In contemporary international affairs, the “rules‑based international order” usually refers to the post‑1945, largely Western‑led system of institutions, norms, and practices that seek to structure state behaviour through agreed rules rather than raw power or ad hoc deals. The term is politically contested and not synonymous with positive international law, even though it heavily draws on, and often claims the legitimacy of, the UN Charter system and wider treaty and customary frameworks.
The idea crystallised after 1945 around the UN Charter and the Bretton Woods institutions, as the United States and its allies used their preponderant power to build a multilateral, rules‑oriented system aimed at preventing another great‑power war and managing economic reconstruction and interdependence.
The term “rules‑based international order” gained prominence especially after the Cold War and more sharply in the 2000s–2010s, partly as a rebranding of “liberal international order” to emphasise procedural rules rather than overtly liberal ideological content.
Many proponents present the rules‑based order as grounded in, and continuous with, general international law: UN Charter principles (sovereign equality, non‑use of force, peaceful settlement), multilateral treaties, and customary norms.
Critical scholarship and some states, however, stress that the phrase often extends beyond Article 38 and International Court of Justice sources to include “soft law”, institutional practices, and non‑binding standards, thereby blurring the line between binding law and politically endorsed norms or preferences.
For Western and like‑minded states, invoking the rules‑based order is a way to frame challenges to Russian aggression, Chinese maritime claims, or erosion of trade norms as violations of a shared, quasi‑universal normative framework, and to justify collective responses (sanctions, institutional coalitions, etc.).
Critics (including Russia, China, and various Global South voices, as well as some international lawyers) argue that the term is vague and selectively applied, masking power‑political bargains and double standards and sometimes operating as a rival framing to “international law” when existing law is inconvenient for leading Western states.
Common criticisms focus on who makes the “rules”, how selectively they are applied, and whether the phrase masks power politics rather than constraining it. Many Global South and non‑Western critics see the “rules‑based order” as Western‑centric, legally ambiguous, and prone to double standards that erode its legitimacy.
One critique relates to power, exclusion, and Western bias. Critics argue that a small group of Western states effectively sets the key rules and institutional agendas, while claiming they are universal, leaving emerging powers and much of the Global South under‑represented in decision‑making (e.g. Bretton Woods institutions, security alliances).
China, Russia and others frame the “rules‑based order” as “house rules” of a few states, imposed on the many, rather than genuinely negotiated multilateral norms open to all.
Another problem is that of vagueness and legal ambiguity. International lawyers note that “rules‑based order” is undefined in formal law and blurs the line between binding international law and non‑binding standards, policies, and institutional practices.
The phrase can be used to demand compliance with rules that some states have not consented to, or to elevate informal “coalition” norms over Charter‑based obligations, raising concerns about consent and the integrity of the international legal order.
A third issue is that of double standards and hypocrisy. Many Global South commentators emphasise that Western states often violate or selectively interpret the very rules they champion, for example in the use of force, sanctions, trade policy, or responses to crises such as Ukraine versus Gaza.
Surveys and commentary highlight a widespread perception that the order’s institutions and enforcement patterns primarily protect Western interests, undermining claims to principled universality.
Another issue is that the “Rules Based Order” runs parallel to international law. Some scholars argue the concept serves as a political frame that can compete with, or sidestep, general international law, allowing powerful states to re‑label discretionary policy preferences as “the rules”.
This perceived move towards “law‑making by majority” or by informal clubs, without clear legal basis or universal participation, is seen as destabilising for the international rule of law.
Chinese and Russian officials routinely portray the “rules‑based order” as a political instrument that entrenches Western hegemony and bypasses genuine, universally agreed international law. They counter‑pose it to the UN‑centred legal order and present their own role (often with the “Global South”) as revising or replacing this Western‑defined system.
Chinese statements describe the “so‑called ‘rules‑based’ international order” as “house rules” made by a small number of Western states, not universal norms accepted by all.
China argues this discourse is used to justify interference, sanctions, and human‑rights‑based pressure, and promotes instead an order “centred on the UN” with “genuine multilateralism,” sovereignty, non‑interference, and greater voice for developing countries.
Russian officials depict the rules‑based order as a Western narrative that masks attempts to preserve a unipolar system in which the West both writes and waives the rules as it sees fit.
Moscow presents its push for a “new world order” or “multipolar” order as a challenge to this system, arguing that existing Western‑led arrangements disadvantage other states and that rules should instead emerge from a more plural balance of powers and cultures.
Since at least their 2022 joint statements, both Chinese and Russian governments explicitly contrast “international law” with “rules elaborated in private by certain nations or blocs,” asserting that only the former is legitimate.
They link criticism of the rules‑based order to broader efforts (BRICS expansion, Global South diplomacy, alternative finance and security forums) which they say are intended to democratise global governance and reduce Western dominance.
A Future or a Collapse?
The institutions, norms, and language of the “rules‑based order” are very likely to persist, but their authority will be more fragmented, contested, and regionally variable in light of Ukraine, Gaza, the Maduro abduction and the posturing about Greenland.
The trajectory looks less like abrupt collapse and more like accelerated erosion of Western normative leadership and a shift towards plural, competing orders and selective compliance.
A very useful analysis of the present situation and what could be done has been offered by Prime Minister Carney of Canada in a speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos. His view of the “rules based order” is realistic and pragmatic as is his proposed solution. A transcript is here. I must thank my friend Richard Mosley of Canada for alerting me to this.
He described the rupture in the world order as the end of the pleasant fiction and the dawn of a brutal reality in which great-power geopolitics is unconstrained.
He then advanced an illustration of how unconstrained power is maintained – not at the top level but at the micro-level.
The term “rules‑based international order” gained prominence especially after the Cold War and more sharply in the 2000s–2010s, partly as a rebranding of “liberal international order” to emphasise procedural rules rather than overtly liberal ideological content.
Many proponents present the rules‑based order as grounded in, and continuous with, general international law: UN Charter principles (sovereign equality, non‑use of force, peaceful settlement), multilateral treaties, and customary norms.
Critical scholarship and some states, however, stress that the phrase often extends beyond Article 38 and International Court of Justice sources to include “soft law”, institutional practices, and non‑binding standards, thereby blurring the line between binding law and politically endorsed norms or preferences.
For Western and like‑minded states, invoking the rules‑based order is a way to frame challenges to Russian aggression, Chinese maritime claims, or erosion of trade norms as violations of a shared, quasi‑universal normative framework, and to justify collective responses (sanctions, institutional coalitions, etc.).
Critics (including Russia, China, and various Global South voices, as well as some international lawyers) argue that the term is vague and selectively applied, masking power‑political bargains and double standards and sometimes operating as a rival framing to “international law” when existing law is inconvenient for leading Western states.
Common criticisms focus on who makes the “rules”, how selectively they are applied, and whether the phrase masks power politics rather than constraining it. Many Global South and non‑Western critics see the “rules‑based order” as Western‑centric, legally ambiguous, and prone to double standards that erode its legitimacy.
One critique relates to power, exclusion, and Western bias. Critics argue that a small group of Western states effectively sets the key rules and institutional agendas, while claiming they are universal, leaving emerging powers and much of the Global South under‑represented in decision‑making (e.g. Bretton Woods institutions, security alliances).
China, Russia and others frame the “rules‑based order” as “house rules” of a few states, imposed on the many, rather than genuinely negotiated multilateral norms open to all.
Another problem is that of vagueness and legal ambiguity. International lawyers note that “rules‑based order” is undefined in formal law and blurs the line between binding international law and non‑binding standards, policies, and institutional practices.
The phrase can be used to demand compliance with rules that some states have not consented to, or to elevate informal “coalition” norms over Charter‑based obligations, raising concerns about consent and the integrity of the international legal order.
A third issue is that of double standards and hypocrisy. Many Global South commentators emphasise that Western states often violate or selectively interpret the very rules they champion, for example in the use of force, sanctions, trade policy, or responses to crises such as Ukraine versus Gaza.
Surveys and commentary highlight a widespread perception that the order’s institutions and enforcement patterns primarily protect Western interests, undermining claims to principled universality.
Another issue is that the “Rules Based Order” runs parallel to international law. Some scholars argue the concept serves as a political frame that can compete with, or sidestep, general international law, allowing powerful states to re‑label discretionary policy preferences as “the rules”.
This perceived move towards “law‑making by majority” or by informal clubs, without clear legal basis or universal participation, is seen as destabilising for the international rule of law.
Chinese and Russian officials routinely portray the “rules‑based order” as a political instrument that entrenches Western hegemony and bypasses genuine, universally agreed international law. They counter‑pose it to the UN‑centred legal order and present their own role (often with the “Global South”) as revising or replacing this Western‑defined system.
Chinese statements describe the “so‑called ‘rules‑based’ international order” as “house rules” made by a small number of Western states, not universal norms accepted by all.
China argues this discourse is used to justify interference, sanctions, and human‑rights‑based pressure, and promotes instead an order “centred on the UN” with “genuine multilateralism,” sovereignty, non‑interference, and greater voice for developing countries.
Russian officials depict the rules‑based order as a Western narrative that masks attempts to preserve a unipolar system in which the West both writes and waives the rules as it sees fit.
Moscow presents its push for a “new world order” or “multipolar” order as a challenge to this system, arguing that existing Western‑led arrangements disadvantage other states and that rules should instead emerge from a more plural balance of powers and cultures.
Since at least their 2022 joint statements, both Chinese and Russian governments explicitly contrast “international law” with “rules elaborated in private by certain nations or blocs,” asserting that only the former is legitimate.
They link criticism of the rules‑based order to broader efforts (BRICS expansion, Global South diplomacy, alternative finance and security forums) which they say are intended to democratise global governance and reduce Western dominance.
A Future or a Collapse?
The institutions, norms, and language of the “rules‑based order” are very likely to persist, but their authority will be more fragmented, contested, and regionally variable in light of Ukraine, Gaza, the Maduro abduction and the posturing about Greenland.
The trajectory looks less like abrupt collapse and more like accelerated erosion of Western normative leadership and a shift towards plural, competing orders and selective compliance.
A very useful analysis of the present situation and what could be done has been offered by Prime Minister Carney of Canada in a speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos. His view of the “rules based order” is realistic and pragmatic as is his proposed solution. A transcript is here. I must thank my friend Richard Mosley of Canada for alerting me to this.
He described the rupture in the world order as the end of the pleasant fiction and the dawn of a brutal reality in which great-power geopolitics is unconstrained.
He then advanced an illustration of how unconstrained power is maintained – not at the top level but at the micro-level.
“In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel wrote an essay called The Power of the Powerless. In it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?
His answer began with a greengrocer. Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: “Workers of the world, unite!” He does not believe it. No one believes it. But he places the sign anyway — to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persists.
Not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.
Havel called this “living within a lie.” The system’s power comes not from its truth but from everyone’s willingness to perform as if it were true. And its fragility comes from the same source: when even one person stops performing — when the greengrocer removes his sign — the illusion begins to crack.”
Carney then goes on to suggest that it is time to take the signs down. Countries like Canada and New Zealand prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, praised its principles, and benefited from its predictability. We could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.
But it was all an illusion. We knew in our hearts that the premises and promises of the rules based order were partially false. The strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. Trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. International law would be applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.
This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security, and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.
As Carney put it, referring to Havel’s example,
“we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals. And largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality. This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct: we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition. Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy, and geopolitics laid bare the risks of extreme global integration.
More recently, great powers began using economic integration as weapons. Tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited. You cannot “live within the lie” of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination. The multilateral institutions on which middle powers relied— the WTO, the UN, the COP—the architecture of collective problem solving — are greatly diminished.”
So how to deal with this disruption of what we have imagined is a safe reality. Carney puts it this way (speaking from a Canadian perspective):
“Our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb has termed ‘values-based realism’ — or, to put it another way, we aim to be principled and pragmatic. Principled in our commitment to fundamental values: sovereignty and territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force except when consistent with the UN Charter, respect for human rights. Pragmatic in recognising that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner shares our values….
To help solve global problems, we are pursuing variable geometry— different coalitions for different issues, based on values and interests. On Ukraine, we are a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per-capita contributors to its defence and security. On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland’s future.
Our commitment to Article 5 is unwavering. We are working with our NATO allies (including the Nordic Baltic 8) to further secure the alliance’s northern and western flanks, including through unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, submarines, aircraft, and boots on the ground.
On plurilateral trade, we are championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union, creating a new trading block of 1.5 billion people. On critical minerals, we are forming buyer’s clubs anchored in the G7 so that the world can diversify away from concentrated supply. On AI, we are cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure we will not ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyperscalers.
This is not naive multilateralism. Nor is it relying on diminished institutions. It is building the coalitions that work, issue by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together. In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations. And it is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities. Middle powers must act together because if you are not at the table, you are on the menu. Great powers can afford to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity, the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.
But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what is offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating. This is not sovereignty. It is the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.
In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice: to compete with each other for favour or to combine to create a third path with impact. We should not allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity, and rules will remain strong — if we choose to wield it together.”
What does it mean for the middle and smaller powers to live – as Havel would put it – in truth.
“It means naming reality. Stop invoking the “rules-based international order” as though it still functions as advertised. Call the system what it is: a period where the most powerful pursue their interests using economic integration as a weapon of coercion.
It means acting consistently. Apply the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic intimidation from one direction but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.
It means building what we claim to believe in. Rather than waiting for the hegemon to restore an order it is dismantling, create institutions and agreements that function as described. And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion.
Building a strong domestic economy should always be every government’s priority. Diversification internationally is not just economic prudence; it is the material foundation for honest foreign policy. Countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.”
Perhaps this is something that the present Government, the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister could consider. Or is their unwillingness to comment a form of “leaving the sign in the window” – or perhaps the silence of the lambs.
Carney concludes with this call
“We are taking the sign out of the window. The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy. But from the fracture, we can build something better, stronger, and more just. This is the task of the middle powers, who have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and the most to gain from a world of genuine cooperation.
The powerful have their power. But we have something too — the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home, and to act together. That is Canada’s path. We choose it openly and confidently. And it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us.”
Canada has found a path and put up a signpost. It is one that New Zealand could well adopt.
Final Comments
The rule based order was only as good as the willingness of the Great Powers to abide them. The reality is that most of the time China and Russia have not accepted the existence of such an order and the USA would invoke the order when it suited them. Recent developments suggest that the rules based order is not longer useful in terms of the strategic interests of the USA.
The rule based order may no longer be invoked and relied upon by smaller states such as Australia and New Zealand. It will probably be recast in the form of a revised collective security arrangement. Canada’s proposals provide an example. Russia is a threat in the northern hemisphere and Europe. China is a threat in Asia and the Pacific. Security arrangements will have to recognise this.
The deterioration or collapse of the rule based order will revive realpolitik – something that has been a factor for decades but has not become quite as manifest as it is likely to become. However, experience shows that realpolitik works best when objectives are limited and clear, and when it is firmly aligned with national interest. It requires clarity about material capabilities—hard power—and an understanding of how these align with the prevailing balance of power. Such diplomacy also demands the capacity to anticipate second-order effects, including the reactions of competitors. At present, many decision-makers lack the ability to anticipate the impact of their policies.
Global rivalries have created a disequilibrium that is unlikely to be stabilized in the short term. The dominant trend in play works against the establishment of a stable balance of power. Yet, what the new balance of power will look like is the key question confronting us.
Prime Minister Carney provides a model. As the world sheds its illusions about the ethical superiority and desirability of a rules-based globalist order, gaining clarity about what a new balance of power looks like becomes of utmost importance.
David Harvey is a former District Court Judge and Mastermind champion, as well as an award winning writer who blogs at the substack site A Halflings View - Where this article was sourced.
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