Morgan Godfery’s claim that New Zealand’s latest “race relations crisis” will “almost certainly resolve in favour of Māori” is a political prediction dressed up as historical inevitability.
A political prediction — resting on remarkably convenient omissions and unexamined assumptions.
Godfery tells us that Māori power has grown. He does not properly explain how it grew.
His story (bold text) runs through:
Much of the modern expansion of Māori political and economic power did not arise naturally from demographic change.
It was constructed, encouraged and progressively entrenched through government policy.
The transformation accelerated dramatically after 1975, when the Labour Government established the Waitangi Tribunal. Its original jurisdiction was limited to contemporary claims. In 1985, Parliament retrospectively extended that jurisdiction back to 1840.
The consequences were enormous.
In 1882, a Māori delegation led by Hirini Taiwhanga took nine grievances to England and sought an investigation.
By June 2009, 2,034 claims had been registered with the Waitangi Tribunal.
That explosion demonstrates something Godfery’s narrative conveniently obscures: once governments created a permanent institutional mechanism for historic grievances to be lodged, investigated and potentially converted into political and material redress, claims multiplied enormously.
By 2015 the Tribunal had registered more than 2,500 claims. Parliament's own description of the process makes clear that claims can be grouped together, and that settlements generally resolve existing and potential historical claims of a claimant group.
The settlement machinery then transferred substantial resources.
By June 30, 2026, legislation had provided for 115 settlements worth $4.94-billion (page 77).
That is an argument against pretending that today's enormous iwi economic base simply emerged from some unstoppable historical process.
Government policy helped build it — deliberately transferring assets, creating new institutional arrangements and progressively expanding the role of iwi in public life.
And then Godfery makes the extraordinary leap from that accumulated economic power to an argument for further political power.
Iwi becoming wealthy does not establish a constitutional right to greater political authority.
Iwi owning land does not establish such a right.
- The New Zealand Wars — initiated by a minority of rebellious tribes.
- Māori urbanisation — Māori moved to the cities seeking work and better opportunities.
- The Labour movement — strengthened by the 1936 Rātana–Labour alliance.
- The Māori renaissance — driven by a growing demand for self-determination.
- Treaty settlements — expanded dramatically after the Waitangi Tribunal gained retrospective jurisdiction to 1840.
- Iwi businesses — strengthened by settlement assets and commercial transfers.
- Māori MPs — supported by dedicated Māori electorates created in 1867.
- The incorporation of tikanga into the state — accelerated through legislation and government policy.
Much of the modern expansion of Māori political and economic power did not arise naturally from demographic change.
It was constructed, encouraged and progressively entrenched through government policy.
The transformation accelerated dramatically after 1975, when the Labour Government established the Waitangi Tribunal. Its original jurisdiction was limited to contemporary claims. In 1985, Parliament retrospectively extended that jurisdiction back to 1840.
The consequences were enormous.
In 1882, a Māori delegation led by Hirini Taiwhanga took nine grievances to England and sought an investigation.
By June 2009, 2,034 claims had been registered with the Waitangi Tribunal.
That explosion demonstrates something Godfery’s narrative conveniently obscures: once governments created a permanent institutional mechanism for historic grievances to be lodged, investigated and potentially converted into political and material redress, claims multiplied enormously.
By 2015 the Tribunal had registered more than 2,500 claims. Parliament's own description of the process makes clear that claims can be grouped together, and that settlements generally resolve existing and potential historical claims of a claimant group.
The settlement machinery then transferred substantial resources.
By June 30, 2026, legislation had provided for 115 settlements worth $4.94-billion (page 77).
That is an argument against pretending that today's enormous iwi economic base simply emerged from some unstoppable historical process.
Government policy helped build it — deliberately transferring assets, creating new institutional arrangements and progressively expanding the role of iwi in public life.
And then Godfery makes the extraordinary leap from that accumulated economic power to an argument for further political power.
Iwi becoming wealthy does not establish a constitutional right to greater political authority.
Iwi owning land does not establish such a right.
Māori entering Parliament does not establish such a right.
The incorporation of tikanga into government does not establish such a right.
Yet Godfery treats each development as another stage in an apparently irreversible historical march.
Consider Māori parliamentary representation. There are currently seven Māori electorates, alongside the general electorates and party-list seats.
That is a deliberate feature of New Zealand's electoral system — not an inevitable consequence of history.
So too are the increasingly controversial Treaty obligations and Māori-specific institutional arrangements embedded in legislation and public administration.
This is why Godfery's argument is backwards.
He mistakes the consequences of political decisions for the laws of history.
There is another awkward fact his racial narrative largely sidesteps: modern New Zealanders are of increasingly mixed ancestry.
New Zealand has experienced generations of intermarriage and shared family, community and economic life. Yet as those social boundaries have become increasingly blurred, the political system has simultaneously become more conscious of racial categories.
The question therefore becomes unavoidable:
If New Zealanders are increasingly integrated as individuals and families, why should ancestry increasingly determine political representation and institutional treatment?
Godfery never really answers that.
Instead, he celebrates Māori moving “from the streets to the boardroom” and from protest into the state.
But who opened the doors?
Parliament did. Governments did. The public service did. The universities did. Crown agencies did.
The modern expansion of Māori institutional power was not simply something that happened to New Zealand.
It was something short-sighted governments deliberately encouraged and progressively entrenched.
However what governments create, governments can change.
That is why Godfery's conclusion that the present conflict will “almost certainly resolve in favour of Māori” is so revealing.
There is no law of history requiring it.
The Treaty does not contain a provision saying Māori political influence must continually expand.
It does not establish two classes of New Zealand citizen.
It does not say that historical grievances must produce an ever-expanding system of separate representation and institutional authority.
Those developments are products of modern political decisions and interpretations.
Godfery wants us to believe the argument is already over because history has chosen a winner.
It hasn't.
Perhaps the real race-relations crisis is not resistance to Māori progress at all.
Perhaps it is the growing realisation that equal citizenship is being replaced by an increasingly elaborate system of racial differentiation — and that this transformation was never put to New Zealanders as a single constitutional choice.
Godfery has mistaken momentum for legitimacy.
And he has mistaken political direction for political destiny.
**History does not get to decide New Zealand's future - New Zealanders do.**
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.
The incorporation of tikanga into government does not establish such a right.
Yet Godfery treats each development as another stage in an apparently irreversible historical march.
Consider Māori parliamentary representation. There are currently seven Māori electorates, alongside the general electorates and party-list seats.
That is a deliberate feature of New Zealand's electoral system — not an inevitable consequence of history.
So too are the increasingly controversial Treaty obligations and Māori-specific institutional arrangements embedded in legislation and public administration.
This is why Godfery's argument is backwards.
He mistakes the consequences of political decisions for the laws of history.
There is another awkward fact his racial narrative largely sidesteps: modern New Zealanders are of increasingly mixed ancestry.
New Zealand has experienced generations of intermarriage and shared family, community and economic life. Yet as those social boundaries have become increasingly blurred, the political system has simultaneously become more conscious of racial categories.
The question therefore becomes unavoidable:
If New Zealanders are increasingly integrated as individuals and families, why should ancestry increasingly determine political representation and institutional treatment?
Godfery never really answers that.
Instead, he celebrates Māori moving “from the streets to the boardroom” and from protest into the state.
But who opened the doors?
Parliament did. Governments did. The public service did. The universities did. Crown agencies did.
The modern expansion of Māori institutional power was not simply something that happened to New Zealand.
It was something short-sighted governments deliberately encouraged and progressively entrenched.
However what governments create, governments can change.
That is why Godfery's conclusion that the present conflict will “almost certainly resolve in favour of Māori” is so revealing.
There is no law of history requiring it.
The Treaty does not contain a provision saying Māori political influence must continually expand.
It does not establish two classes of New Zealand citizen.
It does not say that historical grievances must produce an ever-expanding system of separate representation and institutional authority.
Those developments are products of modern political decisions and interpretations.
Godfery wants us to believe the argument is already over because history has chosen a winner.
It hasn't.
Perhaps the real race-relations crisis is not resistance to Māori progress at all.
Perhaps it is the growing realisation that equal citizenship is being replaced by an increasingly elaborate system of racial differentiation — and that this transformation was never put to New Zealanders as a single constitutional choice.
Godfery has mistaken momentum for legitimacy.
And he has mistaken political direction for political destiny.
**History does not get to decide New Zealand's future - New Zealanders do.**
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.

9 comments:
I haven't read Godfrey's article. It is paywalled in Stuff, and unlike Luxon, there is no way I'm going to give that nasty racist tabloid any money.
If Godfrey predicts that the current race relations issues will resolve in favour of Maori, he is probably correct. A change in government will eventually happen, even if it doesn't happen this year. With a Labour/Greens/TPM government, Maori will run the country and that power will be entrenched. Maori will continue to be givenall the naturalresources. Once they're given away they won't come back. Iwi's powers are expanding even under National. Backing this trend are a generation of brainwashed New Zealanders who have been taught that the country was stolen from Maori and needs to be given back. NZ will inevitably end up like one of those African dictatorships.
Whether that should happen is another question. But it's like that Joni Mitchell song - you don't know what you've got till its gone.
You can say what you like about his argument, but his conclusion is correct:
“The last frontier for the development of New Zealand’s primary industries is the exploitation of the last pockets of land held in Māori title. The most far-sighted infrastructure investments - such as Waikato-Tainui’s inland port at Ruakura - are iwi-led. Just as in the 1860s, it is what iwi and hapū control that is crucial to developing New Zealand’s productive base - that is, it is crucial to capital.”
When Godfery writes, “...Māori were integrated into capital as their Treaty settlement redress was applied to growing businesses...” Marx would explain that “The lower strata of the middle class, the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants, all these sink gradually into the proletariat...” Here Marx is describing movement out of independent ownership and into wage labour. Godfery's passage can be read as the reverse process: In Marxian terms, that is movement toward participation in the capitalist class structure rather than mere participation in labour.
When Godfery writes, “...it is what iwi and hapū control that is crucial to developing New Zealand's productive base, that is, it is crucial to capital,” Marx would likely respond: “The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations... It has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'.”
Marx is arguing that economic relations become the decisive social relations, such that political and cultural arrangements increasingly follow economic interests. Godfery's argument could be rewritten as: Because iwi and hapū control assets needed for the further expansion of New Zealand's productive economy, the state and major economic actors will increasingly accommodate their interests.
If not, then Marx would predict that class tensions eventually re-emerge inside the very institutions that were initially celebrated as vehicles of collective advancement. In other words, the contradiction would shift from Maori versus Crown toward elite versus ordinary member, and more broadly capital versus labour, regardless of ethnicity. That is the point at which Marx's analysis becomes most directly relevant to Godfery's thesis.
That is the situation of the waged people which arises when the means of production is controlled by capitalist owners.
Reference
Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848.
Expect social unrest if the Right wins in November.
Expect rapid advancement of the He Puapua agenda - namely a written constitution - if the Left wins.
Then of course the tax advantages...
My word this whole issue of Maori identity is boring! - so vacuous and unproductive. What a waste of time and energy. Reminds me of my kids vying to be first. I entirely blame pakeha. Maori agitators don't have any more sense, and it seems there's a bloc of hand-wringing latercomers who don't either.
The irony is that Godfery is claiming that the iwis are doing that which Marx rails against. And he is mocking the White proles to his in-group clique because he thinks you won’t have the education to grasp his Marxian cues. They have got you too busy learning waiatas to have time for your own imperialist culture. Godfrey thinks the situation is now sufficiently advanced that he can declare it publicly and you won’t do a thing about it. He is scoffing at you.
It seems he is right: you are becoming the iwi’s taurekareka (wage-slaves).
What is missing from this endless ‘Maori/ Other’ debate, given that ‘Other’ are usually thought of as European Kiwi, is the 29%, and growing, number of NZ citizens who are neither part Maori or European.
At the moment they don’t seem to present as a coherent voting bloc but it can only be a matter of time, then its going to be interesting to see what happens to this ongoing ‘us (partly Maori) vs them (not Maori)’ debate.
Logically I can’t see this other Other bloc voting for Maori supremacy so the Willie, Waititi, Cloe Show had better grab what they can whilst they can before the gravy train hits the buffers.
A strong, masculine take from one of BV’s stalwarts. I would buy Geoff a beer any day of the week. I would probably buy him more than that, for the honourable manly work that he does here. Stay strong, Geoff, stay in the path!
To Anon@4.13.
Seems a very caustic feminist lash! Contribulting nothing.
Steve Ellis
Steve Ellis
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