David Harvey: The China Syndrome

This article addresses the way in which the Chinese Government responded to an opinion piece written by Jonathan Ayling in the Herald. The response is revealing not the least because it maintains an ideological position that is out of touch with reality but as much because of the way in which it reveals the Chinese Government’s mindset, not just about contrary views but also about the way in which those views may be expressed within the boundaries of an independent sovereign state.

I shall start by considering what it is that Mr Ayling said in his article and shall identify the content that the Chinese Government considers to be “objectionable.”

I shall then consider the Chinese Government’s response which was transmitted via X – the irony of the means of communication by a platform dedicated to free speech can not go unremarked -and I shall extract the most egregious comments and demonstrate how antithetical to liberal democratic values.

I go on to consider what this approach demonstrates about the Chinese Government approaches and what it tells us about their attitudes. There have been other activities by proxies of the Chinese Government to stifle debate in New Zealand.

In fact the approach by the Chinese Government is a classic example of ideologically driven lies – a polite way of putting it would be to describe their approach as disinformation – but their efforts to reframe the debate and recast reality tells us much about our largest trading partner that is insidiously infiltrating the Pacific by economic and social means.

Ayling’s Article

In essence Ayling argues that New Zealand should support Taiwan, a liberal democracy, against increasing military and ideological threats from China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory. ​

He highlights China’s tactics, including prosecuting overseas supporters of Taiwanese independence, influencing diaspora communities, and exporting authoritarian suppression into liberal democracies. ​

The article emphasises Taiwan’s democratic values, such as free elections, media, and peaceful power transitions, contrasting them with China’s authoritarian regime. ​

Ayling criticizes New Zealand’s cautious stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty, calling it a “ritual of deference” to China, and warns against adopting authoritarian habits like self-censorship and urges New Zealand to resist intimidation, name transnational repression, and publicly support Taiwan’s democratic freedoms. ​

Ayling concludes by advocating for truth and standing against authoritarian pressure, emphasizing that democracy and freedom are superior to dictatorship and oppression.

There are a number of comments that are factually correct.

“ Beijing’s claim over Taiwan is not merely territorial. It is ideological: the demand that free people be absorbed into a system built on surveillance, intimidation and one-party rule. This is not only about warships in the Taiwan Strait. It is about whether an authoritarian regime gets to export its suppression into liberal democracies in tangible ways….

China, officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), now claims the right to prosecute people overseas for supporting Taiwanese independence, including through trials in absentia, meaning it asserts a right to punish speech made outside China by people who are not in China.” (We in the legal profession refer to this as extraterritoriality which is a vexed question in the field of international law)

Ayling goes on to assert

” Beijing has grown bolder. Its tactics are not confined to diplomacy. They reach into diaspora communities through platforms like WeChat, through influence over Chinese language media and through intimidation that teaches people to self-censor even while living in New Zealand.

In early November, China’s ambassador to New Zealand, Wang Xiaolong, wrote to a dozen MPs who attended a Taiwan National Day event in Wellington, warning that even this show of support threatened New Zealand’s relationship with China. While some MPs, such as Act MP Laura McClure, pushed back, the rest of the House largely stayed silent. It is a strange posture: taking lectures about loyalty from a regime whose proxies have targeted the very Parliament those MPs serve, through cyber attacks.

Former MPs Simon O’Connor and Louisa Wall have also been targeted by PRC-linked cyber attacks. But the pattern does not stop with MPs. Kiwi journalists Portia Mao and Justin Wong, former Auckland councillor Paul Young and Professor Anne-Marie Brady have each faced years of legal harassment, surveillance or intimidation linked to actors aligned to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). All for daring to criticise or refute Chinese posturing.”

Ayling offers four themes as reasons why we should support Taiwan. They are as follows:

Democratic Values: Taiwan is a liberal democracy with free elections, media, and peaceful transfers of power, representing values that align with New Zealand’s commitment to democratic freedoms. ​

Resisting Authoritarianism: China’s claim over Taiwan is not just territorial but ideological, aiming to suppress freedom and export authoritarian practices. ​ Supporting Taiwan helps resist this pressure and defends civil liberties. ​

Transnational Repression: China has grown bolder in intimidating overseas critics, including New Zealand MPs, journalists, and academics. ​ Standing with Taiwan is a stand against such transnational repression. ​

Moral Responsibility: Taiwan symbolizes the difference between freedom and oppression. ​ Supporting Taiwan is a way to uphold truth, resist fear, and affirm that democracy is better than dictatorship. ​

By supporting Taiwan, New Zealand can protect its own democratic values and push back against authoritarian influence. ​

This article was published in the New Zealand Herald for 29 January. Jonathan Ayling has a weekly column (Thursdays) in the Herald and his articles are well worth a read. He makes a better reading diversion and though-provoking commentary than Simon Wilson who has departed the Herald for a fortnightly column in the Listener.

The Chinese Response

The Chinese Embassy didn’t waste any time in responding. Resorting to X a spoke-person posted a response which I shall reproduce in full because in that light the messaging becomes clear and not a little threatening.

“There is but one China in the world. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. This is a well-established international consensus and a universally recognised basic norm governing international relations. The commitment to and support for the one-China principle form the political foundation upon which China has established and developed bilateral relations with 183 countries, including New Zealand.

Taiwan’s restoration to China was a victorious outcome of the Second World War and forms an integral part of the post-war international order. The article by Jonathan Ayling (29 January), however, is permeated with Cold War thinking and ideological bias. In disregard of historical facts and international consensus, it publicly lends support to separatist rhetoric targeting China and goes so far as to advocate interference in China’s internal affairs. Such views openly challenge the one-China principle, run counter to the prevailing consensus of the international community, and are inconsistent with New Zealand’s own stated policy and commitments on the one-China issue, which clearly is not in the interest of New Zealand.

This is not a matter of freedom of expression, but a fundamental question of principle and a clear issue of right and wrong. It concerns the integrity of the basic norms governing international relations and the political foundation of diplomatic relations between China and New Zealand.

It is disappointing that The New Zealand Herald chose to publish an article that facilitates rhetoric and activities advocating “Taiwan independence”. It is hoped that The New Zealand Herald will act as a responsible media outlet, rather than mislead the public or do harm to others without benefiting itself.”

Let’s have a look at the assertions. The first is that there is one China of which Taiwan is a part and the suggestion that Beijing is the sole legal Government representing China.

This flies in the face of the reality that Taiwan is a sovereign state possessed of the various elements of such a state as set out in the Montevideo Convention.

The statement by the spokes-person might be a “nice to have” or something that the PRC would like to see sometime in the future but as a present reality it is a fiction.

Secondly, Taiwan’s restoration to China was a victorious outcome of the Second World War and forms an integral part of the post-war international order.

The statement is contestable and, as written, over-assertive. It reflects one political narrative (largely that of the PRC), but it is not an uncontested statement of post-war international law or order.

It is true that Japan’s defeat in the Second World War ended its control of Taiwan, which it had held since 1895. What is disputed is to whom sovereignty legally transferred. The Cairo Declaration (1943) and Potsdam Declaration (1945) stated Allied intent that Taiwan be “restored to China” but that was not the China of the PRC which did not come into being until 1949. The declarations were political statements, not treaties transferring sovereignty under international law.

Even if one accepts the idea of “restoration to China”, the statement collapses a critical historical distinction:

In 1945, “China” meant the Republic of China, which took administrative control of Taiwan after Japan’s surrender.

The People’s Republic of China did not exist until 1949 and has never exercised control over Taiwan.

The statement therefore risks retroactively attributing post-1949 PRC sovereignty to a 1945 outcome — a move that is politically convenient but legally problematic.

Japan’s formal surrender did not itself settle Taiwan’s final legal status.

Crucially, the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) — the principal multilateral peace treaty ending the war with Japan — required Japan to renounce sovereignty over Taiwan, but did not specify a recipient. That omission matters. Many international lawyers regard it as leaving Taiwan’s legal status undetermined rather than definitively “restored”.

Allied victory certainly ended Japanese rule, but there was no Allied peace settlement that conclusively awarded Taiwan to any state. The United States and several other powers deliberately avoided settling Taiwan’s status during the Cold War.

This ambiguity was not accidental — it was a feature of the post-war settlement, not a bug. So while ROC administration of Taiwan from 1945 was a fact, calling it a universally recognised victorious outcome overstates the degree of international agreement.

The post-war international order — embodied in the United Nations, peace treaties, and Cold War diplomacy — is characterised by strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, not clarity.

Evidence of this includes Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN after 1971, without a definitive determination of sovereignty; the widespread adoption of “One China” policies that acknowledge positions without resolving legal title; the ongoing recognition by many states that Taiwan’s status is politically sensitive and legally unresolved.

An issue that remains one of the most dangerous flashpoints in international relations is hard to describe as a settled, integral component of the post-war order.

Thirdly there is the suggestion that this is not a matter of freedom of expression. Of course it is. It is not surprising that a repressive and totalitarian regime such as the PRC would be so dismissive of such an important element of the democratic process. The language of the dismissal builds in intensity and crescendos in an attack on the freedom of the press – as concept that a dictatorial regime could not understand let alone tolerate.

The passage reads as follows:

“This is not a matter of freedom of expression, but a fundamental question of principle and a clear issue of right and wrong. It concerns the integrity of the basic norms governing international relations and the political foundation of diplomatic relations between China and New Zealand.

This statement ignores the contestable nature of the PRC position. That being the case, the assertion of “basic norms governing internation relations” is hardly settled and it is an bald assertion that acceptance of the PRC position on Taiwan is a political foundation of relations between the PRC and New Zealand.

It is disappointing that The New Zealand Herald chose to publish an article that facilitates rhetoric and activities advocating “Taiwan independence”. It is hoped that The New Zealand Herald will act as a responsible media outlet, rather than mislead the public or do harm to others without benefiting itself.”

This is the concerning assault on the freedom of expression. It is the epitome of arrogance that the PRC should call out an independent newspaper, suggesting that by publishing an opinion piece on a contestable issue it is irresponsible. It is also interesting to see the suggestion that the Herald does not benefit itself by publishing such an article.

One wonders what is meant by this. At its most simplistic the benefit to the newspaper is in the publication of different strands of opinion on the issues of the day. Thus the benefit is the enhancement of the reputation of the Herald as a responsible element of mainstream media and, given public responses to trust in MSM by embarking on this course the Herald is taking steps to recover some of the lost ground of public confidence.

But is there a more sinister sub-text to the comment that the Herald does not benefit and that it is irresponsible and receives no benefit from publishing such an article. Is this some kind of veiled threat that there may well be some misfortune visited upon Mr Ayling or the Herald - the sort of thing that one might expect from a Mafia organization that wields power by veiled and implied threats. Of course fear is a valuable currency for a totalitarian state. But exporting that fear into the domestic context and attempting to influence a domestic newspaper is intolerable.

But apart from the actual response by the spokesperson for the PRC there are some more concerning elements arising from this response and gives some insight into the PRC mindset.

The Wider Implications

We are all familiar with the concepts of “the party line” and the “groupthink” that accompanies it. Rigid adherence to these concepts as a societal norm carries a distinctive set of problems. Some are practical and institutional; others are cultural and psychological. Together, they tend to hollow out a society’s capacity for truth-seeking, innovation, and legitimate authority.

One of the most serious costs is the loss of internal criticism. Healthy societies rely on disagreement to surface errors before they become disasters. When conformity is prized, dissenters are treated as disloyal rather than useful.

This undermines what John Stuart Mill famously argued was the core function of free expression: not merely tolerance, but epistemic correction. Even false or unpopular views perform a social function by testing prevailing assumptions. Groupthink short-circuits this process, allowing weak ideas to harden into orthodoxy simply because they are protected from challenge.

A further downside is intellectual stagnation and mediocrity. Where adherence to the line matters more than accuracy or creativity, intellectual ambition declines. People learn quickly that advancement comes from repetition, not insight. Over time, institutions select for compliance rather than competence.

This produces a peculiar form of stagnation: not a lack of intelligence, but a lack of permission to use it. Original thinkers either self-censor, leave, or are pushed out, leaving behind a narrowing band of “safe” ideas that are endlessly recycled.

Groupthink enables individuals to outsource moral responsibility to the collective. If “everyone agrees,” no one feels personally accountable.

This is how ordinary people come to justify actions they would otherwise reject: “I didn’t decide this — the group did.” History is replete with examples of grave injustice carried out not by fanatics, but by conformists who prioritised belonging over conscience.

Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the banality of evil captures this danger: wrongdoing becomes normal not through passion, but through unthinking obedience.

When deviation from the party line carries reputational, professional, or social penalties, conformity becomes defensive rather than sincere. People say what is required, not what they believe.

The result is a society that looks unified on the surface but is privately fragmented. This breeds cynicism and double-think: public rituals of agreement paired with private disbelief. Trust erodes because no one knows who means what they say. This is the Vaclev Havel problem highlighted by Ayling.

Paradoxically, rigid conformity often intensifies polarisation. By excluding heterodox voices, mainstream institutions push dissent to the margins, where it can harden into resentment and extremism.

Instead of being contested, moderated, and refined in public debate, alternative views metastasise in echo chambers. The result is not consensus, but mutual incomprehension — each side convinced the other is acting in bad faith.

Institutions that enforce orthodoxy over inquiry gradually lose moral authority. Courts, universities, media, bureaucracies, and professional bodies are respected not because they are powerful, but because they are trusted to exercise independent judgment.

When they appear captured by a single ideological script, public confidence collapses. Decisions may still be lawful or procedurally correct, but they no longer feel legitimate.

Groupthink produces brittle systems. Because dissent is suppressed, warning signs go unheeded and adaptability declines. When reality eventually intrudes — as it always does — the correction is abrupt and often destructive.

Resilient societies tolerate internal disagreement precisely because it allows gradual adjustment. Rigid ones swing between enforced consensus and sudden rupture.

Finally, There is a crucial difference between shared values and enforced beliefs. Shared values allow pluralism; enforced beliefs demand uniformity.

When groupthink becomes the social standard, culture shifts from persuasion to policing. Language, tone, and symbolic compliance matter more than substance or outcomes. Moral seriousness is replaced by performative loyalty.

But the PRC has gone beyond the groupthink party line in its critique of Ayling’s article. It has gone beyond a critique of an independent domestic newspaper. It has not hesitated to use proxies and the law in an effort to suppress the expression of point of view with which it disagrees.

In a case that sparked significant debate about free speech and the reach of online-safety laws in New Zealand, veteran Kiwi-Chinese journalist Portia Mao successfully challenged a gag order imposed on her under the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (HDCA).

In July 2024, an Auckland-based commentator and former local body election candidate, Morgan (Zhi Hong) Xiao – an outspoken supporter of the PRC, filed a complaint under the HDCA alleging that articles and social-media comments by Mao about him were harmful, defamatory and caused him “mental pressure”. One of the contested remarks included Mao referring to Xiao as “only worthy of being a dog” in response to his online criticism of a documentary she had worked on.

What made the case particularly controversial was that the District Court granted interim “without notice” orders requiring Mao to delete the articles and posts, and to publish an apology, without notifying her beforehand. Mao first learned of the orders only when she saw them discussed on social media, as the initial court processes had been carried out in her absence due to incorrect contact details and lack of service.

With legal support, Mao challenged those orders in court. In June 2025, Judge Richard McIlraith discharged the interim orders. The judge found that the threshold for applying the HDCA had not been met: there was no independent evidence of “serious emotional distress” caused by Mao’s communications, and the prior decision had been made without giving her an opportunity to be heard. The judge also expressed concern about the use of “without notice” applications in cases of this kind.

Supporters of Mao’s position argued that the case highlighted risks of the HDCA being used to suppress legitimate political or journalistic expression, particularly when applied as a tool in disputes involving public-interest reporting. Critics noted that while the law was originally designed to address bullying and serious harm online, its provisions can be invoked in more contentious contexts of public debate.

The outcome was widely characterised as a win for free speech in New Zealand: Mao is no longer bound by the gag order, and the court’s decision underscored the need for caution in applying the HDCA where robust public-interest discourse and criticism are concerned.

What This Tells Us

So what does all this tell us. The first thing is that a more aggressive PRC is not afraid to insert itself into the domestic fabric of New Zealand.

The most high-profile case involved National Party MP Jian Yang. Newsroom revealed that Yang had studied and taught at an elite Chinese spy school — the People’s Liberation Army Air Force Engineering College — as well as the Luoyang language institute run by China’s equivalent of the NSA, the Third Department, which conducts spying activities. Yang admitted he had a background as a civilian officer in the Chinese military, and had trained linguists to intercept foreign communications.

Critically, Yang did not disclose these military intelligence affiliations in his work or political CVs when he moved to New Zealand. It was later reported that his retirement from Parliament came as the result of a secret deal between Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and Opposition Leader Todd Muller after intelligence agencies raised concerns about his relationship with the Chinese Government.

A similar arrangement was made for Labour MP Raymond Huo, who had been alleged by researcher Anne-Marie Brady to have worked closely with the Chinese Government and had close contacts with the Zhi Gong Party, one of the eight parties in China subordinate to the CCP that focuses on promoting relations between Beijing and Chinese diaspora communities abroad.

New Zealand’s 2025 public threat assessment identified China as first among the states most likely to engage in foreign interference, and a 2024 documentary detailed decades of CCP influence operations including attempts to leverage and negatively influence the Chinese diaspora and harassment campaigns against perceived opponents.

The security report noted that foreign agents have been taking control of community organisations by co-opting or replacing leaders, with replacements sidelining those deemed to be a challenge to the foreign state’s agenda.

The report also cited “involuntary repatriation, in which individuals are coerced or compelled to return to their country of origin.”

New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service identified China as undertaking “ongoing activity in and against New Zealand,” including espionage and influence operations against ethnic Chinese communities.

The acting director-general of NZSIS told parliamentarians that “the most insidious examples” of foreign interference involved the “harassment of ethnic communities in New Zealand who speak out against the actions of a foreign government.”

The Chinese Embassy has consistently rejected these characterisations as politically motivated. But they would, wouldn’t they.

The phrase “the price of liberty is eternal vigilance” has been attributed to Thomas Jefferson but in fact it originated from Irish politician John Philpot Curran in 1790, who said, “The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance”.

We must be vigilant to identify interference with our domestic sovereignty by any foreign power and especially the PRC.

Failure to do so will result in the erosion of our democratic institutions into an Orwellian environment of Groupthink and adherence to “The Party Line.”

David Harvey is a former District Court Judge and Mastermind champion, as well as an award winning writer who blogs at the substack site A Halflings View - Where this article was sourced.