A guest post on Kiwiblog by Lucy Rogers:
I recently had an interview (https://theplatform.kiwi/podcasts/episode/lucy-rogers-on-liberation-theology) with The Platform about my criticism of Cuban academic Professor Miguel de la Torre, who spoke at Auckland University. Some issues arose in our conversation which are worth more elucidation than was possible in a 10 minute radio interview.
Cuba’s human rights abuses are morally wrong
At one point in the interview I said that Cuban atrocities, like Nazi atrocities, are morally wrong and it was therefore morally wrong to invite a supporter of the Cuban government to speak at Auckland Uni. However, I emphasised that my commitment to free speech meant I did not believe in employing the apparatus of the state to prevent his talk from happening.
Morality: a social construct?
Michael Laws responded: “But isn’t morality subjective?” I said that I did not think so and that there was no academic consensus on that issue. He responded (and I am paraphrasing) that respect for free speech depends on the state presumption that objective morality does not exist.
Our law presupposes objective morality
In fact, the concept of objective morality is inherent to our law. Section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 states that it is a defence to a criminal charge that someone suffers from “natural imbecility or a disease of the mind rendering him or her incapable of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong”, i.e. insanity.
Moral wrongness is not the test of criminality
The question is not whether morality is subjective: rather, it is whether it is prudent for the state to involve itself in prohibiting an act. We do not criminalise every child who tells their schoolteacher an excuse for not doing their homework. But lying in other contexts, such as perjury, is a criminal act.
What was our culture’s historic answer?
The rationales against state censorship historically were various. Firstly, private institutions like the media, the family, the academy, the Church, etc play an important role as a check on the power of the state, as no one ideology can predominate. The concentration of too much power in one institution, whether in the monarch or the Church during the Middle Ages, was deemed undesirable due to the human tendency to misuse power. This requires limitations on the role of the state in steering social institutions towards monolithic views.
Censorship does not permit social pluralism
A second reason for state non-interference in the expression of opinion is that it permitted social pluralism, which was facilitated by an evolving concept of shared cultural identity despite our differences and a willingness of different ideological factions to peacefully co-exist. Our forebears discovered that it was possible for people to disagree without killing each other.
Worldviews are deeply important to many people
If we accept that to kōrero (speak) is an important aspect of what it means to be human, and that it is deeply important to many people to be able to express their sincerely wrong views, then social pluralism requires that the state remain out of the regulation of expression of opinion.
The subjectivity of morality undermines the concept of human rights
These arguments ought to challenge cultural assumptions across the political spectrum today. For one thing, the arguments I have outlined above emphatically do not (as Michael Laws believes) entail that morality is subjective. In fact, I submit that the supposed subjectivity of morality undermines the concept of human rights altogether, including free speech.
Is it important to constitutionally protect gratuitous offence?
The arguments I have made also challenge free speech absolutism, as nothing I have said justifies (for example) gratuitous offence. Readers may remember the phenomenon of Wicked Campervans a few years ago: I do not see the great historic rationales for free speech as applicable to displaying the word “C**T” on a van. I do not agree that offence is subjective, although it may be in the interests of social pluralism that we should treat it as such.
My arguments also challenge ideological intolerance
I scarcely need add, however, that my arguments should also challenge anyone who cannot fathom how anyone could possibly hold a differing opinion, or who assumes ill-faith of her political opponents, or hates them. This discourages social pluralism and leads to totalitarianism. Liberty requires that people want to co-exist. Perhaps the most precious taonga (treasure) of Western culture was the belief that reasonable people can disagree.
My thanks to Michael Laws for a great conversation. He was an intelligent and reasonable interviewer who gave me a fair hearing. I thought his pushback at points was very appropriate, although I disagree with his conclusions.
At one point in the interview I said that Cuban atrocities, like Nazi atrocities, are morally wrong and it was therefore morally wrong to invite a supporter of the Cuban government to speak at Auckland Uni. However, I emphasised that my commitment to free speech meant I did not believe in employing the apparatus of the state to prevent his talk from happening.
Morality: a social construct?
Michael Laws responded: “But isn’t morality subjective?” I said that I did not think so and that there was no academic consensus on that issue. He responded (and I am paraphrasing) that respect for free speech depends on the state presumption that objective morality does not exist.
Our law presupposes objective morality
In fact, the concept of objective morality is inherent to our law. Section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 states that it is a defence to a criminal charge that someone suffers from “natural imbecility or a disease of the mind rendering him or her incapable of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong”, i.e. insanity.
Moral wrongness is not the test of criminality
The question is not whether morality is subjective: rather, it is whether it is prudent for the state to involve itself in prohibiting an act. We do not criminalise every child who tells their schoolteacher an excuse for not doing their homework. But lying in other contexts, such as perjury, is a criminal act.
What was our culture’s historic answer?
The rationales against state censorship historically were various. Firstly, private institutions like the media, the family, the academy, the Church, etc play an important role as a check on the power of the state, as no one ideology can predominate. The concentration of too much power in one institution, whether in the monarch or the Church during the Middle Ages, was deemed undesirable due to the human tendency to misuse power. This requires limitations on the role of the state in steering social institutions towards monolithic views.
Censorship does not permit social pluralism
A second reason for state non-interference in the expression of opinion is that it permitted social pluralism, which was facilitated by an evolving concept of shared cultural identity despite our differences and a willingness of different ideological factions to peacefully co-exist. Our forebears discovered that it was possible for people to disagree without killing each other.
Worldviews are deeply important to many people
If we accept that to kōrero (speak) is an important aspect of what it means to be human, and that it is deeply important to many people to be able to express their sincerely wrong views, then social pluralism requires that the state remain out of the regulation of expression of opinion.
The subjectivity of morality undermines the concept of human rights
These arguments ought to challenge cultural assumptions across the political spectrum today. For one thing, the arguments I have outlined above emphatically do not (as Michael Laws believes) entail that morality is subjective. In fact, I submit that the supposed subjectivity of morality undermines the concept of human rights altogether, including free speech.
Is it important to constitutionally protect gratuitous offence?
The arguments I have made also challenge free speech absolutism, as nothing I have said justifies (for example) gratuitous offence. Readers may remember the phenomenon of Wicked Campervans a few years ago: I do not see the great historic rationales for free speech as applicable to displaying the word “C**T” on a van. I do not agree that offence is subjective, although it may be in the interests of social pluralism that we should treat it as such.
My arguments also challenge ideological intolerance
I scarcely need add, however, that my arguments should also challenge anyone who cannot fathom how anyone could possibly hold a differing opinion, or who assumes ill-faith of her political opponents, or hates them. This discourages social pluralism and leads to totalitarianism. Liberty requires that people want to co-exist. Perhaps the most precious taonga (treasure) of Western culture was the belief that reasonable people can disagree.
My thanks to Michael Laws for a great conversation. He was an intelligent and reasonable interviewer who gave me a fair hearing. I thought his pushback at points was very appropriate, although I disagree with his conclusions.
2 comments:
Taonga does not mean treasure. It means property.
Argue like an academic , and ruin it by including the Maori gabble for whatever reason , but certainly does nothing to suggest you are an academic, or productive which IS what NZ requires .
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