In a recent opinion piece, New Plymouth District Councillor Dinnie Moeahu defends Mana Whakahono ā Rohe (MWaR) by dismissing critics as victims of "myths" and "political slogans". He argues that because MWaR agreements under Sections 58L–58U of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) are categorised as "participation agreements", they do not transfer statutory authority, create co-governance, or establish a veto.
This defence relies heavily on semantics. In public policy and administrative law, controlling the process can significantly influence the outcome.
Parliament introduced Mana Whakahono ā Rohe to improve engagement between councils and iwi during resource management planning. The question, however, is not why it was introduced, but whether the statutory rights it creates alter the balance of influence within local government.
When the operation of the RMA is examined, the claim that MWaR is merely a benign procedural tool becomes more difficult to sustain.
1. Section 58M Creates a Mandatory Statutory Process
Cr Moeahu frames MWaR as a collaborative framework intended to foster goodwill and efficiency. What he omits is that MWaR is not simply an optional arrangement that councils may choose to ignore.
Under Section 58M of the RMA, when an iwi authority formally seeks to initiate a MWaR, the local authority must commence the statutory process and negotiate in good faith with the relevant iwi authorities.
Unlike ordinary civic partnerships or voluntary consultation arrangements, a council cannot simply refuse to engage, decline the process, or substitute its own preferred model of consultation.
The fact: A framework that one party has a statutory right to initiate, requiring the other party to participate in a formal negotiation process, is not the same as a purely voluntary partnership. It creates an asymmetrical legal obligation.
2. Planning Influence Shapes Property Rights
Cr Moeahu points out that MWaR operates primarily at the plan-making stage (Schedule 1 of the RMA), rather than providing iwi with direct approval powers over individual resource consents. While this is technically correct, it understates the importance of planning decisions.
District Plans and Regional Policy Statements establish the rules that determine what private landowners can build, farm, develop, or use their property for.
Under Section 58R, a MWaR agreement may include provisions covering:
3. Procedural Rights Create Legal Leverage
The argument that MWaR does not amount to co-governance often relies on the fact that it does not formally transfer decision-making powers under provisions such as Section 33 or establish a Joint Management Agreement under Section 36B.
That distinction is legally correct. However, administrative law recognises that procedural rights can have substantial practical consequences.
Under a signed MWaR agreement:
Asymmetry of access: Iwi authorities receive statutory participation rights, including earlier engagement in planning processes, agreed consultation mechanisms, and involvement in monitoring arrangements. These rights are not automatically available to every other community group, ratepayer organisation, farmer, or business association.
Judicial review risk: If a council fails to follow agreed statutory processes under a MWaR agreement, its decisions may be exposed to judicial review for procedural unfairness or failure to comply with statutory obligations.
The fact: When a council is legally required to follow a specific statutory engagement pathway with one group, that group gains significant legal leverage within the democratic decision-making process. Describing this as "mere participation" overlooks the practical effect of those rights.
4. Additional Statutory Layers Create Complexity
The argument is often made that MWaR was created because existing RMA consultation arrangements had failed and that it would improve efficiency. However, creating additional mandatory statutory processes can also create additional complexity.
Councils can incur significant costs negotiating MWaR agreements and maintaining the administrative systems required to service them.
Issues may arise around:
The Bottom Line
When the operation of the RMA is examined, the claim that MWaR is merely a benign procedural tool becomes more difficult to sustain.
1. Section 58M Creates a Mandatory Statutory Process
Cr Moeahu frames MWaR as a collaborative framework intended to foster goodwill and efficiency. What he omits is that MWaR is not simply an optional arrangement that councils may choose to ignore.
Under Section 58M of the RMA, when an iwi authority formally seeks to initiate a MWaR, the local authority must commence the statutory process and negotiate in good faith with the relevant iwi authorities.
Unlike ordinary civic partnerships or voluntary consultation arrangements, a council cannot simply refuse to engage, decline the process, or substitute its own preferred model of consultation.
The fact: A framework that one party has a statutory right to initiate, requiring the other party to participate in a formal negotiation process, is not the same as a purely voluntary partnership. It creates an asymmetrical legal obligation.
2. Planning Influence Shapes Property Rights
Cr Moeahu points out that MWaR operates primarily at the plan-making stage (Schedule 1 of the RMA), rather than providing iwi with direct approval powers over individual resource consents. While this is technically correct, it understates the importance of planning decisions.
District Plans and Regional Policy Statements establish the rules that determine what private landowners can build, farm, develop, or use their property for.
Under Section 58R, a MWaR agreement may include provisions covering:
- how iwi authorities participate in the development and review of policy statements and plans;
- agreed processes for monitoring environmental outcomes;
- and processes relating to information sharing and cultural impact considerations.
3. Procedural Rights Create Legal Leverage
The argument that MWaR does not amount to co-governance often relies on the fact that it does not formally transfer decision-making powers under provisions such as Section 33 or establish a Joint Management Agreement under Section 36B.
That distinction is legally correct. However, administrative law recognises that procedural rights can have substantial practical consequences.
Under a signed MWaR agreement:
Asymmetry of access: Iwi authorities receive statutory participation rights, including earlier engagement in planning processes, agreed consultation mechanisms, and involvement in monitoring arrangements. These rights are not automatically available to every other community group, ratepayer organisation, farmer, or business association.
Judicial review risk: If a council fails to follow agreed statutory processes under a MWaR agreement, its decisions may be exposed to judicial review for procedural unfairness or failure to comply with statutory obligations.
The fact: When a council is legally required to follow a specific statutory engagement pathway with one group, that group gains significant legal leverage within the democratic decision-making process. Describing this as "mere participation" overlooks the practical effect of those rights.
4. Additional Statutory Layers Create Complexity
The argument is often made that MWaR was created because existing RMA consultation arrangements had failed and that it would improve efficiency. However, creating additional mandatory statutory processes can also create additional complexity.
Councils can incur significant costs negotiating MWaR agreements and maintaining the administrative systems required to service them.
Issues may arise around:
- the scope of agreements;
- cost recovery;
- overlapping iwi and hapū interests; and
- the practical administration of ongoing obligations.
The Bottom Line
Cr Moeahu is correct that MWaR does not provide iwi authorities with a final approval power or a formal veto over individual resource consents.
However, claiming that MWaR does not alter the balance of influence within local government is a much stronger claim and is difficult to sustain.
By creating a statutory right to initiate negotiations (Section 58M), establishing binding participation processes (Section 58R), and providing iwi authorities with formal influence in shaping planning frameworks, Mana Whakahono ā Rohe has changed the relationship between councils and iwi.
The debate should therefore not be reduced to accusations of "myths" or "political slogans".
The real question is whether Parliament should create statutory rights and procedural advantages that are available only to one section of the population, and whether that is consistent with a system of local government founded on equal citizenship and equal democratic participation.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.
However, claiming that MWaR does not alter the balance of influence within local government is a much stronger claim and is difficult to sustain.
By creating a statutory right to initiate negotiations (Section 58M), establishing binding participation processes (Section 58R), and providing iwi authorities with formal influence in shaping planning frameworks, Mana Whakahono ā Rohe has changed the relationship between councils and iwi.
The debate should therefore not be reduced to accusations of "myths" or "political slogans".
The real question is whether Parliament should create statutory rights and procedural advantages that are available only to one section of the population, and whether that is consistent with a system of local government founded on equal citizenship and equal democratic participation.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.

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