I was privileged to hear them speak recently on this issue, and it was hugely illuminating (and depressing).
Before we get into what they say, it is worth highlighting what they have done – as that is relevant to their opinions.
Major General Howard was the head of defence intelligence for NZ. More impressively he also served for several years as the deputy director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency. He was only the second non American to serve at that level. It has more than 16,000 staff and is a major contributor to the US President’s Daily Brief. He previously led our deployment of 7,000 troops to East Timor, now Timor-Leste.
Major Tim Ewing-Jarvie was the Chief Instructor of the NZ Army Combat School. He spent three years as an advisor in The Pentagon, and previously was the Recon and Sniper Platoon Commander.
Both gentlemen have seen combat, and have worked professionally in intelligence at the highest levels. They know more the the average blogger, to put it mildly.
They write:
Major Tim Ewing-Jarvie was the Chief Instructor of the NZ Army Combat School. He spent three years as an advisor in The Pentagon, and previously was the Recon and Sniper Platoon Commander.
Both gentlemen have seen combat, and have worked professionally in intelligence at the highest levels. They know more the the average blogger, to put it mildly.
They write:
The United States–Iran war has punctured any residual belief that distant conflicts stay distant, with airspace disruption affecting flights through Middle East hubs and adding renewed pressure to the prices of energy, key imports and inputs. Set this alongside Russia’s war in Ukraine grinding into its fifth year, a pressured Nato, the weaponisation of trade and escalating tension across the Indo-Pacific.
We are a long way from Helen Clark’s benign strategic environment.
It’s fair to say that national security is not a policy area most people encounter directly, in the same way personal experiences of a classroom, a hospital waiting room, or a burglary shape views on education, health or crime. But national security is not all about warships and intelligence agencies. It’s about protecting New Zealand’s freedom to prosper (economically, ideologically and physically) and the resilience of those systems and dependencies that underpin everyday life.
In other words, it is really really important.
Addressing these challenges may, for one, call for broader public-private information sharing, greater contingency planning with critical sectors, and a more explicit national view of which dependencies (energy, medicines, critical minerals) warrant prioritised investment for greater resilience. We need to talk more about the potential function of government subsidies to offset commercial viability issues in the process, and the prioritisation of infrastructure resilience. Perhaps more challenging, we also need more nuanced discussions about our sensitivity to resource extraction at a time when the inputs needed to secure sustainable technologies could become increasingly unaffordable, or inaccessible, without valued chips to trade.
We need to be prepared.
Take one example. What if China moves on Taiwan within the next 12 months? If the US uses up the huge bulk of its offensive capacity in Iran, this could tempt China to move earlier than later. China is building 10 warships a year and a new aircraft carrier every three years or so.
I used to think China moving on Taiwan was possible, but not probable. I now think it is probable – more when, not if. President Xi has said multiple times they will unify, with force if necessary. We should believe him.
Has the NZ Government got a plan for what to do if this happens? Have we war gamed what the effect on our supply lines will be, on the economy – let alone the diplomatic and military response. Do we have a mitigation plan for this eventuality, that we are already putting into place?
Some other thoughts I have had, since hearing them speak.
1. We should follow Australia in identifying critical industry supply chains, and directing the industry that over the next x years, no more than y% (say 50%) should come from one country.
2. We should consider a Director of National Intelligence who co-ordinates all the intelligence functions from Defence, SIS, GCSB, Customs, Police etc. However only to do this if it doesn’t just become an extra bureaucratic agency.
3. Should the National Security Advisor be the Chief Executive of DPMC (who has many other things to look after), or be a standalone position?
4. Should our commitment to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP be legislated, so that future governments follow through (or explicitly change the law). We have made the commitment in theory, but most of it is set for many years away.
I think we underestimate how devastating for regional security (and our economy) a conflict between China and Taiwan would be. Hoping it never happens is not a strategy.
David Farrar runs Curia Market Research, a specialist opinion polling and research agency, and the popular Kiwiblog where this article was sourced. He previously worked in the Parliament for eight years, serving two National Party Prime Ministers and three Opposition Leaders
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