In drawing upon the natural law as the foundation for his ethics of liberty, Rothbard highlights the philosophical links between human nature, human reason, and free will. Natural law, as Rothbard depicts it, is based on “the ability of man’s reason to understand and arrive at the laws, physical and ethical, of the natural order.” This ability to reason is inherent in being human, a point on which Rothbard quotes Frederick Copleston:
He [Aquinas] shared with Aristotle the view that it is the possession of reason which distinguished man from animals [and which] enables him to act deliberately in view of the consciously apprehended end and raises him above the level of purely instinctive behavior.
Rothbard argues that both reason and free will are essential in choosing which ends to pursue: man “possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.” Thus, he views both reason and free will as essential components of human nature. Both reason and free will are universal characteristics of all human beings. It is, therefore, mistaken to suppose that vulnerable people are not responsible for their actions, for example, when they commit crimes, on grounds that they do not have the free will to decide to desist from crime and are “forced” into crime by their poverty or other disadvantages. Rothbard explains that free will is inherent in human nature and is, therefore, common to all human beings:
And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, “the rational animal,” possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.
Therefore, everyone, no matter the circumstances of his life, has the free will to make choices. Rothbard’s explanation for why reason and free will are universal human attributes is that they are elements of self-ownership. He explains:
The individual man, in introspecting the fact of his own consciousness, also discovers the primordial natural fact of his freedom: his freedom to choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason about any given subject. In short, the natural fact of his “free will.” He also discovers the natural fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his natural ownership over his self.
Based on the concept of self-ownership, everyone is free to think, free to choose which ends to pursue, and free to exercise his reason as he wills. One may feel constrained or trapped by circumstances, for example, feeling trapped in poverty, or one may feel under irresistible temptation to commit crimes, but that too is a choice and an exercise of free will. Everyone has the ability to say yes or no, to think before acting. Rothbard explains that “any man, has freedom of will, freedom to choose the course of his life and his actions.”
The fact that we have different reasoning abilities, and may often be unreasonable and prone to error, does not mean that human beings lack the capacity to reason or the freedom to choose. By the same token, the fact that people’s decisions may be strongly influenced by their material circumstances or their station in life does not mean they lack free will.
A related argument often advanced by egalitarians is that free will is only meaningful if people have the freedom to exert their will. Rothbard rejects that argument by distinguishing between “free will” and “freedom of action.” Freedom of action may be constrained by some form of impairment, physical, mental, situational, or circumstantial, but that does not extinguish free will. We all have free will, and free will is inalienable, but this does not mean that everyone is free at all times and in all places to do whatever they want.
In this connection Rothbard also distinguishes between “freedom” and “power,” as human beings are of course not omnipotent and, therefore, do not have the power to do whatever they choose. Our choices and actions are constrained by the laws of nature—we are not free to “leap oceans at a single bound,” to use Rothbard’s example.
Freedom of action is also constrained by the laws of society, for example, when held in bondage. No man lives alone on a desert island like Robinson Crusoe, but instead lives in a society where his property rights are bounded by the property rights of others and attendant laws. Free will, therefore, cannot mean unlimited freedom to act:
If a man’s free will to adopt ideas and values is inalienable, his freedom of action—his freedom to put these ideas into effect in the world, is not in such a fortunate condition. Again, we are not talking about the limitations on man’s power inherent in the laws of his own nature and of the natures of other entities. What we are talking about now is interference with his sphere of action by other people.
What people are free to do is materially, socially, legally, and politically constrained, which is precisely the concern in debates about liberty. Yet all these debates about the meaning and scope of liberty must recognize the innate capacity of human beings to reason, to decide which ends to pursue, and the free will to choose.
Dr. Wanjiru Njoya is a Scholar-in-Residence for the Mises Institute. She is the author of Economic Freedom and Social Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). This article was first published HERE
1 comment:
This is a good counter argument to much of Marxism which reduces us to being not responsible for our behaviour.
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