That is the real issue behind Te Pāti Māori’s new constitutional policy.
Constitutional Transformation
Te Pāti Māori wants to make Crown obligations arising from Te Tiriti legally enforceable and to fund the next stage of Māori-led constitutional transformation.
The policy includes:
> a $220 million Mātike Mai Fund over four years;
> an independent Te Tiriti Commission with powers to investigate serious Crown breaches, require remedial action and issue Te Tiriti Compliance Orders;
> making Waitangi Tribunal recommendations binding on the Crown;
> implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
> ensuring constitutional transformation by 2040.
Te Pāti Māori has a made this a bottom line in post-election negotiations.
So, this is now an election policy with the potential to become part of negotiations to form the next Government.
One element deserves particular attention:
The proposed Te Tiriti Commission would not simply advise ministers. It would be an independent body able to investigate Crown decisions, policy and executive action for compliance with statutory obligations arising from Te Tiriti.
For serious breaches, it could require remedial action and issue a Te Tiriti Compliance Order to stop or suspend the decision. Rawiri Waititi describes the status of the proposed Commission as “over and above Parliament.”
So, an independent body, whose members are not elected by the public, would have power to stop or suspend an executive decision made by an elected Government.
That is not ordinary co-governance.
This represents a fundamental shift about where political authority resides. Mātike Mai explicitly addresses constitutional transformation and explores a multi-sphere structure where hapū, iwi and other Māori representation could organise assemblies alongside the Crown in Parliament.
It also envisages a relational sphere involving constitutionally mandated relationships and decision-making between Māori and the Crown.
Mātike Mai further advocates recognising hapū and iwi’s tikanga and kawa as a valid system of law sitting alongside ( not within) the New Zealand legal system.
Constitutional transformation is to be realised by 2040.
This is a very different constitutional concept from that of NZ today.
What Happens To Parliament?
Parliament is elected by the people and the Government must retain the confidence of the elected House. Parliament makes the law, while judges interpret and apply it. Judges do not usually have the power to strike down an Act of Parliament simply because they disagree with it.
That principle of parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental feature of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements.
What happens if the Te Parti Maori proposals come into force?
Notably, what is the role of:
The elected Government?
Parliament?
The courts?
The Te Tiriti Commission?
Moreover, what about a future constitutional arrangement where political authority is divided amongst different spheres?
These are NOT minor technical questions. This goes to the heart of democracy.
Canadian law professor , James Allan, has warned about this problem for years.
Regarding a possible written NZ constitution , he argued that incorporating or entrenching the Treaty would mean handing questions of enormous political importance to judges rather than leaving them to voters. His objection was not to having a constitution as such, but to replacing democratic decision-making with judicial interpretation of broad constitutional principles whose meaning could be contested.
Lawyer David Round gave a similar warning in his 2013 discussion of the Treaty . He argued that putting Treaty principles into a new constitution - without broad public agreement - could allow a minority to entrench its interests against widespread opposition.
Those warnings deserve serious consideration now.
Once constitutional principles have superior legal status, their meaning is no longer determined solely byelected governments or Parliament. Courts may be required to determine the meaning of those principles and whether legislation or government action is consistent with them.
That can fundamentally change the balance amongst Parliament, the courts and the electorate.
Once constitutional power is entrenched, getting it back is much harder than changing an ordinary Act of Parliament.
He Puapua Returns To The Discussion
Now, to discuss He Puapua - an independent report commissioned by the previous Government. It was NOT adopted as Government policy in its entirety.
It set out a roadmap for implementing UNDRIP and proposed major changes in the balance between kāwanatanga (Crown authority) and rangatiratanga (Maori autonomy).
Its Vision 2040 explicitly drew on the Mātike Mai model of different spheres of authority ( i.e. Maori, Crown and joint).
It also considered circumstances where governance functions - such as education, health and social services - could shift from the kāwanatanga sphere to the rangatiratanga sphere.
In contrast, Te Pāti Māori’s 2026 policy is more troubling — and potentially more dangerous.
The He Puapua constitutional direction could remain . But now, these ideas would be developed within the wider constitutional-transformation movement reflected in concrete political policy.
And now, a $220 million fund is attached to the process.
What Does This Mean For The Remaining 83% Of NZers ?
A fundamental question is:
What happens to the principle that every New Zealander is an equal citizen under one Parliament?
Regarding Mātike Mai’s proposed constitutional structure of multiple spheres, supporters may argue that this is a new form of partnership leading to a fairer country.
But NZers who disagree are equally entitled to ask whether such an arrangement would create different political rights and different sources of political authority according to ancestry or Treaty status.
Does this situation move us away from the principle of one political system and equal citizenship ?
This question must be answered.
What About Private Property?
This is another critical issue. Te Pāti Māori’s present constitutional policy does not propose confiscating privately owned houses, farms or businesses.
However, constitutional transformation goes far beyond the wording of TPM’s policy announcement.
Te Pāti Māori has previously supported policies giving mana whenua a first right of refusal over culturally significant private land. The party has also supported stronger Māori claims concerning natural resources and the implementation of UNDRIP.
Though private property is currently protected, legitimate questions arise:
If the constitutional balance of authority is fundamentally changed, how far could collective iwi and hapū rights ultimately extend?
This issue concerns every homeowner, farmer, business owner and landowner in New Zealand – so, another question which must be answered.
2040 is close - only 14 years away.
2040 is is the stated horizon for constitutional transformation in Mātike Mai and He Puapua.
As stated previously, Te Pāti Māori now seeks public funding for a process intended to advance Māori-led constitutional transformation, alongside legislation designed to make Crown obligations arising from Te Tiriti ‘s legally enforceable status.
Clearly this debate deserves attention now — not in 2039.
New Zealand At A Crossroads
The Election on 7 November 2026 - where the outcome is far from certain – makes this debate urgent.
Recent polls produce very different results.
The possibility of a Labour-Green-Te Pāti Māori Government - potentially dependent on support from another 4th party - is real. This matters enormously.
Regarding TPM’s Treaty policy: Labour has some reservations; the Greens and the Opportunities (TOP)Party have indicated broad support. TOP matters because, under MMP, a small party can have considerable political influence - if it holds votes that another party needs.
Therefore, the critical issue is what happens AFTER the election - if the numbers do not produce a straightforward majority AND since Te Pāti Māori has already declared a constitutional transformation programme as a bottom line for post-election negotiations.
If Labour and the Greens could not form the basis of a Government requiring Te Pāti Māori’s support, TPM would have considerable bargaining power. However, if the numbers needed support from yet another 4th party - such as TOP, that could also affect the direction of constitutional policy.
If more than one support party favours moving the country towards a broader constitutional role for Te Tiriti, the political pressure becomes even greater- especially for Labour to maintain traditional leadership of the Left.
The issue, therefore, is that post-election, once the votes have been counted and the numbers needed to form a Government are known, individual parties must be prepared to negotiate.
Who holds the balance of power post- election becomes as important as which party wins the most seats.
The constitutional question cannot be separated from the election arithmetic.
The Choice Facing New Zealanders
New Zealanders must think very carefully about the process that their vote could set in motion.
This election is not simply about tax, spending, health, housing or immigration – nor even about co-governance.
It could determine whether New Zealand continues as a democracy based on one Parliament, one system of law and equal citizenship - or, it begins moving towards a fundamentally different constitutional arrangement where political authority is divided amongst different spheres and increasingly defined by Treaty status and ancestry.
The choice ultimately belongs to the NZ voters. This is about who governs New Zealand – now and in the future. Once the foundations of a democracy are changed, reversal is virtually impossible.
Geoff Parker is a passionate advocate for equal rights and a colour blind society.

12 comments:
Parliament are themselves largely responsible for this situation.
First, Parliament does not have a mandate from the people to govern. The Constitution Act 1986 should have been passed by a referendum but instead Parliament empowered themselves.
Second, the present coalition have had three years to remove the Maori seats and the Waitangi Tribunal and they have not done so.
Third, Parliament do not fulfil their primary responsibility of representing We the people.
The Maori Party just are exploiting a weak and disordered Parliament, which is what they are there to do.
Our Parliament needs a fundamental review and that requires the sort of vigor shown by the Maori Party.
Should National win the election, that will not be an end to the problem. That will only get us another three years to develop a solution.
Christopher Luxon and Winston Peters have shown they will stop the sort of fundamental change required when they stopped the TPB.
It is difficult to see a way forward.
Make no mistake. This is throw whitey out of this country and Maori tribal autocracy takes over. Perhaps whitey needs to be strung along a bit to fund everything for a while longer. And as unbelievable as that sounds...
also make no mistake, Labour via the Maori Caucus who run Labour anyway, are on the exact same page. Add the useful idiots that make up the Greens, Opportunities and the rest of the non maori Labour caucus with their naive misplaced academic guilt and this is a done deal.
But good luck in the return to the 1700's tribal hierarchy where might equalled rule. We know exactly how that turns out.
Never has the future of this country being at such a crossroads as this election.
I feel sorry for the 29% of Kiwis who are neither part-Maori or European, they must get heartily sick of the constant banging on about Te Tiriti O Waitangi, who did what to whom and when, who deserves reparations and who should pay for it.
How long before they start to organise into voting blocs to get it wiped from the statute books?
So happy to be voting for a Maori(part) this election....go Winston and David. Let"s hope this tiresome Maori -fatigue inducing syndrome is behind us after 7th November. How many more articles need to be written? How many more explanations given?
I'm with you Janine! Absolutely fed up with Maori grifters - and I rather think quite a few of good Maori folk would agree with me - a whitey!
"Where should NZ’s political authority ultimately reside?"
Our political authority - that relating to the public affairs of New Zealand - originates in We the People.
We could possibly vest that power in Parliament, but we have never done so, nor have we ever been given the opportunity to do so.
There is an important distinction between what New Zealand’s constitutional system ACTUALLY IS and what some people believe IT OUGHT TO BE.
The assertion that political authority in New Zealand originates in “We the People” is a political or philosophical proposition, not a statement found in New Zealand’s constitutional law. New Zealand does not have a constitutional provision declaring that phrase to be the source of governmental authority.
Likewise, the claim that the Constitution Act 1986 should have been approved by referendum needs to be distinguished from the assertion that it was legally required to be. The Act was enacted by Parliament as part of New Zealand’s constitutional development. One may argue that such a fundamental measure should have been put to the people, but that is an argument for constitutional reform, not proof that Parliament lacked the authority to enact it.
Nor did Parliament somehow acquire its authority from the Constitution Act 1986. Parliamentary government and representative democracy in New Zealand long pre-date that Act.
There is also a circularity in arguing that Parliament has no authority because the people never expressly transferred that authority to Parliament, while simultaneously demanding that Parliament use that very authority to abolish institutions, change electoral arrangements and fundamentally restructure the constitutional system.
If Parliament has no constitutional authority, it cannot provide the solution. If it does possess constitutional authority, then the argument that it has no authority to govern cannot stand as stated.
None of this means New Zealand's constitutional arrangements are beyond criticism. They are not. There is a perfectly legitimate debate to be had about whether New Zealand should adopt a more formal written constitution, whether certain constitutional changes should require referendums, and how popular sovereignty should be expressed.
But those are arguments about what New Zealand's CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM SHOULD BECOME.
They should not be confused with claims about what NEW ZEALAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM CURRENTLY IS.
“Likewise, the claim that the Constitution Act 1986 should have been approved by referendum needs to be distinguished from the assertion that it was legally required to be. The Act was enacted by Parliament as part of New Zealand’s constitutional development. One may argue that such a fundamental measure should have been put to the people, but that is an argument for constitutional reform, not proof that Parliament lacked the authority to enact it.”
Anonymous, October 28, 2026 at 5:09 PM
Here is what academic lawyer Philip A. Joseph, in his text Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, 3rd Edition, has to say about that. He concludes: “Parliament’s legislative powers may now have factual rather than legal force.”
“13.6.1 Severing the branch
“The Constitution Act 1986 invites two analogies. First, an axeman, perched on the branch of a tree, severs the limb at the trunk. Does the axeman fall to the ground with the branch? Or can he defy gravity and remain suspended, though he has lost his means of support? The Constitution Act 1986 revoked New Zealand’s sources of legislative power (namely the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK), the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK) and the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (UK)), yet declared: “The Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full power to make laws.” Like the axeman who loses his only means of support, do Parliament’s power likewise fall to the ground? Can there exist, in law, a power without a source? To declare the continuance of powers does not constitute or create them. Such declaration premises their existence and, perforce, their source. Perhaps, on this view, the Constitution Act 1986 is New Zealand’s ultimate proclamation of autochthony? Though itself a product of New Zealand’s legislative autonomy gifted by the Westminster Parliament, it repudiated the source of that autonomy and denied the gift was ever made. Parliament’s legislative powers may now have factual rather than legal force.”
That being the case, how now can our Parliament have a source of legal force other than by a referendum?
The quotation from Philip Joseph raises a serious and interesting constitutional question, but it DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE CONCLUSION BEING DRAWN FROM IT.
Joseph is examining a theoretical problem created by the Constitution Act 1986: Parliament repealed the earlier statutory sources of New Zealand’s legislative autonomy while simultaneously declaring that Parliament “continues to have full power to make laws.” He asks whether a legislative power can exist without an identifiable legal source for that power, and concludes that Parliament’s powers “may now have factual rather than legal force.”
THAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OR UNRESOLVED THEORETICAL QUESTION. It is not a legal finding that Parliament lost its authority, NOR DOES JOSEPH SAY THAT A REFERENDUM IS THEREFORE THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOURCE OF THAT AUTHORITY.
Indeed, the Constitution Act itself expressly provides that there shall be a Parliament of New Zealand, consisting of the Sovereign and House of Representatives, AND THAT PARLIAMENT “CONTINUES TO HAVE FULL POWER TO MAKE LAWS.”
More importantly, New Zealand's constitutional system did not suddenly begin in 1986. The Constitution Act 1986 expressly describes the Parliament as the same body that previously operated as the General Assembly ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION ACT 1852.
So the real constitutional question is more subtle than “Where is the referendum that gave Parliament its authority?”
It is whether the constitutional continuity of Parliament, the Crown, representative government, statute law, constitutional convention and the common law provides a sufficient legal foundation for Parliament's present authority, notwithstanding the theoretical difficulty identified by Joseph.
That is a legitimate constitutional debate.
But it is a CONSIDERABLE LEAP from Joseph identifying a constitutional puzzle to declaring that only a referendum can supply Parliament with legal authority.
There is NO PROVISION in the Constitution Act 1986 saying that a referendum is required to confer that authority. Nor is there a general constitutional rule that Parliament's legislative power can arise only through a referendum.
If the argument is that New Zealand should now hold a referendum to settle the ultimate source of constitutional authority, that is a proposition for constitutional reform.
It is NOT THE SAME THING as demonstrating that Parliament presently has no legal authority.
THOSE TWO PROPOSITIONS SHOULD NOT BE CONFLATED.
Is it just me, or is anyone else starting to get a sense of deja vu?
No Barend, it is not just you. I suspect that our Anonymous commenter is Geoff Parker and he is just wasting everyone’s time with his humbug. He also seems to think he is a legal authority when he writes:
“The assertion that political authority in New Zealand originates in “We the People” is a political or philosophical proposition, not a statement found in New Zealand’s constitutional law.” (Anonymous, October 28, 2026 at 5:09 PM)
Roger Partridge is chairman and a co-founder of The New Zealand Initiative and is a senior member of its research team. He led law firm Bell Gully as executive chairman from 2007 to 2014. Partridge says “Political power in New Zealand comes from the people.”
“This understanding has deep roots in Westminster constitutional theory. British jurist AV Dicey, often called the father of constitutional law, famously articulated the principle of “parliamentary sovereignty.” This principle means Parliament can make or unmake any law. But crucially, Parliament’s authority derives from democratic accountability to the people. Modern scholar Jeffrey Goldsworthy reinforces this: Parliament’s supreme legal authority exists precisely because it represents the democratic will of the people.”
Our political authority - that relating to the public affairs of New Zealand - originates in We the People.
There seems to be a conflation here between two different propositions.
That political power is ultimately exercised with the democratic consent of the people is entirely uncontroversial. Elections are the mechanism by which tHAT DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IS EXPRESSED.
But that is not the same proposition as saying that New Zealand's LEGAL AUTHORITY ORIGINATES IN AN IDENTIFIABLE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT BY “WE THE PEOPLE”, or that Parliament requires a referendum before it possesses lawful legislative authority.
Quoting Roger Partridge saying that “political power in New Zealand comes from the people” does not establish the latter proposition. Nor does invoking Dicey or Goldsworthy establish that A REFERENDUM WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED TO CREATE OR VALIDATE PARLIAMENT'S LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Nothing I have said claims to be a pronouncement from a “legal authority”. The point is simply that a proposition about what the constitutional order OUGHT TO BE SHOULD NOT BE PRESENTED AS AN ESTABLISHED FACT ABOUT WHAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IS.
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