In the wake of the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, all eyes were on the Republican National Convention. While Trump’s formal nomination as the GOP’s presidential candidate was a foregone conclusion, his choice of running mate raised eyebrows: JD Vance, the author of Hillbilly Elegy.
Vance’s selection concludes quite a political journey. Once a “never-Trumper”, Vance has morphed into an arch-Trumpist. But from a European perspective, his nomination signifies more than a stunning political transformation. It is a harbinger of tough times to come for trans-Atlantic relations.
Vance, a staunch isolationist, has openly advocated for reducing US involvement in European security affairs. His advocacy for a “dormant NATO” in which the US would serve merely as an offshore “balancer of last resort” represents a radical departure from decades of trans-Atlantic security cooperation. For European leaders, this should be setting off alarm bells.
Yet given this alarming development, Europe appears woefully unprepared for the potential seismic shift in US foreign policy that a second Trump term could bring. This lack of readiness raises a puzzling question: Why has Europe failed to significantly bolster its defence capabilities and reduce its dependence on American security guarantees, despite years of clear warning signs?
The puzzle becomes even more perplexing when we consider the series of events that should have spurred Europe into action. Trump’s initial term from 2016 to 2020 provided a stark preview of what an ‘America First’ foreign policy could mean for Europe. His scepticism towards NATO, transactional approach to diplomacy, and criticism of European defence spending were clear indicators that the post-World War II security arrangement could no longer be taken for granted.
In November 2020, as Joe Biden secured his victory over Trump, a cautious optimism rippled across European capitals. As I wrote for Newsroom back then (Defrosting the trans-Atlantic relationship, 17 November 2020), it seemed the “trans-Atlantic Ice Age” might be thawing, potentially heralding a return to more predictable relations between Europe and the United States.
In retrospect, even such moderate optimism appears to have been misplaced. More crucially, it seems to have lulled Europeans into a false sense of security, leading to a puzzling lack of action in preparing for future geopolitical uncertainties.
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should have shattered any remaining complacency. But instead of a rapid and comprehensive overhaul of European defence capabilities, little has fundamentally changed in Europe’s security situation.
Despite rhetorical commitments to Ukraine’s defence, Europe’s material support has lagged that of the United States, highlighting the continent’s limited capacity for sustained military engagement. The war has made it abundantly clear what Europe should prepare for, yet the response has been remarkably muted.
Several factors may contribute to this puzzling inaction. Institutional inertia within the EU and NATO structures, designed for stability, is paradoxically hindering rapid adaptation to new geopolitical realities. Economic constraints, exacerbated by the lingering effects of the pandemic, are making many European countries reluctant to significantly increase defence spending. Political fragmentation and the rise of populist movements in some countries are impeding a cohesive European response.
Moreover, decades of relative peace and US security guarantees have eroded Europe’s capacity for independent strategic thinking. There seems to be a persistent, and wishful, belief that US foreign policy will inevitably revert to its post-World War II norm, regardless of election outcomes.
The implications of this inaction are profound and troubling. Europe now faces the prospect of a potential second Trump term from a position of continued vulnerability. Where Trump’s first term was characterised by bluster and threats, a second term is likely to see concrete action. NATO’s existence could be at stake, leaving Europe exposed to an increasingly aggressive Russia.
Europe’s options for addressing this security deficit are limited and fraught with challenges. The prospect of a European nuclear deterrent – whether through a new EU-wide programme or an expansion of French and British capabilities – is a non-starter (Europe’s impossible nuclear option, 7 February 2024). The political, technological, and financial hurdles are simply too high to overcome in the short to medium term.
Conventional forces fare little better. Despite the wake-up call of the Ukraine war, European militaries remain underfunded and ill-equipped for large-scale conflict. The spectre of reintroducing conscription looms over a continent that had thought such measures consigned to history (Europe will not be able to fight the return of conscription, 30 April 2024). Yet even this drastic step would take years to meaningfully enhance Europe’s defensive capabilities, while the real military shortage lies in equipment and ammunition.
The tragedy of Europe’s current predicament is that it was entirely foreseeable. The four years of the Biden presidency should have been used to build resilience, enhance military capabilities, and forge a more cohesive European defence strategy. Instead, they were largely wasted, with many European leaders reverting to old habits of free-riding on American security guarantees.
Now, as the 2024 US election approaches, Europe finds itself in a state of vulnerability reminiscent of the early Cold War years – but without the assurance of unwavering American support. The continent faces the very real prospect of having to confront Russian aggression with insufficient military capabilities and a fragmented political will.
And now Europe may not just have to deal with Trump but with Vance, too. Vance’s nomination as Trump’s running mate is emblematic of a broader shift in American politics. It reflects the deep-seated changes in the Republican Party’s foreign policy outlook.
The selection of Vance also highlights the widening gulf between American and European perspectives on global security. While Europe continues to operate under post-Cold War assumptions, figures like Vance represent a fundamentally different worldview that sees little inherent value in traditional alliances.
As Europe grapples with this new reality, it faces not just a military readiness challenge but a conceptual one. The continent must come to terms with a world where long-held certainties about the trans-Atlantic relationship no longer apply. Europe is now on its own.
Whether Europe’s political and institutional structures can adapt to this new paradigm remains an open question.
If the Europeans thought dealing with Trump was tough, dealing with a Vice President (and possible future President) JD Vance will be even more challenging.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
Yet given this alarming development, Europe appears woefully unprepared for the potential seismic shift in US foreign policy that a second Trump term could bring. This lack of readiness raises a puzzling question: Why has Europe failed to significantly bolster its defence capabilities and reduce its dependence on American security guarantees, despite years of clear warning signs?
The puzzle becomes even more perplexing when we consider the series of events that should have spurred Europe into action. Trump’s initial term from 2016 to 2020 provided a stark preview of what an ‘America First’ foreign policy could mean for Europe. His scepticism towards NATO, transactional approach to diplomacy, and criticism of European defence spending were clear indicators that the post-World War II security arrangement could no longer be taken for granted.
In November 2020, as Joe Biden secured his victory over Trump, a cautious optimism rippled across European capitals. As I wrote for Newsroom back then (Defrosting the trans-Atlantic relationship, 17 November 2020), it seemed the “trans-Atlantic Ice Age” might be thawing, potentially heralding a return to more predictable relations between Europe and the United States.
In retrospect, even such moderate optimism appears to have been misplaced. More crucially, it seems to have lulled Europeans into a false sense of security, leading to a puzzling lack of action in preparing for future geopolitical uncertainties.
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should have shattered any remaining complacency. But instead of a rapid and comprehensive overhaul of European defence capabilities, little has fundamentally changed in Europe’s security situation.
Despite rhetorical commitments to Ukraine’s defence, Europe’s material support has lagged that of the United States, highlighting the continent’s limited capacity for sustained military engagement. The war has made it abundantly clear what Europe should prepare for, yet the response has been remarkably muted.
Several factors may contribute to this puzzling inaction. Institutional inertia within the EU and NATO structures, designed for stability, is paradoxically hindering rapid adaptation to new geopolitical realities. Economic constraints, exacerbated by the lingering effects of the pandemic, are making many European countries reluctant to significantly increase defence spending. Political fragmentation and the rise of populist movements in some countries are impeding a cohesive European response.
Moreover, decades of relative peace and US security guarantees have eroded Europe’s capacity for independent strategic thinking. There seems to be a persistent, and wishful, belief that US foreign policy will inevitably revert to its post-World War II norm, regardless of election outcomes.
The implications of this inaction are profound and troubling. Europe now faces the prospect of a potential second Trump term from a position of continued vulnerability. Where Trump’s first term was characterised by bluster and threats, a second term is likely to see concrete action. NATO’s existence could be at stake, leaving Europe exposed to an increasingly aggressive Russia.
Europe’s options for addressing this security deficit are limited and fraught with challenges. The prospect of a European nuclear deterrent – whether through a new EU-wide programme or an expansion of French and British capabilities – is a non-starter (Europe’s impossible nuclear option, 7 February 2024). The political, technological, and financial hurdles are simply too high to overcome in the short to medium term.
Conventional forces fare little better. Despite the wake-up call of the Ukraine war, European militaries remain underfunded and ill-equipped for large-scale conflict. The spectre of reintroducing conscription looms over a continent that had thought such measures consigned to history (Europe will not be able to fight the return of conscription, 30 April 2024). Yet even this drastic step would take years to meaningfully enhance Europe’s defensive capabilities, while the real military shortage lies in equipment and ammunition.
The tragedy of Europe’s current predicament is that it was entirely foreseeable. The four years of the Biden presidency should have been used to build resilience, enhance military capabilities, and forge a more cohesive European defence strategy. Instead, they were largely wasted, with many European leaders reverting to old habits of free-riding on American security guarantees.
Now, as the 2024 US election approaches, Europe finds itself in a state of vulnerability reminiscent of the early Cold War years – but without the assurance of unwavering American support. The continent faces the very real prospect of having to confront Russian aggression with insufficient military capabilities and a fragmented political will.
And now Europe may not just have to deal with Trump but with Vance, too. Vance’s nomination as Trump’s running mate is emblematic of a broader shift in American politics. It reflects the deep-seated changes in the Republican Party’s foreign policy outlook.
The selection of Vance also highlights the widening gulf between American and European perspectives on global security. While Europe continues to operate under post-Cold War assumptions, figures like Vance represent a fundamentally different worldview that sees little inherent value in traditional alliances.
As Europe grapples with this new reality, it faces not just a military readiness challenge but a conceptual one. The continent must come to terms with a world where long-held certainties about the trans-Atlantic relationship no longer apply. Europe is now on its own.
Whether Europe’s political and institutional structures can adapt to this new paradigm remains an open question.
If the Europeans thought dealing with Trump was tough, dealing with a Vice President (and possible future President) JD Vance will be even more challenging.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
21 comments:
For my comment ( to article) - I pick up on the following statement (quote) "Conventional forces fare little better. Despite the wake-up call of the Ukraine war, European militaries remain underfunded and ill-equipped for large-scale conflict. The spectre of reintroducing conscription looms over a continent that had thought such measures consigned to history"(end quote).
The reason for picking this comment, is that it has a historical edge'to it, the Historical focus - the years that led to WW2, the complacency of Europe, and also England, in the face of what was happening in Germany during the 1930's, NO Country at the time had a purpose built army, trained and equipped to deal with "any unforeseen event, that may have and/or would have impacted on the sovereignty of a Nation, that could have impacted on another
Nation - an example Holland, Belgium, France & Britain.
Events that unfolded with Germany invading Poland, then the Nations to the south with the unprepared military actions of those Nations is well documented.
That part of History has a "bell ringing" similarity to Russia crossing the Ukraine border. It should not have been a surprise, Putin was "reported widely" on what he intended to do.
At this point The United States had been in the process of downsizing Troops & Miscellaneous equipment (Britain was doing the same thing), thinking that the EU, in tandem with NATO would be the "brick wall, to any aggressive military acts". Sadly complacency with EU Nations & Military is again well documented, in the "slide of funding, personnel, equipment - that comprised of both no longer fit for purpose, or delays in procuring modern equipment".
It is recorded, that on a visit to Europe & NATO - Trump "stated that EU Nations, then, had to up the anti with monies to NATO and also to improving their own military systems". As the USofA was not going to be the "forever cash cow". A comment that had "bells ringing" with Political factions across the EU.
You only have to look at the "movement of military equipment (mostly not wanted and/or being used - by EU Nations)- into Ukraine', that the US 'promoted' (that took much arm twisting to achieve), along with the sales of updated equipment, to those EU Nations, from America - example the Abrams tank.
Also look at how quickly EU Nations "suddenly" wished to become NATO Members - Finland & Sweden, who have borders with Russia, had no previous issues with Russian intent, until the invasion of Ukraine. Ditto Turkey, particularly as Russian Military are now encamped in Syria.
Among the Congressional & Senators of The Republican Party, they have for sometime spoken out about the level of funding to Ukraine, when in their own Country, financial assistance is now a more pressing issue.
We wait, watch and will view the outcome of November 2024 and the actions that follow, especially regarding Europe.
Surely the simple answer is western Europe has been happy to allow America to cover the majority of the cost for their own defense. The crybaby act when Trump asked them to honour the agreement they had willingly signed was a sight to see.
Their own breaking of a defence agreement was excused, all while blaming it all on the devil in America for their woes. Now they get to stand up, and pay the bills, for the problems they have helped create.
Then again, taking responsibility for your choices is such an old concept. Stamping feet and crying about how unfair it all is has become the way.
Oliver, do you think it might be that the very top of European politicians simply don’t fear the Russian bear? That could be the real reason for their obvious lack of determined military preparation? And maybe they see the Ukraine imbroglio as very readily solvable, once the US is out of the picture?
The USSR ceased to exist in 1991 and NATO became redundant, or should have done. However, it has been enlarging instead and expanding right up to Russia's borders. Russia has responded the way it always has when it perceived an external threat: create a buffer zone of satellite states between itself and the threat.
We in Europe had been dealing with Russia for many centuries before NATO. The spectre of invading Russian hordes from the steppes has never come to be realised - except after WW2 when Churchill and Roosevelt handed Stalin Eastern Europe on a silver platter.
Communism is dead and Russia is no threat to Europe. Why do we allow NATO to provoke Moscow? Is it because the Yanks want a showdown with Russia on European soil (this was a major talking point in the 80s)?
We are forcing Moscow into an unholy alliance with China and North Korea. I believe that historians of the future will regard this as the biggest geopolitical strategic blunder of all time.
Nice to 'hear' a bit of what seems like common sense to me Barend.
Let us not forget the riches which Ukraine sits upon, and which The US, and all of, which that implies, who wish to control these riches. And then there's Russia's riches which awaits, such temptations! If only it's power could be diminished. Broken into pieces. Colour revolutions, Presidents and governments installed. How perfect that would be. Perfect.
For Russia 1991 was merely a rebranding. The USSR was always totally dominated by the Russian Soviet Fedarative Socialist Republic. Which is why the USSR was normally referred to as Russia.
After the 2nd World War the USSR/Russia remained in occupation of its newly conquered Western European states, never giving them anything like independence. They remained vassal states of Russia till the collapse of the sham that was the USSR.
And indeed they "reinvaded" a few of them, just to remind them whose foot the boot was on. Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Chechnya 1994, Georgia 2004. The Ukraine in 2022. Nagorno Karabakh in 2023. And neighbouring inependent Afghanistan in 1979. They like to keep in practice you know. And the order for these invasions came from where ? Moscow.
The Allied forces quickly withdrew from Western Europe after the 2nd World War. Nato was formed in 1949 and since then has invaded no one . It is a voluntary association. Unlike the USSR.
Western Liberal Democracies believe in an International rules based order, one of the foremost of those rules being the sanctity of borders.
And we are forcing Russia into an unholly alliance with China and North Korea ? I don't think so . I don't think Russia needs a lot of forcing in that relationship. All three are authoritarian dictatorships, have a history of genocide, and the mass murder of political dissidents. They seem to have a lot in common.
Spot the difference Barend ? Russia is no threat to Europe you say ?
Try telling the Ukrainian's that. But not just now, they might still be busy pulling the bodies of dead chilren out of the Paediatric Hospital Russia just destroyed with guided missiles.
And if you do go back to Europe I'd be carefull wich way you fly. The Russians have a habit of shooting down civilian airliners, Korean Airlines in 1983, Malaysian Airlines in 2014.
Europe has nothing to worry about from Russia ? I think you have your red tinted glasses on again Barend .
No red-tinted glasses here, Tom. I'm a realist and realise that I have to side with a powerful ally against other powerful entities. I'll throw in my lot with Moscow rather than Beijing any day.
Note that the 'reinvasion' of Hungary and Czechoslovakia was in response to the governments of those countries (puppet govts that they were) asking the Soviets for assistance to put down an insurrection that threatened the State. That's allowed under international law. (Yeah, I know, it's as weak as water, but that's the answer you'll get from international law experts in Moscow, and the US doesn't exactly behave any differently...... ditto Afghanistan/Vietnam..... sauce for the goose.......) .
I still need convincing that today's Russia is any more of a threat to Europe proper (which doesn't include Ukraine) than was pre-Communist Russia. It is the US that stokes things up. They should rack off and leave us Europeans to it - we have a track record going back millennia.
Nothing I have ever read about the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 suggests it was invited by the Czechoslovak Government. Nothing, ever. The Priminister Alexander Dubcek had massive public support.
The whole democratic world was shocked by this invasion, not just the Czechoslovak government and people.
The Czechoslovak Government no more invited an invasion by the Russians in 1968 than the Ukrainians did in 2022.
Once again you seem to be inhabiting this post truth space where you transpose the facts and truths of a matter with your opinions. Facts beat opinions every time Barend. No way did the Government of Czechoslovakia ever invite a Russian invasion.
I saw on TV One news a Ukrainian child , bald from chemotherapy, being wheeled from the wreckage of childrens hospital, destroyed by Russian missiles just moments before.
So I say again , go and tell the Ukrainians they have nothing to fear from the Russians. If you want to support the Russians I think you'll find you're in a tiny minority.
Ah, but the Soviets hold that Dubcek's government was illegitimate, Tom....... like the way the Yanks have regarded govts unfriendly to them in their back yard as illegitimate.
They ALL cheat, Tom. It comes with power. Rules-based world governance is a farce when the chips are down. I'm not an apologist for Russia, just a realist who has choices to make. Maybe I'm too cynical for you?
I regard the alliance with the US as a liability rather than a security asset (speaking as a European). Let them go and do their warmongering elsewhere, not on my soil thanks. I maintain that we Europeans should be aligning with Russia to take on the might of Communist China (not necessarily militarily, though it may come to that). Better still, let the Chinese and the Yanks battle it out for supremacy, and leave us right out of it.
PS Tom, you're fibbing when you claim that Ukraine is Europe (in the sense of an attack on Ukraine being an attack on a European nation, which it ain't), and it's cheating to use tear-jerkers to promote a political argument - I'm sure I can find similar instances on the Russian side.
Barend, you keep changing what you say. First you say the Russians were 'invited" by Hungary and Czechoslovakia to invade them, which was false . Then you change it to the Russians invaded because these regimes were illegitimate, which is also false. So which side of your argument do you want to run with ?
Mr Putin seems to have made his mind up though. At the Eastern Economic Forum Conference in Vladivostok on 12th September 2023 ,he specifically stated that the invasions of both these countries had been wrong. And he further stated that ' it is not wright to do anything in foreign policy that harms the interests of other people". Yes just 10 months ago . Look it up for yourself.
Strange that Putin is in the middle of another Russian invasion. Perhaps you had better get on the phone to him and put him straight on a few things Barend.
And I note that The Ukraine wants to be part of Nato, and wishes to be regarded as part of Europe. These calls are only their right to make.
As of February 22nd this year the civilian casualty toll in The Ukraine stood at 30,547 injured which includes 10,582 deaths of which 587 were children. I would not want the death or injury of any civilian or child on either side of this conflict. But the nature of this conflict would suggest that civilian casualties on the Russian side of the front would be a tiny fraction of these numbers.
I have not yet heard of Ukrainian missile strikes on crouded Russian shopping malls, schools or Paediatric hospitals , have you Barend. .
And I note the Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Sjizzarto very recently made the statement,
"There are some issues in Hungarian History on which we won't even start a debate. The Revolutionaries of 1956 are our heroes."
So I wouldn't try to put hm right Barend
Tom, you seem to have problems following other people's convoluted reasoning. The call for assistance from Prague came from the crowd recognised as the legit govt by the Soviets. Yep, that's as topsy-turvy as it gets, but it's typical Big Power reasoning when they feel compelled to intervene in another nation's internal affairs.
Do I agree with that? No, I don't. But unlike you, I am able to add a twist to my reasoning to mimic the thought processes of someone else. I think it's important to be able to see things as others do - some of whom may be opposed to you (in fact especially them).
Of course the rebels of 1956 and 1968 are now seen as heroes. Good heavens, man, the world changed a great deal after 1991 and yesterday's subversives are today's heroes (and vice-versa). What's new?
The one very correct thing you say is "The Ukraine wants to be part of Nato, and wishes to be regarded as part of Europe"' That's a concession that Ukraine is NOT Europe and so Russian designs on it have no implications for the security of Europe. You also put your finger right on the button as to why Russia has taken the steps it has to secure its borders - although you might not realise it - which is NATO expansion. You've shot yourself in both feet here.
I can find you tear-jerkers from the Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk; yeah, I know, they're not recognised by most countries - but they are by Moscow, and that is what matters. But I don't regard that as a legitimate argumentative ploy.
Barend, your geography is as confused as your politics. Every geographic reference I look at confirms Ukraine is in Europe or Eastern Europe . Perhaps that’s why Ukraine regards itself as a European state and not a vassal subject of Russia. Perhaps you can tell both the geographers and the mapmakers they’ve got it wrong. And don’t forget to tell the Ukrainians , they got it wrong too.
That’s after you’ve corrected Mr Putin. Clearly you know better than him . Clearly Russia had every right to invade Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Mr Putin can’t possibly know more than you do Barend.
And the poor foolish Czechs. Alexander Dubcek, the Prime Minister they held in the highest regard. The PM they thought they had elected in a fair and free election was an imposter all along. The rightful government was a few stooges known only to the Russian invaders.. You had better let the Czechs know they got it wrong.
You’re going too have a busy few days.
The reason European states join NATO is so that Russia can’t invade them, pure and simple. So just tell me one state NATO has invaded in 75 years, just one Barend just one.just one !
There is absolutely no joy in counting the deaths in war. But do tell us of the Ukrainian strikes on occupied shopping malls and schools and hospitals in the Russian occupied parts of Ukraine. Or the mass graves of civilians massacred by Ukrainian forces discovered by the Russian liberators. Please do tell us.
What you may regard as your convoluted reasoning others would see as your highly subjective personal opinion justified by unsupportable reworking of history, devoid of hard facts. When you are asked for facts you have none.
So do get on the phone to Putin, I bet he just can’t wait to hear from you.
Any don’t forget to lower that hammer and cycle flag outside your place.
Your going to have
Tom, in your desperate attempt to ridicule me, you are only making a fool of yourself to anyone who has read my comments in the spirit in which they were drafted.
It wasn't my convoluted reasoning I was on about (who on Earth would call their own reasoning convoluted?) but that of the Kremlin. The difference between us is that I am able and willing to see things through their lens in order to understand their reactions to what they perceive as external threats, and their take on international law.
There is a simplistic right/wrong absolutism coming through in your comments - not helpful when it comes to understanding how the world works.
Now go back and read what I wrote earlier, and this time try to understand what I was saying, which you have totally misinterpreted and misrepresented.
PS Those who know me and my works over the past 12 years on this site must be in stitches at the insinuation that I am a Commie.
Onc again Barend when your highly subjective personal opinions are challenged you resort to derogratory comments.
Have you contacted Mr Putin yet to correct his recent opinions, so clearly contradictory to yours? Or the Hungarian Foreign Minister whose opinion is also so very contrary to yours ?
And perhaps you shold also contact Mr Zelenskyy the Ukrainian President who so very foolishly believes he is part of Europe and even worse, believes his country has the right to act in what they believe are their own best interests and join Nato ,
You really must put all these people right
You show your specific bias too clearly in your comment of 8.08 pm last night, "I can find you tear jerkers from the Russian Republics of Donetsk and Lubansk. Yeah I know they are not recognised by most countries but they are by Moscow and that's what matters." But Barend they are not independent Republics, they are parts of Ukraine illegally occupied by Russia, as is Crimea. And that is what matters , not Moscow's opinion.
Their is nothing convoluted about your writing, it is in fact just highly subjective personal opinion , often quite devoid of factual content and indeed often quite contrary to accepted facts or historical events. And often quite contrary to the expressed views of the main players, Putin and Zelenskyy being two examples. Your writing is little more than personal gibberish .
Have you picked up an Atlas yet and discovered where everyone else thinks Ukraine is ?
And don't forget to raise the hammer and cycle flag again this morning.
>"And that is what matters, not Moscow's opinion."
But people react according to their own perceptions of a situation, not other people's.
You are clearly incapable of seeing issues from conceptual frameworks outside of your own. Forget about that job with the Foreign Office.
I'll leave it to the astute reader to decide who has more credibility.
But that Barend is the very crux of the matter you just don't grasp.
Every one is entitled to their opinion . But to be relevant and valid and worth debating your " conceptual frameworks", your personal opinions need some factual base. Your writings are almost wholly lacking in such substance.
You constantly re-invent history, deny geography, deny accepted truths and facts. Your changing justification for the illegal Russian invasions of both Hungary and Czechoslovakia is not part of one of some "conceptual frameworks", it is simply wrong. Your writing is full of such error.
You may note that not one European state has been invaded by Russia whilst being a member state of Nato. Unfortunately a number of non Nato member European states have been invaded by Russia
And I note that on 17th March 2023 the International Criminal Court issued warrants for the arrest of Mr Putin for the commission by him of War
Crimes in the Ukrainian conflict, specifically crimes against children.
Great company you keep Barend. Your biases are just too obvious.
Don't forget to pull the red flag down tonight comrade.
Facts are only meaningful when interpreted within a particular conceptual framework. The same 'fact' can be used for opposing purposes by competing parties. My interest lies in doing just that and engaging in a bit of devil's advocacy en route. One does not reach the 'truth' (whatever that is in the political context) that way but one does get to understand the issue. By the way, I thought the original article was an opinion piece (as 99% of political articles are) so I am hardly out of step in posting a counter-opinion. I sometimes don't agree with opinions I put forward but I want to stay ahead of the game and that means pre-empting what others will come up with. It's a lot more fun that way than your black-and-white goodies-and-baddies world view which smacks of naivete.
Now have a look at my 10:08am post of yesterday and consider what a complete jerk you are making of yourself with your closing statements. I could be offended but I can't be bothered.
Those who are interested in the plight of the Ukrainian people may wish to read the contents of a recent letter authored by 148 eminent intellectuals from Europea, America and other nations urging Nato to accelerate Ukraine's admission into Nato . The letter may be found here;
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jul/27/ukraine-nato-membership
The authors don't believe Nato membership for Ukraine would provoke a conflict with Russia, citing Russia's calm acceptance of Finland and Sweden as proof. They believe Russia's oposition to Ukraine's Nato membership is because it would obstruct Russia's continued aggression against that country.
They further suggest the focus on Russia's "Nato expansion anxiety" and attempts to appease it, ignore Russia's genocidal propaganda and systematic war crimes in occupied territory of Ukraine, including massacres, mass rape and torture demonstrate Russia's clear intention to destroy Ukraine as a nation.
They also make the point that Russia has never invaded a Nato member state, but has invaded plenty of non members.
Many may find it a very interesting read
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