America had launched a major war without consulting its NATO allies. British bases in Bahrain, Qatar and Cyprus were hit by Iranian retaliation, even though London had refused to support the operation.
And here was Macron, telling Europeans they could no longer rely on Washington for their security. “To be free, one needs to be feared,” he declared.
Macron said France would increase its nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades. He named eight countries that had agreed to host French nuclear-armed aircraft on their soil: Germany, Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark.
The plan is to spread French jets carrying nuclear weapons across the continent, complicating Russian targeting calculations. Macron also unveiled a Franco-German nuclear steering group, co-founded with Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
France has guarded its nuclear weapons with a jealousy bordering on obsession. When Charles de Gaulle built the French bomb in the early 1960s, he did so to free France from dependence on America.
In 1966, he pulled France out of NATO’s military command and ordered all foreign forces off French soil. To this day, France is the only NATO member that refuses to participate in the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.
Now, for the first time, Paris is offering to share the one capability it has never been willing to discuss with anyone.
In 1964, de Gaulle gave West Germany an ultimatum: follow America or follow Europe. Germany chose America.
Every French president since has tested that choice. Mitterrand hinted to Kohl in the 1980s that France’s vital interests extended beyond French borders. Macron offered nuclear dialogue to Merkel after his election in 2017. She ignored it.
He tried again with Olaf Scholz, whose fractious coalition left Germany unable to act. Scholz once tried to bond with Macron over a Fischbrötchen, a fish roll from a Hamburg harbour stand. Offering that to the president of the country that invented haute cuisine told you all you needed to know.
Before Merz, the last French and German leaders who genuinely got on were Chirac and Schröder, united by their opposition to the Iraq war in 2003. For two long decades after that, the relationship drifted.
The American umbrella was always deemed sufficient. Why take a risk on something untested?
But the umbrella started leaking. US military aid to Ukraine collapsed. The New START arms control treaty between Washington and Moscow expired in February 2026 without a successor. And then came Iran.
De Gaulle always feared that future American presidents would not risk their own cities to defend Europe. He was six decades early but looking at the wreckage in Ukraine (and considering America’s unilateralism in Tehran), it is hard to say he was wrong.
Germans have drawn the same conclusion. A December 2025 poll found that 75 percent supported nuclear talks with France. Nine months earlier, it had been 54 percent. This in a country that shut down every nuclear power station and defined itself through post-war pacifism.
Merz set the tone in a podcast interview in February. He does not want Germany to build its own nuclear weapons. The 1990 treaty that permitted German reunification explicitly forbids it. But the French offer, he said, “cannot simply be left unexamined.”
In the same interview, Merz let slip something revealing. The flagship Franco-German defence project, a 100-billion-euro next-generation fighter jet called FCAS, is on the verge of collapse.
France needs the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons and operate from aircraft carriers. Germany does not. “We have a real problem in the requirement profile,” Merz said. “If we cannot solve that, we cannot maintain the project.”
France and Germany cannot agree on FCAS because they have different nuclear needs. But they can apparently agree on joint nuclear deterrence.
None of it will matter, though, if the politics do not hold.
In France, the far-right National Rally is polling at 35 to 37 percent, ahead of a presidential election in 2027. Marine Le Pen was convicted of embezzlement in 2025 and banned from office, but her protégé Jordan Bardella leads in every tested run-off scenario.
The National Rally views the nuclear pact as a betrayal of Gaullist sovereignty. Party officials have promised to revoke it if they win power. Macron cannot run again. His approval rating has sunk to 11 percent in any case. The next president will take office in little more than a year. The eight countries sheltering under the French umbrella must ask whether it will still be there in 2028.
Germany faces its own version of the problem. The Alternative for Germany, or AfD, is polling at around 24 percent, virtually tied with Merz’s party. The AfD wants to restore ties with Russia, end sanctions and pull back from NATO. Some of its more radical members have called for independent German nuclear weapons. Its leader, Alice Weidel, has declared that peace in Europe is only possible with Russia, not without it.
The AfD wants to befriend the very country the pact is designed to deter.
Mainstream parties still refuse to govern with either the National Rally or the AfD. But the French firewall is crumbling, and the German one has never been tested at this level of pressure. If both fail at once, the most significant European security agreement since the Cold War will become a dead letter. Moscow knows this. Russian officials wasted no time comparing German rearmament to 1933.
While America is busy bombing Iran, Russia is watching Europe’s defence struggles with undisguised satisfaction.
Macron and Merz have done what they can. Whether their strategy survives depends on voters, who may not share their sense of urgency.
De Gaulle built the French bomb because he believed Europe could not rely on anyone else.
Sixty years later, Europe is discovering it may not be able to rely on itself.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
Macron said France would increase its nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades. He named eight countries that had agreed to host French nuclear-armed aircraft on their soil: Germany, Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark.
The plan is to spread French jets carrying nuclear weapons across the continent, complicating Russian targeting calculations. Macron also unveiled a Franco-German nuclear steering group, co-founded with Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
France has guarded its nuclear weapons with a jealousy bordering on obsession. When Charles de Gaulle built the French bomb in the early 1960s, he did so to free France from dependence on America.
In 1966, he pulled France out of NATO’s military command and ordered all foreign forces off French soil. To this day, France is the only NATO member that refuses to participate in the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.
Now, for the first time, Paris is offering to share the one capability it has never been willing to discuss with anyone.
In 1964, de Gaulle gave West Germany an ultimatum: follow America or follow Europe. Germany chose America.
Every French president since has tested that choice. Mitterrand hinted to Kohl in the 1980s that France’s vital interests extended beyond French borders. Macron offered nuclear dialogue to Merkel after his election in 2017. She ignored it.
He tried again with Olaf Scholz, whose fractious coalition left Germany unable to act. Scholz once tried to bond with Macron over a Fischbrötchen, a fish roll from a Hamburg harbour stand. Offering that to the president of the country that invented haute cuisine told you all you needed to know.
Before Merz, the last French and German leaders who genuinely got on were Chirac and Schröder, united by their opposition to the Iraq war in 2003. For two long decades after that, the relationship drifted.
The American umbrella was always deemed sufficient. Why take a risk on something untested?
But the umbrella started leaking. US military aid to Ukraine collapsed. The New START arms control treaty between Washington and Moscow expired in February 2026 without a successor. And then came Iran.
De Gaulle always feared that future American presidents would not risk their own cities to defend Europe. He was six decades early but looking at the wreckage in Ukraine (and considering America’s unilateralism in Tehran), it is hard to say he was wrong.
Germans have drawn the same conclusion. A December 2025 poll found that 75 percent supported nuclear talks with France. Nine months earlier, it had been 54 percent. This in a country that shut down every nuclear power station and defined itself through post-war pacifism.
Merz set the tone in a podcast interview in February. He does not want Germany to build its own nuclear weapons. The 1990 treaty that permitted German reunification explicitly forbids it. But the French offer, he said, “cannot simply be left unexamined.”
In the same interview, Merz let slip something revealing. The flagship Franco-German defence project, a 100-billion-euro next-generation fighter jet called FCAS, is on the verge of collapse.
France needs the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons and operate from aircraft carriers. Germany does not. “We have a real problem in the requirement profile,” Merz said. “If we cannot solve that, we cannot maintain the project.”
France and Germany cannot agree on FCAS because they have different nuclear needs. But they can apparently agree on joint nuclear deterrence.
None of it will matter, though, if the politics do not hold.
In France, the far-right National Rally is polling at 35 to 37 percent, ahead of a presidential election in 2027. Marine Le Pen was convicted of embezzlement in 2025 and banned from office, but her protégé Jordan Bardella leads in every tested run-off scenario.
The National Rally views the nuclear pact as a betrayal of Gaullist sovereignty. Party officials have promised to revoke it if they win power. Macron cannot run again. His approval rating has sunk to 11 percent in any case. The next president will take office in little more than a year. The eight countries sheltering under the French umbrella must ask whether it will still be there in 2028.
Germany faces its own version of the problem. The Alternative for Germany, or AfD, is polling at around 24 percent, virtually tied with Merz’s party. The AfD wants to restore ties with Russia, end sanctions and pull back from NATO. Some of its more radical members have called for independent German nuclear weapons. Its leader, Alice Weidel, has declared that peace in Europe is only possible with Russia, not without it.
The AfD wants to befriend the very country the pact is designed to deter.
Mainstream parties still refuse to govern with either the National Rally or the AfD. But the French firewall is crumbling, and the German one has never been tested at this level of pressure. If both fail at once, the most significant European security agreement since the Cold War will become a dead letter. Moscow knows this. Russian officials wasted no time comparing German rearmament to 1933.
While America is busy bombing Iran, Russia is watching Europe’s defence struggles with undisguised satisfaction.
Macron and Merz have done what they can. Whether their strategy survives depends on voters, who may not share their sense of urgency.
De Gaulle built the French bomb because he believed Europe could not rely on anyone else.
Sixty years later, Europe is discovering it may not be able to rely on itself.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
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