Between sessions, I scrolled through X on my phone. What I saw shocked me. Russian drones had violated Polish airspace. NATO fighters were scrambling in darkness. For the first time since the Ukraine war began, a NATO member was firing on Russian military assets.
My first instinct was to try to verify what I was reading. Social media gets things wrong. So I went straight to the BBC, CNN, Die Welt, the Washington Post – the international outlets you trust when something serious happens. But they had nothing. No breaking news. No sign of anything unusual.
And still, on X, I could read details about Dutch fighter jets over Poland intercepting Russian drones. And so, I sat there, seventeen thousand kilometres from Warsaw, reading about events most Europeans did not know were happening.
For hours, X users documented NATO’s first combat with Russia while European journalists slept. European media was catching up hours later, around the time the attack was finally over. New Zealand outlets ran it much later still.
So, it is fair to say the world’s media did not pass the test of responding to a Russian aggression against NATO. But sadly, NATO did not pass Putin’s test, either. Not on the operational front, and not even on the political level.
The basic problem with NATO’s response was that it was both too expensive and not very effective. That probably requires some explanation.
When Russia sent its 19 cheap drones towards Poland, NATO threw everything at them at its disposal. The West’s most high-tech fighter jets, the F-35, went into the air and fired their missiles. They even hit some of Russia’s drones.
But here comes the problem. A Russian Shahed drone costs around US$35,000. But the American-made AMRAAM missile, their air-to-air weapon of choice, costs between one and two million US dollars. The other options would be Patriot interceptor missiles, but they cost about four million US dollars each. Even a shoulder-fired Stinger, the cheapest option, typically costs several hundred thousand dollars.
At this rate, NATO would be burning millions to stop cheap drones made of plywood. And that is before we add tens of thousands per F-35 flying hour. It is just not the most economical way to defend oneself. It is not sustainable, either.
But even given this high-tech, high-cost defence, many Russian drones got through, penetrating hundreds of kilometres into Poland. Debris turned up as far as Łódź. This was clearly not a border incident. Russian drones flew deep into NATO territory, and NATO’s high-tech gear could not stop them.
Compare this to Ukraine which shoots down 70 to 90 percent of incoming drones every night. They do it with cheap interceptor drones, so essentially racing drones with explosives attached, costing a few thousand dollars each. Ukraine also uses electronic jammers that cost a fraction of Stinger missiles (and can be used multiple times). Mobile gun teams backed by acoustic sensors take out the rest.
Ukraine only uses the expensive weapons when cruise missiles or ballistic threats appear. So, Ukrainian engineers working under bombardment have solved what NATO has not: you beat cheap threats with cheap defences.
Poland has its own counter-drone system designed for exactly this threat. Unfortunately, that system had its upgrades paused for “reassessment” earlier this year. Whether it would have been sufficient is a different question.
If NATO’s military response was suboptimal, its political response was hardly any better. First, US President Trump tweeted “Here we go!”, and then, hours later, he suggested it might have all been “a mistake”.
Only when Polish leaders vehemently disagreed, Washington eventually issued a statement at the UN about defending NATO territory. The problem was that the crucial moment for sending a clear message to Russia had long passed by then.
That Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, not Article 5, completed the picture. For those unfamiliar with NATO’s rules, Article 5 triggers the collective defence case: an attack on one is an attack on all. It would have escalated the situation.
Meanwhile, Article 4 just means consultations. It was not meant to cover cases in which an attack has happened, but in which one is feared. Except, on this occasion, that was quite clearly not the case. There had been an attack, but Poland, quite wisely, did not want to go to war but consult with its allies.
And yet, how would this look from Putin’s perspective? He would probably take from it that he can strike just below the Article 5 threshold, only to watch NATO burn money on ineffective responses and have its members argue about what to do.
And what did they decide to do? They came up with a response that looked a bit 20th century: France sent Rafale fighters, the Czech Republic readied helicopters for “low-altitude anti-drone missions”, Germany activated its Patriot batteries, and Britain announced sanctions. Two days later, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry to reinforce the eastern flank.
That was all very well. Except that none of these responses involved cheap counter-drone systems like the ones they use in Ukraine.
If Putin wanted to test NATO’s response, he has now learned many valuable lessons from this probe.
Russia’s attack went unnoticed by mainstream media for hours. It then took NATO too long to prevent drones from entering hundreds of kilometres into Polish airspace. And when NATO did become active, it cost millions of dollars to counter an attack that would cost thousands. And the icing on the cake was NATO’s confused political messaging after the attack, especially from the US side.
If nineteen drones cause this level of chaos, what happens when they send two hundred?
But perhaps the most significant discovery was that the bar for triggering NATO’s Article 5 is higher than anyone assumed. As it turns out, attacks on NATO territory prompt consultations, not retaliation. This is good to know if you are Vladimir Putin.
For a long time, security experts (and this column) have warned of Russia testing NATO’s defences. There was nothing surprising about what happened last week. Except, it was surprising how unprepared NATO was when it happened.
Next time, it might no longer be just a test.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
And still, on X, I could read details about Dutch fighter jets over Poland intercepting Russian drones. And so, I sat there, seventeen thousand kilometres from Warsaw, reading about events most Europeans did not know were happening.
For hours, X users documented NATO’s first combat with Russia while European journalists slept. European media was catching up hours later, around the time the attack was finally over. New Zealand outlets ran it much later still.
So, it is fair to say the world’s media did not pass the test of responding to a Russian aggression against NATO. But sadly, NATO did not pass Putin’s test, either. Not on the operational front, and not even on the political level.
The basic problem with NATO’s response was that it was both too expensive and not very effective. That probably requires some explanation.
When Russia sent its 19 cheap drones towards Poland, NATO threw everything at them at its disposal. The West’s most high-tech fighter jets, the F-35, went into the air and fired their missiles. They even hit some of Russia’s drones.
But here comes the problem. A Russian Shahed drone costs around US$35,000. But the American-made AMRAAM missile, their air-to-air weapon of choice, costs between one and two million US dollars. The other options would be Patriot interceptor missiles, but they cost about four million US dollars each. Even a shoulder-fired Stinger, the cheapest option, typically costs several hundred thousand dollars.
At this rate, NATO would be burning millions to stop cheap drones made of plywood. And that is before we add tens of thousands per F-35 flying hour. It is just not the most economical way to defend oneself. It is not sustainable, either.
But even given this high-tech, high-cost defence, many Russian drones got through, penetrating hundreds of kilometres into Poland. Debris turned up as far as Łódź. This was clearly not a border incident. Russian drones flew deep into NATO territory, and NATO’s high-tech gear could not stop them.
Compare this to Ukraine which shoots down 70 to 90 percent of incoming drones every night. They do it with cheap interceptor drones, so essentially racing drones with explosives attached, costing a few thousand dollars each. Ukraine also uses electronic jammers that cost a fraction of Stinger missiles (and can be used multiple times). Mobile gun teams backed by acoustic sensors take out the rest.
Ukraine only uses the expensive weapons when cruise missiles or ballistic threats appear. So, Ukrainian engineers working under bombardment have solved what NATO has not: you beat cheap threats with cheap defences.
Poland has its own counter-drone system designed for exactly this threat. Unfortunately, that system had its upgrades paused for “reassessment” earlier this year. Whether it would have been sufficient is a different question.
If NATO’s military response was suboptimal, its political response was hardly any better. First, US President Trump tweeted “Here we go!”, and then, hours later, he suggested it might have all been “a mistake”.
Only when Polish leaders vehemently disagreed, Washington eventually issued a statement at the UN about defending NATO territory. The problem was that the crucial moment for sending a clear message to Russia had long passed by then.
That Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, not Article 5, completed the picture. For those unfamiliar with NATO’s rules, Article 5 triggers the collective defence case: an attack on one is an attack on all. It would have escalated the situation.
Meanwhile, Article 4 just means consultations. It was not meant to cover cases in which an attack has happened, but in which one is feared. Except, on this occasion, that was quite clearly not the case. There had been an attack, but Poland, quite wisely, did not want to go to war but consult with its allies.
And yet, how would this look from Putin’s perspective? He would probably take from it that he can strike just below the Article 5 threshold, only to watch NATO burn money on ineffective responses and have its members argue about what to do.
And what did they decide to do? They came up with a response that looked a bit 20th century: France sent Rafale fighters, the Czech Republic readied helicopters for “low-altitude anti-drone missions”, Germany activated its Patriot batteries, and Britain announced sanctions. Two days later, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry to reinforce the eastern flank.
That was all very well. Except that none of these responses involved cheap counter-drone systems like the ones they use in Ukraine.
If Putin wanted to test NATO’s response, he has now learned many valuable lessons from this probe.
Russia’s attack went unnoticed by mainstream media for hours. It then took NATO too long to prevent drones from entering hundreds of kilometres into Polish airspace. And when NATO did become active, it cost millions of dollars to counter an attack that would cost thousands. And the icing on the cake was NATO’s confused political messaging after the attack, especially from the US side.
If nineteen drones cause this level of chaos, what happens when they send two hundred?
But perhaps the most significant discovery was that the bar for triggering NATO’s Article 5 is higher than anyone assumed. As it turns out, attacks on NATO territory prompt consultations, not retaliation. This is good to know if you are Vladimir Putin.
For a long time, security experts (and this column) have warned of Russia testing NATO’s defences. There was nothing surprising about what happened last week. Except, it was surprising how unprepared NATO was when it happened.
Next time, it might no longer be just a test.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
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