After all, Germany’s economy is struggling, its energy prices are among the highest in the world, its military barely functions, and its relations with Eastern European neighbours remain strained.
This interview, carefully staged to promote her forthcoming memoir Freedom: Memories 1954-2021, offers a revealing glimpse into the mind of one of the world’s most influential leaders.
Her 720-page account of her life in both East and West Germany, co-written with long-time advisor Beate Baumann, will be published in over 30 countries this week. It promises insights into her dealings with figures like Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. That will ensure a global audience, from Berlin to Washington and probably Wellington, too.
Yet rather than using this platform for genuine reflection, Merkel demonstrates precisely the qualities that made her both a successful politician and a poor leader.
The problems facing Germany today can be traced back to decisions she made – or failed to make – during her 16 years as chancellor. Each exemplifies her governing style: strong on tactical manoeuvres, weak on strategic thinking.
Her hallmarks remain: stubborn adherence to past decisions, self-righteous dismissal of critics, and unwillingness to acknowledge even obvious mistakes. The interview reveals a politician more concerned with justifying her record than learning from it.
Take her Russia policy. “I never had illusions about Putin”, she claims, while defending her approach to Moscow until the very end. If that is true, her decisions appear even more inexplicable.
Having grown up in East Germany under Soviet influence and being fluent in Russian, she should have understood the nature of the Putin regime better than most. Instead, she pushed ahead with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline despite warnings from Eastern European allies and three successive American administrations.
She kept Germany dependent on Russian energy while knowing exactly who she was dealing with. That is not realpolitik – it is strategic malpractice. Her “change through trade” philosophy proved as naive as her critics claimed.
The costs of this policy are now evident. German industry faces some of the highest energy prices in Europe, with electricity costs triple those in France.
The country’s competitiveness suffers as a result. Major manufacturers are considering relocating production to countries with cheaper energy. Steel producers, chemical companies and car manufacturers are all warning of an industrial exodus.
Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski warned in 2011 that he feared German inaction more than German power. He proved prescient. Yet in the interview, Merkel still defends a policy that left Germany strategically vulnerable and Eastern Europe justifiably furious.
Her defence of her 2015 migration decisions follows the same template. “I had the feeling I would have given up all credibility of our Sunday speeches about our values in Europe and human dignity”, she says about opening Germany’s borders to more than a million migrants.
Yet, she never addresses the practical challenges of integration. The long-term fiscal costs are estimated at well over one trillion euros. Two-thirds of the migrants remain dependent on social welfare. The political fallout strengthened populist movements across Europe.
Her decision created problems that will take generations to resolve. Cities and communities struggle with parallel societies. Integration efforts have largely failed. Crime rates among young male migrants have soared.
For Merkel, taking the moral high ground remains more important than wrestling with complex realities. She consistently chose grand gestures over practical solutions. The gap between her rhetoric and reality grew wider with each crisis.
The political costs of her migration policy were immense. Her unilateral decision split the European Union. Britain’s exit from the EU was partly influenced by fears of unrestricted migration under German leadership. The damage to European unity may be permanent.
The central European nations of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia once looked to Germany for leadership. Instead, they formed a defensive alliance against German policy diktats. Still Merkel dismisses their concerns with platitudes about European values.
When faced with difficult questions about these issues, she retreats into process descriptions, talking about coalition negotiations and meetings rather than meaningful outcomes or achievements.
Her economic record proves equally troubling. Germany’s share of global exports has declined. Its digital infrastructure lags behind competitors. Despite demographic pressures, its pension system remains unreformed.
The economic dynamism created by her predecessor Gerhard Schröder’s market reforms gradually dissipated. Her management-by-polls approach replaced strategic thinking. Germany lived off its past reforms rather than preparing for future challenges.
Infrastructure investment fell to critical levels. Roads and bridges crumbled. Schools deteriorated. The railway system became notoriously unreliable. Yet she defends her fiscal policies by pointing to balanced budgets.
Her response when asked about mistakes is most revealing. She still defends shutting down Germany’s nuclear power plants after Japan’s Fukushima disaster. This hasty move, driven by regional election concerns, left Germany more dependent on Russian gas, compounding the country’s energy crisis.
The military presents another catastrophic failure. Despite promising NATO to spend 2 percent of GDP on defence, German military spending fell during her tenure. The Bundeswehr became a shadow of its former self.
The armed forces’ equipment deteriorated dramatically. At times, none of Germany’s submarines were operational. Only a quarter of its fighter jets could fly. Less than half its tanks were combat-ready. Soldiers had to train with broomsticks instead of guns.
When asked about this neglect, she blames defence ministers and coalition partners, exemplifying her method of avoiding responsibility while claiming credit for successes.
The Spiegel interview reveals the essence of Merkel’s chancellorship. She presents controversial decisions as alternativlos – without alternative. She wraps failures in moral certainty. She substitutes process for progress.
This method served her well politically. She won four elections. She outlasted all her rivals. She dominated German politics for a generation. But her success came at Germany’s expense.
Her interview reveals no belated realisation that tactical victories can lead to strategic defeat, nor any acceptance that her “politics of avoidance” has left Germany unprepared for current challenges.
Yet Merkel remains unrepentant – having governed Germany for 16 years without ever truly leading it. This interview shows why.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
Yet rather than using this platform for genuine reflection, Merkel demonstrates precisely the qualities that made her both a successful politician and a poor leader.
The problems facing Germany today can be traced back to decisions she made – or failed to make – during her 16 years as chancellor. Each exemplifies her governing style: strong on tactical manoeuvres, weak on strategic thinking.
Her hallmarks remain: stubborn adherence to past decisions, self-righteous dismissal of critics, and unwillingness to acknowledge even obvious mistakes. The interview reveals a politician more concerned with justifying her record than learning from it.
Take her Russia policy. “I never had illusions about Putin”, she claims, while defending her approach to Moscow until the very end. If that is true, her decisions appear even more inexplicable.
Having grown up in East Germany under Soviet influence and being fluent in Russian, she should have understood the nature of the Putin regime better than most. Instead, she pushed ahead with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline despite warnings from Eastern European allies and three successive American administrations.
She kept Germany dependent on Russian energy while knowing exactly who she was dealing with. That is not realpolitik – it is strategic malpractice. Her “change through trade” philosophy proved as naive as her critics claimed.
The costs of this policy are now evident. German industry faces some of the highest energy prices in Europe, with electricity costs triple those in France.
The country’s competitiveness suffers as a result. Major manufacturers are considering relocating production to countries with cheaper energy. Steel producers, chemical companies and car manufacturers are all warning of an industrial exodus.
Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski warned in 2011 that he feared German inaction more than German power. He proved prescient. Yet in the interview, Merkel still defends a policy that left Germany strategically vulnerable and Eastern Europe justifiably furious.
Her defence of her 2015 migration decisions follows the same template. “I had the feeling I would have given up all credibility of our Sunday speeches about our values in Europe and human dignity”, she says about opening Germany’s borders to more than a million migrants.
Yet, she never addresses the practical challenges of integration. The long-term fiscal costs are estimated at well over one trillion euros. Two-thirds of the migrants remain dependent on social welfare. The political fallout strengthened populist movements across Europe.
Her decision created problems that will take generations to resolve. Cities and communities struggle with parallel societies. Integration efforts have largely failed. Crime rates among young male migrants have soared.
For Merkel, taking the moral high ground remains more important than wrestling with complex realities. She consistently chose grand gestures over practical solutions. The gap between her rhetoric and reality grew wider with each crisis.
The political costs of her migration policy were immense. Her unilateral decision split the European Union. Britain’s exit from the EU was partly influenced by fears of unrestricted migration under German leadership. The damage to European unity may be permanent.
The central European nations of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia once looked to Germany for leadership. Instead, they formed a defensive alliance against German policy diktats. Still Merkel dismisses their concerns with platitudes about European values.
When faced with difficult questions about these issues, she retreats into process descriptions, talking about coalition negotiations and meetings rather than meaningful outcomes or achievements.
Her economic record proves equally troubling. Germany’s share of global exports has declined. Its digital infrastructure lags behind competitors. Despite demographic pressures, its pension system remains unreformed.
The economic dynamism created by her predecessor Gerhard Schröder’s market reforms gradually dissipated. Her management-by-polls approach replaced strategic thinking. Germany lived off its past reforms rather than preparing for future challenges.
Infrastructure investment fell to critical levels. Roads and bridges crumbled. Schools deteriorated. The railway system became notoriously unreliable. Yet she defends her fiscal policies by pointing to balanced budgets.
Her response when asked about mistakes is most revealing. She still defends shutting down Germany’s nuclear power plants after Japan’s Fukushima disaster. This hasty move, driven by regional election concerns, left Germany more dependent on Russian gas, compounding the country’s energy crisis.
The military presents another catastrophic failure. Despite promising NATO to spend 2 percent of GDP on defence, German military spending fell during her tenure. The Bundeswehr became a shadow of its former self.
The armed forces’ equipment deteriorated dramatically. At times, none of Germany’s submarines were operational. Only a quarter of its fighter jets could fly. Less than half its tanks were combat-ready. Soldiers had to train with broomsticks instead of guns.
When asked about this neglect, she blames defence ministers and coalition partners, exemplifying her method of avoiding responsibility while claiming credit for successes.
The Spiegel interview reveals the essence of Merkel’s chancellorship. She presents controversial decisions as alternativlos – without alternative. She wraps failures in moral certainty. She substitutes process for progress.
This method served her well politically. She won four elections. She outlasted all her rivals. She dominated German politics for a generation. But her success came at Germany’s expense.
Her interview reveals no belated realisation that tactical victories can lead to strategic defeat, nor any acceptance that her “politics of avoidance” has left Germany unprepared for current challenges.
Yet Merkel remains unrepentant – having governed Germany for 16 years without ever truly leading it. This interview shows why.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is the Executive Director of The New Zealand Initiative think tank. This article was first published HERE.
4 comments:
What an interesting analysis. How does a political leader hold sway for four terms in office? What does that say about the German people’s acceptance of poor leadership? They had built a thriving economy from the ruins the Nazi regime created to become the envy of the world. Was it because it’s in their nature not to question but follow? Are we New Zealanders also capable of just following in Germany’s downward spiral as we “unquestioningly” pursue the Net-Zero nonsense? Is it not too late to learn from other countries mistakes by challenging political dogma?
"Having grown up in East Germany.." which would have her educated in an education system dominated by "Russian think" hence the ability to communicate in Russian".
Also during this time she would have been exposed to what the KGB was doing and a certain gentleman, who was a KGB operative, this same person who she would associate with after becoming Chancellor. So one questions her statement - "I never had illusions about Putin", because what hold did Putin have over Angela?
"she claims, whilst defending her approach to Moscow", if you read some of the interesting facts regarding the "decline of Germany under Angle's tenure", something that would have had the surrounding European Nations becoming concerned, along with France Britain & America - particularly the Military - I would advance that this was deliberate and can be aligned with Putin's desire to re-establish the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which at the time included East Germany, but if "the Putin dream became a reality", then what was to stop him acquiring all of Germany, something that (reputably) Iosef Stalin wanted to do toward the end pf Russia's incursion into Germany, only to be stopped by the Americans at the Elbe river.'
Current Germany, poor military functions, ability to defend against a predator, America (which I believe had withdrawn many of their Military functions & equipment from Germany? - Britain likewise?) -not able to respond fast enough, oh dear such thoughts - thus Ukraine then became the "test crash dummy", look at how Germany responded!
Ditto other European Nations & NATO.
Oh and it has been "noted by many esteemed people that the invasion of Males from Middle East & African Countries was deliberate", the second question was "Who was behind this movement", and thirdly what was and still is the objective of this mass migration.
Is it not interesting, that after the fact ( In this case Angela writing a book) that she can not justify her actions past, and why the were activated/ carried out -which brings me back to one question - "How cozy was Angela's relationship with Putin"??
Oliver, sadly few will read this when many should. It shows the incapability of the NZ MSM to source news like this and bring it to the attention of NZ public- sadly a Maori haka is more important.
..."taking the moral high ground remains more important than wrestling with complex realities. She consistently chose grand gestures over practical solutions. The gap between her rhetoric and reality grew wider with each crisis"
Where have we seen that before in NZ? I guess we can be thankful we got rid of ours after five years, although the damage will last over a generation.
Sounds a bit like the tone deaf arrogance of our PM, although he won't see anything like 16 years. There plastered the other day on the front page of that woke rag, "The Post" he claiming "no regrets." Clearly, he can't read the room and the next poll should be telling - provided it's not more msm bs.
Post a Comment