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Showing posts with label deterrence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label deterrence. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 16, 2013

Ron Smith: Iran, Israel and Nuclear Weapons

A couple of critics of my recent posting (29 September) on the Iranian nuclear weapon programme commented that I had failed to notice the already existing substantial arsenal possessed by Israel.  There are a number of observations that might be made about this criticism and the most obvious of these is that they represent the classic ‘change the subject’ move.  The fact that Israel has a substantial nuclear arsenal, and has had such weapons for nearly fifty years, is quite beside the point.

Iran is not saying that it ought to be allowed to develop nuclear weapons because another party in the region has such weapons.  It is saying that it has no nuclear weapon programme and that its present nuclear activities are entirely peaceful. 

Thursday, February 7, 2013

Ron Smith: DPRK: Would they actually do it



For a number of years around the turn of this century, I was a member of an international group that brought together academic and official persons to discuss nuclear security problems in the Asia-Pacific region.  It was part of a wider project to reduce tension and build confidence, which worked in parallel with formal diplomatic meetings.  Apart from technical persons, it also included diplomats, but because of its relative informality, it tended to be referred to as ‘Track Two’.

Thursday, July 5, 2012

Ron Smith: Hard questions about nuclear weapons


The New Zealand Red Cross is running an essay competition for tertiary students.  The topic is, “Why do we need an international treaty to ban nuclear weapons?”  First prize: $1,000.  That’s good!  What isn’t good is that the question is completely closed.  (‘We need a treaty to ban nuclear weapons.  Tell me why in two thousand words’.  The Red Cross website is explicit on the matter.  The intention is, they say, “to reignite the debate for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons”.).

The assumption is that such a treaty is desirable and practicable.  I wonder how entrants who cast plausible doubt on either of these propositions get on?   Our universities are full enough of closed questions.  It does no service to higher education to add another one and especially on so fraught and difficult a question as that of the future of nuclear weapons and its essential relationship to global security.