New Zealand faces an array of security challenges. Foreign interference tops the list, followed closely by espionage, while the threat of violent extremism remains ever-present. What sets this year’s NZSIS report apart is its willingness to confront these problems head-on.
This newfound frankness suggests a significant recalibration of New Zealand’s security outlook. It indicates that Wellington is aligning itself more closely with its traditional allies in recognising and addressing the complex threats facing the Indo-Pacific region.
Perhaps the most striking example of this shift is the report’s explicit naming of China as a source of concern. The document states unequivocally: “The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains a complex intelligence concern in New Zealand, but there are other states that undertake malicious activity here as well.”
This level of directness is unusual for such reports and underscores the gravity of the situation. The NZSIS provides specific examples of PRC activities, noting their use of “professional social networking sites to identify unwitting candidates, including New Zealanders” for “roles that can be co-opted for reporting privileged information.”
Interestingly, Russia is the only other country named, albeit in a different context: “Russia views their diaspora communities as a global network of ‘compatriots’ whose role is to promote their language, culture, and worldview.”
The document paints a picture of a nation grappling with intertwined security risks. It highlights the evolving nature of these threats: traditional espionage now coexists with cyber intrusions, foreign interference has become more sophisticated, and the spectre of lone-wolf terrorism looms large.
The report outlines ways in which foreign countries attempt to manipulate New Zealand’s political processes. These efforts target diaspora communities, influence academic institutions, and shape media narratives.
These are not hypotheticals. The NZSIS provides specific case studies, including foreign diplomats maintaining relationships with New Zealand student groups. They use this access to influence group memberships and ensure politically loyal leadership. Another example reveals attempts by a foreign state to pressure a local council by offering to fund a community event if they restricted the participation of a particular religious group banned in their country.
The findings also highlight more subtle forms of interference. These include efforts to shape public opinion through social media manipulation and attempts to exploit New Zealand’s open society for strategic advantage.
Particularly concerning is the targeting of New Zealand’s democratic institutions. The document suggests that some foreign actors seek to undermine public trust in these institutions by exploiting societal divisions and attempting to influence electoral processes.
The espionage threat is equally worrying. The NZSIS describes sophisticated efforts to steal intellectual property and warns of attempts to acquire sensitive technologies with potential military applications. The examples illuminate: Seemingly innocent proposals for space infrastructure have masked nefarious intentions, and academic collaborations have been exploited for intelligence gathering.
Cyber espionage receives significant attention. The report warns of state-sponsored hacking attempts against government agencies and private businesses. Many such attempts now employ artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques.
On violent extremism, the assessment is nuanced. While the threat level remains ‘low’, the NZSIS stresses that an attack is nonetheless a ‘realistic possibility’. The most likely scenario is a lone, self-radicalised actor acting with little warning.
The document notes the growing influence of online radicalisation. It warns that global events can inspire local extremists and highlights the difficulty of detecting and preventing such attacks.
What is particularly striking about the NZSIS report is not just its content, but what it signifies about New Zealand’s evolving stance on national security. This document marks a significant departure from the approach of recent years, especially under the Ardern government.
For Australia and other members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), this report sends a clear message: New Zealand has recognised the realities of the complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and is now willing to confront them openly.
New Zealand’s acknowledgment of the urgency and severity of these threats aligns its perspective more closely with that of its traditional allies. It is not about New Zealand playing catch-up but rather about the country independently arriving at similar conclusions and choosing to address these challenges more directly.
This report is a positive development for the trans-Tasman relationship., It suggests a closer alignment in how both countries perceive and intend to address regional security challenges. This could pave the way for enhanced cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening their already robust partnership.
Moreover, for the wider Five Eyes community, the NZSIS report reaffirms New Zealand’s commitment to the alliance. It demonstrates that New Zealand is prepared to take a more assertive stance on security issues, which could lead to more effective collaboration within the intelligence-sharing network.
The NZSIS report offers no easy solutions, nor should it. Its role is to illuminate threats, not prescribe policy. However, clearly articulating these threats sets the stage for a more robust and coordinated response, both domestically and in concert with New Zealand’s international partners.
And so, as valuable as the NZSIS report is for setting the scene, the real challenge will be the political response to the threats it identified.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
Perhaps the most striking example of this shift is the report’s explicit naming of China as a source of concern. The document states unequivocally: “The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains a complex intelligence concern in New Zealand, but there are other states that undertake malicious activity here as well.”
This level of directness is unusual for such reports and underscores the gravity of the situation. The NZSIS provides specific examples of PRC activities, noting their use of “professional social networking sites to identify unwitting candidates, including New Zealanders” for “roles that can be co-opted for reporting privileged information.”
Interestingly, Russia is the only other country named, albeit in a different context: “Russia views their diaspora communities as a global network of ‘compatriots’ whose role is to promote their language, culture, and worldview.”
The document paints a picture of a nation grappling with intertwined security risks. It highlights the evolving nature of these threats: traditional espionage now coexists with cyber intrusions, foreign interference has become more sophisticated, and the spectre of lone-wolf terrorism looms large.
The report outlines ways in which foreign countries attempt to manipulate New Zealand’s political processes. These efforts target diaspora communities, influence academic institutions, and shape media narratives.
These are not hypotheticals. The NZSIS provides specific case studies, including foreign diplomats maintaining relationships with New Zealand student groups. They use this access to influence group memberships and ensure politically loyal leadership. Another example reveals attempts by a foreign state to pressure a local council by offering to fund a community event if they restricted the participation of a particular religious group banned in their country.
The findings also highlight more subtle forms of interference. These include efforts to shape public opinion through social media manipulation and attempts to exploit New Zealand’s open society for strategic advantage.
Particularly concerning is the targeting of New Zealand’s democratic institutions. The document suggests that some foreign actors seek to undermine public trust in these institutions by exploiting societal divisions and attempting to influence electoral processes.
The espionage threat is equally worrying. The NZSIS describes sophisticated efforts to steal intellectual property and warns of attempts to acquire sensitive technologies with potential military applications. The examples illuminate: Seemingly innocent proposals for space infrastructure have masked nefarious intentions, and academic collaborations have been exploited for intelligence gathering.
Cyber espionage receives significant attention. The report warns of state-sponsored hacking attempts against government agencies and private businesses. Many such attempts now employ artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques.
On violent extremism, the assessment is nuanced. While the threat level remains ‘low’, the NZSIS stresses that an attack is nonetheless a ‘realistic possibility’. The most likely scenario is a lone, self-radicalised actor acting with little warning.
The document notes the growing influence of online radicalisation. It warns that global events can inspire local extremists and highlights the difficulty of detecting and preventing such attacks.
What is particularly striking about the NZSIS report is not just its content, but what it signifies about New Zealand’s evolving stance on national security. This document marks a significant departure from the approach of recent years, especially under the Ardern government.
For Australia and other members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), this report sends a clear message: New Zealand has recognised the realities of the complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and is now willing to confront them openly.
New Zealand’s acknowledgment of the urgency and severity of these threats aligns its perspective more closely with that of its traditional allies. It is not about New Zealand playing catch-up but rather about the country independently arriving at similar conclusions and choosing to address these challenges more directly.
This report is a positive development for the trans-Tasman relationship., It suggests a closer alignment in how both countries perceive and intend to address regional security challenges. This could pave the way for enhanced cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening their already robust partnership.
Moreover, for the wider Five Eyes community, the NZSIS report reaffirms New Zealand’s commitment to the alliance. It demonstrates that New Zealand is prepared to take a more assertive stance on security issues, which could lead to more effective collaboration within the intelligence-sharing network.
The NZSIS report offers no easy solutions, nor should it. Its role is to illuminate threats, not prescribe policy. However, clearly articulating these threats sets the stage for a more robust and coordinated response, both domestically and in concert with New Zealand’s international partners.
And so, as valuable as the NZSIS report is for setting the scene, the real challenge will be the political response to the threats it identified.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
1 comment:
The huge territorial waters that NZ should be responsible for have still not been remedied afer Helen Clarke virtually disbanded the airforce . Endless tracts of ocean cannot be protected even from illegal fishing by the NZ navy. The budget for upgrading our surveilance has to be dramatically expanded with assistance from satelittes and larger aircraft patrols . NASA should be invited and introduced to a full international airport in the deep south of NZ to cover the southern ocean and Antarctica .
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