Philip Crump: The Future of the International Rules-Based Order

The “international rules-based order” (IRBO) is a concept frequently championed by politicians, diplomats and academics as the foundation of contemporary global stability. It is portrayed as a coherent system of norms, treaties, and institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, and international law, that regulates State interactions, promotes economic cooperation, and prevents catastrophic conflict.

Yet despite its historic success, the future of the IRBO looks increasingly uncertain. Last week, foreign policy expert Professor Anne-Marie Brady wrote an article for The Post in which she observed that: “NZ has never looked more isolated. The rules-based international order is being vaporised. The alliances that guaranteed NZ security since the end of WWII are finished. A new order is forming in Europe, but NZ is not yet named among the like-minded states.”

Even before the emergence of Trump 2.0, the substance and universality of the international rules-based order had become subject to growing scepticism. Indeed, Professor Paul Gewirtz writing for The Brookings Institute in July 2024 described the IRBO as “weakened” due to the challenge posed by a rising China.

In 2021, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi articulated his country’s concerns by stating that, “The so-called ‘rules-based international order’ by a few countries is not clear in its meaning, as it reflects the rules of a few countries and does not represent the will of the international community.”

Wang’s critique raises a critical question: does this order exist in a meaningful way, or is it a crumbling façade, upheld only when it serves the interests of the world’s great powers, with peace maintained not by rules but by a complex web of threats and counter-threats?

The re-election of the maverick President Trump has added a wildcard into the mix which has accelerated the decline and made predicting an outcome impossible.

The Selective Application of Rules

The IRBO ostensibly provides a universal framework wherein all nations adhere to a shared set of principles. In practice, however, its application reveals significant disparities. The great powers, chiefly the United States and China, alongside others, exercise outsized influence over its mechanisms.

The United Nations Security Council exemplifies this imbalance: its five permanent members, each endowed with veto power, can unilaterally obstruct resolutions that contravene their strategic priorities. During the 1980s, for instance, the United States repeatedly vetoed UN resolutions condemning its support for the Contras in Nicaragua, despite a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling that U.S. actions violated international law. Meanwhile, China has leveraged its position to deflect scrutiny of its own policies. Far from being inviolable, these rules can appear to be contingent upon the preferences of the powerful.

Enforcement further undermines the IRBO’s credibility. International law, while theoretically binding, lacks efficacy without the power to compel compliance. The International Criminal Court’s rulings, such as those addressing conflicts in Ukraine or elsewhere, remain largely symbolic gestures against States with sufficient might to ignore them.

Meanwhile, the United States exempts its own military personnel from ICC jurisdiction. Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani highlighted this inconsistency in 2018, arguing that, “unlawful unilateral sanctions in themselves constitute a form of ‘economic terrorism’” and that the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal demonstrated a resolve “to render all international institutions ineffectual.” For Rouhani, the IRBO functions less as a shared order than as a tool of coercion wielded by dominant powers.

Stability: Rules or Realpolitik?

Advocates of the IRBO often attribute the absence of global war since 1945 to its stabilising influence, alongside the growth of economic interdependence. Yet, a closer examination suggests that deterrence, rather than adherence to rules, may be the true anchor.

NATO’s collective defence commitment, the spectre of nuclear arsenals, and the mutual economic reliance between powers like the United States and China create formidable barriers to large-scale conflict. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine flagrantly breached foundational norms of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the UN Charter. Yet escalation has been curtailed not by legal precepts but by NATO’s robust military response and economic sanctions. The post-war era’s relative stability may owe more to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction than to the sanctity of any rules-based system.

Even within the West, doubts about the IRBO’s resilience have surfaced. Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, reflecting on Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2022, observed, “The lesson is that the rules-based international order is not self-sustaining. It requires constant effort, constant vigilance, and constant willingness to defend it.”

Delivered during a speech at the Conservative Party Conference, Johnson’s remark tacitly conceded that the order’s effectiveness depends not on its inherent strength but on the active resolve of those prepared to uphold it, a recognition that its existence hinges on hard power rather than principle.

A Functional, Yet Limited, Framework

This is not to suggest that the IRBO lacks all utility. It provides a practical foundation for routine international affairs. Diplomatic immunity ensures the smooth conduct of foreign relations; maritime laws facilitate global commerce; and smaller states, such as New Zealand, leverage trade agreements to amplify our influence in an unequal world. In these respects, the order serves as a useful scaffold for cooperation.

Yet its limitations become starkly apparent in moments of crisis. The 2003 invasion of Iraq proceeded without UN authorisation, driven by American determination rather than collective consent. China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, upheld despite a 2016 international tribunal ruling against them, further illustrate how readily powerful states bypass the system when it aligns with their interests.

French President Emmanuel Macron has underscored this fragility, warning in 2020 at the United Nations General Assembly that, “all the fractures that existed before the pandemic, the hegemonic shock of the powers, the questioning of multilateralism or its instrumentalisation, the trampling of international law has only accelerated and deepened.” Macron’s observation suggests that the IRBO’s practical utility is eroding under the weight of competing powers.

The international rules-based order, as we know it, emerged from the wreckage of World War II, a system crafted by the victorious Allied powers to cement their authority and forestall another global cataclysm.

Established in 1945 with the United Nations and reinforced by the Bretton Woods institutions, it was less a singular triumph than a strategic entrenchment of the wartime coalition’s influence, principally the United States, the Soviet Union, and their partners, albeit one fractured by Cold War rivalry shortly thereafter.

Yet, as the 21st century progresses, this framework shows signs of exhaustion. The ascent of China, the assertiveness of regional actors, and the unravelling of multilateral trust reveal a set of rules and institutions ill-suited to a multipolar landscape. As new frameworks, perhaps rooted in competing blocs or pragmatic alliances, begin to take shape, the question of whose interests they will serve looms large.

Conclusion

Does the international rules-based order exist in a meaningful way?

To an extent, yes - it has provided a framework that, for all its flaws, has shaped State behaviour and averted global collapse since the crucible of 1945.

Yet, as Wang Yi and Boris Johnson suggest, its limits are clear: Wang questions its universality, while Johnson underscores its reliance on ceaseless effort. The deeper truth lies in a delicate balance - military might, economic ties, and the shared interest in avoiding chaos have sustained it more than any universal ideals.

The IRBO remains a tool, often bent to the will of the powerful, yet one that has fostered a measure of stability worth preserving. As its foundations shift, the task ahead is not to abandon it wholesale but to forge a successor that reflects today’s multipolar world, one that tempers dominance with cooperation and ensures the weak are not merely pawns.

Lawyer and writer Philip Crump explores political, legal and cultural issues facing New Zealand. Sometimes known as Thomas Cranmer. This article was published HERE