At its eastern edge, Washington still enforces Trump’s version of the Monroe Doctrine with vigour. This doctrine holds that any intervention in the Americas by foreign powers is a hostile act against the United States. Meanwhile, in the South Pacific, it appears content to create opportunities for Beijing’s expansion.
The contrast is striking. Under intense pressure from the Trump administration, Panama has just exited China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Yet thousands of miles westward, the Cook Islands is preparing to deepen its ties with Beijing – just as the United States plans to withdraw its aid presence from the region.
These parallel developments expose the selective nature of America’s strategic competition with China. They also reveal the limits of traditional alliances in a new era of economic statecraft.
For New Zealand, the Cook Islands’ growing engagement with Beijing is more than a diplomatic headache. As a self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand, the Cook Islands determines its own domestic and foreign policy but remains tied to Wellington for defence and citizenship.
Yet Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has dismissed New Zealand’s concerns with unusual bluntness. “There is no need for New Zealand to sit in the room with us,” he declared. His government intends to sign a strategic partnership with Beijing regardless of Wellington’s objections.
This is more than political posturing. It signals a fundamental shift in how Pacific nations see themselves.
They are no longer content to be passive recipients of great (or even regional) power influence. Instead, they actively seek to shape the regional order according to their interests.
Beijing has carefully cultivated these aspirations. Its partnerships extend far beyond infrastructure investment, encompassing education, technology and political cooperation.
Recent events in the Solomon Islands show how this strategy unfolds. What began as a modest policing arrangement with Beijing has quietly expanded into broader security cooperation.
A similar trajectory could now emerge in the Cook Islands. Current assurances about limiting military ties offer little comfort, given recent regional patterns.
For China, the timing is opportune. The Cook Islands may become the second Pacific nation to forge deeper ties with China just as the US prepares to withdraw USAID from the region.
USAID’s regional footprint is substantial. It manages US$3.4 billion in programs across twelve Pacific nations. These range from disaster preparedness to governance support. Its departure would create a vacuum in both Western aid and influence – one that China will be delighted to fill.
This is not a complete American retreat – the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet remains active in the Pacific, and US security commitments endure. But the contrast with Washington’s approach to Panama is striking.
Through diplomatic pressure and economic leverage, Washington convinced Panama to abandon the Belt and Road Initiative. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s presence in Panama City ahead of the announcement left no room for ambiguity.
The message was clear: some regions remain off-limits to Beijing. Yet while enforcing this 19th-century principle in Latin America, Washington appears remarkably passive about Chinese expansion in the Pacific.
America’s historical amnesia is striking. This is a nation whose Pacific expansion began in earnest in 1898 with the annexation of Hawaii and acquisition of Guam and the Philippines from Spain.
Yet a country that spent more than a century building its Pacific presence – and whose modern strategic awakening came with the shock of Pearl Harbor – now seems oddly relaxed about strategic surprises in the same ocean.
Perhaps the closest historical parallel is Britain’s east-of-Suez withdrawal in the 1960s. That decision was framed as a rational redistribution of resources. In reality, it signalled an irreversible decline in British global influence. Now it could be Washington’s turn to gradually cede influence in a region it has shaped since 1900.
Beijing, by contrast, plays a long game. Rather than demanding immediate alignment, China offers gradual, interwoven partnerships spanning multiple sectors.
The Belt and Road Initiative is only the most visible framework. China’s builds influence through diplomatic engagement, technological partnerships and cultural exchanges.
All these efforts aim to expand and deepen China’s sphere of influence.
Australia and New Zealand have been slow to respond to China’s rise in the South Pacific. Despite long-standing cultural and historical ties to the region, their diplomatic efforts have barely registered.
The so-called “Pacific Step-up” from Canberra has been more rhetorical than real. Wellington’s engagement during the Ardern years was equally sporadic. It only gained real momentum when Winston Peters once again became Foreign Minister after the change of government in 2023.
If Australia and New Zealand wish to retain their influence, their challenge is not only financial. Even if both countries could match China dollar for dollar, it would not be enough. Pacific island nations want more attention, which China is only too pleased to accord them.
If Australia and New Zealand want to counter-balance China’s lure, they will do better in tandem with other democracies. Japan and India could play crucial roles in this rebalancing.
Even then, America’s USAID withdrawal would remain a major blow. Until now, its programs have supported areas like public health and disaster resilience – precisely where China’s influence now wants to engage, too.
If Washington does not reconsider its approach, it risks allowing Beijing to consolidate control over a region vital to global shipping routes and Indo-Pacific security.
History teaches that strategic neglect has consequences. The US, like Britain before it, must decide whether it will bear the costs of maintaining influence, or cede the Pacific to a patient and determined rival.
Neither Australia nor New Zealand should be comfortable with that possibility.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
These parallel developments expose the selective nature of America’s strategic competition with China. They also reveal the limits of traditional alliances in a new era of economic statecraft.
For New Zealand, the Cook Islands’ growing engagement with Beijing is more than a diplomatic headache. As a self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand, the Cook Islands determines its own domestic and foreign policy but remains tied to Wellington for defence and citizenship.
Yet Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has dismissed New Zealand’s concerns with unusual bluntness. “There is no need for New Zealand to sit in the room with us,” he declared. His government intends to sign a strategic partnership with Beijing regardless of Wellington’s objections.
This is more than political posturing. It signals a fundamental shift in how Pacific nations see themselves.
They are no longer content to be passive recipients of great (or even regional) power influence. Instead, they actively seek to shape the regional order according to their interests.
Beijing has carefully cultivated these aspirations. Its partnerships extend far beyond infrastructure investment, encompassing education, technology and political cooperation.
Recent events in the Solomon Islands show how this strategy unfolds. What began as a modest policing arrangement with Beijing has quietly expanded into broader security cooperation.
A similar trajectory could now emerge in the Cook Islands. Current assurances about limiting military ties offer little comfort, given recent regional patterns.
For China, the timing is opportune. The Cook Islands may become the second Pacific nation to forge deeper ties with China just as the US prepares to withdraw USAID from the region.
USAID’s regional footprint is substantial. It manages US$3.4 billion in programs across twelve Pacific nations. These range from disaster preparedness to governance support. Its departure would create a vacuum in both Western aid and influence – one that China will be delighted to fill.
This is not a complete American retreat – the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet remains active in the Pacific, and US security commitments endure. But the contrast with Washington’s approach to Panama is striking.
Through diplomatic pressure and economic leverage, Washington convinced Panama to abandon the Belt and Road Initiative. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s presence in Panama City ahead of the announcement left no room for ambiguity.
The message was clear: some regions remain off-limits to Beijing. Yet while enforcing this 19th-century principle in Latin America, Washington appears remarkably passive about Chinese expansion in the Pacific.
America’s historical amnesia is striking. This is a nation whose Pacific expansion began in earnest in 1898 with the annexation of Hawaii and acquisition of Guam and the Philippines from Spain.
Yet a country that spent more than a century building its Pacific presence – and whose modern strategic awakening came with the shock of Pearl Harbor – now seems oddly relaxed about strategic surprises in the same ocean.
Perhaps the closest historical parallel is Britain’s east-of-Suez withdrawal in the 1960s. That decision was framed as a rational redistribution of resources. In reality, it signalled an irreversible decline in British global influence. Now it could be Washington’s turn to gradually cede influence in a region it has shaped since 1900.
Beijing, by contrast, plays a long game. Rather than demanding immediate alignment, China offers gradual, interwoven partnerships spanning multiple sectors.
The Belt and Road Initiative is only the most visible framework. China’s builds influence through diplomatic engagement, technological partnerships and cultural exchanges.
All these efforts aim to expand and deepen China’s sphere of influence.
Australia and New Zealand have been slow to respond to China’s rise in the South Pacific. Despite long-standing cultural and historical ties to the region, their diplomatic efforts have barely registered.
The so-called “Pacific Step-up” from Canberra has been more rhetorical than real. Wellington’s engagement during the Ardern years was equally sporadic. It only gained real momentum when Winston Peters once again became Foreign Minister after the change of government in 2023.
If Australia and New Zealand wish to retain their influence, their challenge is not only financial. Even if both countries could match China dollar for dollar, it would not be enough. Pacific island nations want more attention, which China is only too pleased to accord them.
If Australia and New Zealand want to counter-balance China’s lure, they will do better in tandem with other democracies. Japan and India could play crucial roles in this rebalancing.
Even then, America’s USAID withdrawal would remain a major blow. Until now, its programs have supported areas like public health and disaster resilience – precisely where China’s influence now wants to engage, too.
If Washington does not reconsider its approach, it risks allowing Beijing to consolidate control over a region vital to global shipping routes and Indo-Pacific security.
History teaches that strategic neglect has consequences. The US, like Britain before it, must decide whether it will bear the costs of maintaining influence, or cede the Pacific to a patient and determined rival.
Neither Australia nor New Zealand should be comfortable with that possibility.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
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