizon: the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, to be held in late June next year. The location is probably not coincidental because in more than 70 years of membership, the Netherlands has never hosted a NATO Summit.
Rutte’s hosting of NATO’s members (and approximately 8,500 attendees, including 45 heads of state and government) in his home country will occur at a crucial time. There will be a new US president. Nobody knows whether the Ukraine war will still be ongoing. And who would dare guess how China will have responded to the new US President and the situation in Ukraine by then?
This will be a crucial time for NATO and its future. Rutte will hope that this Summit (the largest ever hosted by the Netherlands) will put the alliance on a path to dealing with the geopolitical challenges of the 21st century.
NATO is a product of the First Cold War. It is also a relic of an era in which the US looked to defend Europe and Europeans looked to America for guidance and support.
Whether you want to call it multipolar or see it as a Second Cold War, today’s world is different. Rutte’s job will be to define NATO’s role in these circumstances, unite its diverse membership and keep it relevant to new challenges.
It is not the easiest job in world politics, but at least with Rutte, NATO seems to have found the right kind of person for it.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
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