Her proposed solution is stronger constitutional protection, placing those rights beyond the reach of ordinary political bargaining and changes of government.
Protecting rights sounds straightforward. But much bigger questions lie behind her proposal: who ultimately decides what those rights mean, and who has the final authority when Parliament and the courts disagree?
Parliamentary sovereignty is not a constitutional failure
Charters describes New Zealand as an international outlier because Parliament retains the authority to make, amend and repeal legislation.
That is not an accidental weakness. It is a central feature of our Westminster parliamentary democracy.
New Zealand courts can review government decisions, interpret legislation and declare legislation inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. But they cannot invalidate an Act of Parliament simply because it conflicts with that Act. Parliament retains the final legislative authority.
Charters wants stronger constitutional protection for Treaty and Indigenous rights. But if Parliament can no longer change certain laws, who determines their meaning and how they apply?
Where courts can invalidate legislation for constitutional inconsistency, judges therefore acquire much greater authority over the limits of Parliament's power.
That is a major constitutional change, not simply stronger rights protection.
Do her overseas examples support her case?
Charters points to Canada, where the Constitution recognises and protects existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Canadian courts can invalidate legislation inconsistent with constitutional rights.
But Canada's arrangements developed through its own constitutional history and political negotiations. They cannot simply be transplanted into New Zealand without considering the consequences for our parliamentary system.
She also refers to the Sámi parliaments in Norway, Sweden and Finland. However, these are primarily representative and advisory institutions, not independent legislatures with general law-making powers. They demonstrate that Indigenous representation can operate within existing democratic systems without necessarily transferring ultimate legislative authority.
Victoria provides another interesting comparison. Its recently established Gellung Warl gives First Peoples a formal representative and accountability structure. Yet the Victorian Government confirms that the body cannot veto legislation or government policy. Parliamentary sovereignty remains intact.
These examples demonstrate that Indigenous representation and participation can be strengthened without necessarily surrendering Parliament's ultimate authority.
International recommendations are not domestic law
Charters also relies on recommendations from the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
International human-rights obligations deserve serious consideration. But recommendations from international monitoring committees are not the same as binding judgments of New Zealand courts, nor do international instruments automatically become enforceable domestic law.
If instruments such as UNDRIP are to become constitutional standards against which Parliament's legislation is judged, New Zealanders need to understand exactly what that would mean for domestic law, judicial interpretation and parliamentary authority.
Who ultimately governs New Zealand?
This is the issue running through Charters' latest arguments.
She wants Māori and Indigenous rights protected from the changing political priorities of elected governments.
There is legitimate debate about what constitutional powers, if any, should follow from recognising Māori as the Indigenous people of New Zealand.
Article 3 of the Treaty expressly extended to Māori the rights and privileges of British subjects, while its Māori text promised the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England. That guarantee of equal citizenship should not be overlooked.
Recognition of Indigenous status does not, by itself, establish a right to separate political authority or determine how far such authority should extend. Those are constitutional issues that still require democratic debate.
But the practical questions cannot be avoided.
Would judges be empowered to invalidate legislation? Which interpretations of the Treaty would they apply? Would tikanga Māori and international instruments become constitutional standards? Who would resolve conflicts over their meaning? And how would the public hold those exercising this authority accountable?
These are not minor technical details. They go to the heart of democratic government.
Protecting rights is important. But transferring ultimate constitutional authority from elected Parliament to unelected judges or to institutions exercising political authority on the basis of ancestry is quite another matter.
New Zealanders should not be asked to accept fundamental constitutional changes without understanding their consequences.
The central question is not simply how rights should be protected. It is who gets to decide what those rights mean, who enforces them, and who ultimately holds the power to govern.
One country. One citizenship. Equal rights. Equal responsibilities. Democratic accountability.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.
Parliamentary sovereignty is not a constitutional failure
Charters describes New Zealand as an international outlier because Parliament retains the authority to make, amend and repeal legislation.
That is not an accidental weakness. It is a central feature of our Westminster parliamentary democracy.
New Zealand courts can review government decisions, interpret legislation and declare legislation inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. But they cannot invalidate an Act of Parliament simply because it conflicts with that Act. Parliament retains the final legislative authority.
Charters wants stronger constitutional protection for Treaty and Indigenous rights. But if Parliament can no longer change certain laws, who determines their meaning and how they apply?
Where courts can invalidate legislation for constitutional inconsistency, judges therefore acquire much greater authority over the limits of Parliament's power.
That is a major constitutional change, not simply stronger rights protection.
Do her overseas examples support her case?
Charters points to Canada, where the Constitution recognises and protects existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Canadian courts can invalidate legislation inconsistent with constitutional rights.
But Canada's arrangements developed through its own constitutional history and political negotiations. They cannot simply be transplanted into New Zealand without considering the consequences for our parliamentary system.
She also refers to the Sámi parliaments in Norway, Sweden and Finland. However, these are primarily representative and advisory institutions, not independent legislatures with general law-making powers. They demonstrate that Indigenous representation can operate within existing democratic systems without necessarily transferring ultimate legislative authority.
Victoria provides another interesting comparison. Its recently established Gellung Warl gives First Peoples a formal representative and accountability structure. Yet the Victorian Government confirms that the body cannot veto legislation or government policy. Parliamentary sovereignty remains intact.
These examples demonstrate that Indigenous representation and participation can be strengthened without necessarily surrendering Parliament's ultimate authority.
International recommendations are not domestic law
Charters also relies on recommendations from the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
International human-rights obligations deserve serious consideration. But recommendations from international monitoring committees are not the same as binding judgments of New Zealand courts, nor do international instruments automatically become enforceable domestic law.
If instruments such as UNDRIP are to become constitutional standards against which Parliament's legislation is judged, New Zealanders need to understand exactly what that would mean for domestic law, judicial interpretation and parliamentary authority.
Who ultimately governs New Zealand?
This is the issue running through Charters' latest arguments.
She wants Māori and Indigenous rights protected from the changing political priorities of elected governments.
There is legitimate debate about what constitutional powers, if any, should follow from recognising Māori as the Indigenous people of New Zealand.
Article 3 of the Treaty expressly extended to Māori the rights and privileges of British subjects, while its Māori text promised the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England. That guarantee of equal citizenship should not be overlooked.
Recognition of Indigenous status does not, by itself, establish a right to separate political authority or determine how far such authority should extend. Those are constitutional issues that still require democratic debate.
But the practical questions cannot be avoided.
Would judges be empowered to invalidate legislation? Which interpretations of the Treaty would they apply? Would tikanga Māori and international instruments become constitutional standards? Who would resolve conflicts over their meaning? And how would the public hold those exercising this authority accountable?
These are not minor technical details. They go to the heart of democratic government.
Protecting rights is important. But transferring ultimate constitutional authority from elected Parliament to unelected judges or to institutions exercising political authority on the basis of ancestry is quite another matter.
New Zealanders should not be asked to accept fundamental constitutional changes without understanding their consequences.
The central question is not simply how rights should be protected. It is who gets to decide what those rights mean, who enforces them, and who ultimately holds the power to govern.
One country. One citizenship. Equal rights. Equal responsibilities. Democratic accountability.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.
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