This year was different. On 13 October, the presidents of Germany’s three intelligence services – foreign, domestic and military – delivered a coordinated assessment that was remarkable for its bluntness.
Their message was simple: Germany is already under attack in a hybrid war waged by Russia. Not a hypothetical future conflict, but a campaign happening now, across multiple domains and within Germany’s borders.
This matters far beyond Berlin. What Germany’s spies described is a template Russia is deploying across Europe. Understanding how Moscow wages this undeclared war is essential for any country hoping to defend itself.
Germany’s foreign intelligence chief, Martin Jäger, was blunt. Russia now views Germany as “an adversary and a party to the war” and “will not shy away from a direct military confrontation with NATO, if necessary.”
This was not a warning about distant threats. Jäger explicitly dismissed earlier forecasts suggesting Russia might not be ready to attack NATO until 2029. The strategic environment, he said, is at best an “icy peace that can turn into hot confrontations at any point.” Indeed, Jäger got even blunter: “We are already under fire today.”
Russia’s campaign against Germany takes multiple forms. These days, there are frequent physical attacks aimed at critical infrastructure. Railways, energy grids and military facilities all face persistent sabotage.
In doing so, Russia has evolved its tactics. Instead of deploying elite intelligence operatives, Moscow now outsources the work in what could be called a “gig economy” model. That means local criminals, extremists or vulnerable individuals are recruited online, sometimes for trivial sums, to commit sabotage. Railway signal boxes have been set ablaze. Defence contractors have been targeted. German naval vessels have been sabotaged.
This approach offers Russia perfect deniability. When a petty criminal sets fire to a railway junction, that does not usually create a diplomatic incident. There are no captured spies, and it is hard to link Moscow to the attack – until one sees the pattern across dozens of incidents.
Alongside these physical attacks runs an industrial-scale disinformation campaign. Russia deploys hundreds of thousands of automated bot accounts alongside dozens of cloned websites that mimic German news outlets like Der Spiegel and Bild. These Russian fake sites publish articles that criticise German support for Ukraine or claim that sanctions hurt Germany more than Russia. Yes, their content is often crude, but that misses the point.
Russia is not trying to convince readers that its position is correct. It aims to create such a fog of conflicting information that people stop believing anything at all. Among security analysts, this technique is known as “information nihilism.”
Of course, there is still traditional espionage too. In fact, it has become more brazen. Germany’s military counter-intelligence service reported a sharp increase in spying activities targeting the armed forces.
It also warned of a sharp rise in drone incursions over sensitive military sites, part of a broader surge in Russian espionage targeting the armed forces. These drones do not just gather intelligence on military capabilities. They also send a psychological message: Russia is watching, and you cannot stop us. And that is true because Germany lacks clear legal authority and adequate means to interdict many of these drones.
Russia also exploits domestic extremist movements to destabilise Germany from within. The so-called Reichsbürger movement – a loose collection of conspiracy theorists who reject the legitimacy of the German state – provides fertile ground for such interference.
The Reichsbürger believe that Germany is merely a vassal of the United States. They attack democratic institutions as illegitimate and believe the government is hostile to ordinary Germans. Russian state propaganda then echoes Reichsbürger themes, both via social media and through its own media outlets. This external validation reinforces the conspiracy theorists’ belief that they have grasped some hidden truth.
The 2022 Reichsbürger coup plot demonstrated how dangerous this can become. The plotters, whose leaders sought contact with Russian officials, planned to storm the Bundestag and install a provisional government. They were arrested before they could act.
Russia did not have to create such extremist movements. But it amplifies them, provides external legitimacy and uses them for its own goals.
Germany is struggling to respond to Russia’s active destabilisation efforts because, after 1945, it defined itself through restraint. For good reasons, it was sceptical about military power and preferred diplomacy, dialogue and compromise.
Jäger’s statement during the hearing, urging the foreign intelligence service to become more operational and willing to take calculated risks, marked a decisive shift in tone. He and his fellow intelligence chiefs called for expanded legal authorities and technical capabilities so the services could respond more effectively to Russian operations.
Such changes would not only require new legislation but also a fundamental psychological shift in how Germany thinks about security. Whether German society is prepared for this remains unclear.
None of this is unique to Germany. The three service heads confirmed what observers across Europe already knew: Russia is waging a continent-wide campaign of destabilisation. Similar patterns appear in Austria with election interference, in France with disinformation campaigns and across Poland and the Baltic states.
But Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and most powerful state, represents the ultimate prize. If Russia can paralyse German decision-making, it can paralyse Europe.
The 13 October hearing matters for this reason. Germany’s spymasters were not just describing threats to their own country. They were diagnosing a disease afflicting the entire European project.
The question is whether Europe will respond before it is too late. Most Europeans do not yet know they are in a war. And that means they are bound to lose it.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
This matters far beyond Berlin. What Germany’s spies described is a template Russia is deploying across Europe. Understanding how Moscow wages this undeclared war is essential for any country hoping to defend itself.
Germany’s foreign intelligence chief, Martin Jäger, was blunt. Russia now views Germany as “an adversary and a party to the war” and “will not shy away from a direct military confrontation with NATO, if necessary.”
This was not a warning about distant threats. Jäger explicitly dismissed earlier forecasts suggesting Russia might not be ready to attack NATO until 2029. The strategic environment, he said, is at best an “icy peace that can turn into hot confrontations at any point.” Indeed, Jäger got even blunter: “We are already under fire today.”
Russia’s campaign against Germany takes multiple forms. These days, there are frequent physical attacks aimed at critical infrastructure. Railways, energy grids and military facilities all face persistent sabotage.
In doing so, Russia has evolved its tactics. Instead of deploying elite intelligence operatives, Moscow now outsources the work in what could be called a “gig economy” model. That means local criminals, extremists or vulnerable individuals are recruited online, sometimes for trivial sums, to commit sabotage. Railway signal boxes have been set ablaze. Defence contractors have been targeted. German naval vessels have been sabotaged.
This approach offers Russia perfect deniability. When a petty criminal sets fire to a railway junction, that does not usually create a diplomatic incident. There are no captured spies, and it is hard to link Moscow to the attack – until one sees the pattern across dozens of incidents.
Alongside these physical attacks runs an industrial-scale disinformation campaign. Russia deploys hundreds of thousands of automated bot accounts alongside dozens of cloned websites that mimic German news outlets like Der Spiegel and Bild. These Russian fake sites publish articles that criticise German support for Ukraine or claim that sanctions hurt Germany more than Russia. Yes, their content is often crude, but that misses the point.
Russia is not trying to convince readers that its position is correct. It aims to create such a fog of conflicting information that people stop believing anything at all. Among security analysts, this technique is known as “information nihilism.”
Of course, there is still traditional espionage too. In fact, it has become more brazen. Germany’s military counter-intelligence service reported a sharp increase in spying activities targeting the armed forces.
It also warned of a sharp rise in drone incursions over sensitive military sites, part of a broader surge in Russian espionage targeting the armed forces. These drones do not just gather intelligence on military capabilities. They also send a psychological message: Russia is watching, and you cannot stop us. And that is true because Germany lacks clear legal authority and adequate means to interdict many of these drones.
Russia also exploits domestic extremist movements to destabilise Germany from within. The so-called Reichsbürger movement – a loose collection of conspiracy theorists who reject the legitimacy of the German state – provides fertile ground for such interference.
The Reichsbürger believe that Germany is merely a vassal of the United States. They attack democratic institutions as illegitimate and believe the government is hostile to ordinary Germans. Russian state propaganda then echoes Reichsbürger themes, both via social media and through its own media outlets. This external validation reinforces the conspiracy theorists’ belief that they have grasped some hidden truth.
The 2022 Reichsbürger coup plot demonstrated how dangerous this can become. The plotters, whose leaders sought contact with Russian officials, planned to storm the Bundestag and install a provisional government. They were arrested before they could act.
Russia did not have to create such extremist movements. But it amplifies them, provides external legitimacy and uses them for its own goals.
Germany is struggling to respond to Russia’s active destabilisation efforts because, after 1945, it defined itself through restraint. For good reasons, it was sceptical about military power and preferred diplomacy, dialogue and compromise.
Jäger’s statement during the hearing, urging the foreign intelligence service to become more operational and willing to take calculated risks, marked a decisive shift in tone. He and his fellow intelligence chiefs called for expanded legal authorities and technical capabilities so the services could respond more effectively to Russian operations.
Such changes would not only require new legislation but also a fundamental psychological shift in how Germany thinks about security. Whether German society is prepared for this remains unclear.
None of this is unique to Germany. The three service heads confirmed what observers across Europe already knew: Russia is waging a continent-wide campaign of destabilisation. Similar patterns appear in Austria with election interference, in France with disinformation campaigns and across Poland and the Baltic states.
But Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and most powerful state, represents the ultimate prize. If Russia can paralyse German decision-making, it can paralyse Europe.
The 13 October hearing matters for this reason. Germany’s spymasters were not just describing threats to their own country. They were diagnosing a disease afflicting the entire European project.
The question is whether Europe will respond before it is too late. Most Europeans do not yet know they are in a war. And that means they are bound to lose it.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
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