Dave Patterson: How Did the US Navy Shoot Down Its Own Fighter?

When America’s naval ships engage in friendly fire, something has gone terribly wrong.

Once again, the spotlight is on the failure of President Joe Biden’s military policies. There are few other explanations for the US Navy assigned to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea being in a position to shoot down one of its own fighters. Questions that need to be answered: What were the Pentagon’s maritime and air policies from which the rules of engagement (ROE) were created? What training procedures led those manning the combat information center radar and weapons operators to identify a US Navy F/A-18EF, the Super Hornet, as a hostile inbound aircraft?

US Navy Attacks Iran-Backed Houthis

Combat sorties have been flown frequently by the Israelis, the US Navy, and the US Air Force, carrying out attacks on Yemeni Houthi terrorist targets. On Dec. 21, US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces attacked “a missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility operated by Iran-backed Houthis within Houthi-controlled territory in Sana’a, Yemen,” a CENTCOM press release announced. The strikes used precision-guided weapons to “disrupt and degrade Houthi operations, such as attacks against US Navy warships and merchant vessels in the Southern Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.”

During the launch of one of the flights heading to attack the Houthis, the USS Gettysburg, a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, mistook the F/A-18 Super Hornet for an enemy drone or anti-ship missile of some sort. During the launch and recovery operations for the fighter aircraft from the USS Harry S. Truman, members of the carrier task force “also shot down multiple Houthi one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles and an anti-ship cruise missile over the Red Sea,” CENTCOM reported. There was a significant amount of air activity around the Gettysburg and Harry S. Truman.

When engaged and hit by a missile fired by the Gettysburg’s weapon, “Both aviators were recovered alive after ejecting from their stricken two-seat F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft, with one suffering minor injuries. But the shootdown underlines just how dangerous the Red Sea corridor has become,” Real Clear Defense explained. The Associated Press provided a more detailed explanation of the incident:

“From the military’s description, the aircraft shot down was a two-seat F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet assigned to the ‘Red Rippers’ of Strike Fighter Squadron 11 out of Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia. While Central Command referred to both as pilots, typically a two-seat F/A-18 has a pilot and a weapons officer on board. It wasn’t immediately clear how the Gettysburg could mistake an F/A-18 for an enemy aircraft or missile, particularly as ships in a battle group remain linked by both radar and radio communication.”

Reports from the scene indicate the F/A-18 Super Hornet was hit as it left the deck of the Truman. After a catapult shot from a carrier deck, the time achieving speed and gaining altitude is particularly critical in initiating the climbing turn to join a formation or arrive at cruise altitude. In any event, it would seem the US Navy fighter jet would have been moving away from the carrier task force.

There was no report on what weapons were used to shoot down the American jet. “The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser carries several missile systems, including several variants of the Navy’s Standard Missile — which have become the main ordinance used against Houthi weapons and equipment — as well as anti-air machine guns,” Task and Purpose observed. Not knowing the details of what happened until an official inquiry is completed, speculation regarding fault is neither useful nor fair. When hearing about combat actions, there is an adage that the first report is always wrong.

Confusion in a Ship Under Attack

In the heat of battle, who’s who and where are sometimes difficult to ferret out. The US naval vessels were under attack from Houthi terrorist missiles and drones. Confusion during defense is generally reduced by having fire control systems, radars, and communications integrated among the vessels to create situational awareness among the combatants. Clearly, something failed in this instance. US Navy ship captains are charged with the safety of their vessels and the lives of their crew. This responsibility is a priority. If a US Navy warship captain believes the ship is in danger, it is incumbent upon that captain to protect it.

The rub comes in understanding and defining “danger.” Pentagon policies and the ROEs that flow from them are supposed to clarify how a captain determines what is dangerous to the ship and crew. The precise US strategy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has at times been difficult to determine. Nonetheless, an unambiguous understanding of the ROEs is also critical to the training of the crews so that when they fire their weapons, it is the enemy that is engaged. Strict adherence to the ROEs structures and disciplines should govern a warship’s response when attacked.

What happened will come out in the investigation. What we know is that something definitely went wrong. Fortunately, the F/A-18 Super Hornet crew came out of the experience able to fight another day.

Dave is a retired U.S. Air Force Pilot with over 180 combat missions in Vietnam. He is the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and has served in executive positions in the private sector aerospace and defense industry. This article was first published HERE