An optimist, watching Ukraine’s soldiers chewing their way through Russian defences, can hope that a catastrophe for the Russian army is not far away. A realist might say that it’s far from inevitable.
But we can draw some conclusions even before the fighting stops.
First, Ukraine (the country) has won. It has stopped an existential threat and improbably unified its citizenry.
Secondly, Russia (the regime) has lost. Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy was built on stability and security. Both have disappeared.
Thirdly, Europe has mostly chosen insignificance. It has left it to others to make the decisive contributions to a strategic border war which has already claimed half a million casualties. New Zealand does this too of course but it is further from the action.
While it is unclear when Putin will go and what aspects of his regime with him, his main support – at home and abroad – seems to be fear of the alternatives.
Hence the various arguments for postponing the replacement of a leader distinguished for consistently making the most destructive choices over his political lifetime.
Russia’s last twenty years seem to offer little hope of a happy outcome. But perhaps we ought to be more open to the possibility of optimism.
Can any successor regime claim legitimacy over Russia’s damaged fragments without a plausible electoral mandate?
Would a weakened Russia be able to ignore the forces which have helped half the former Soviet empire to climb out of the pit?
Russia’s political environment has been turned upside down by the diminution of its own armed forces and the addition of a powerful and truculent Ukrainian neighbour with a perfect right to interfere in the currently Russian-occupied territories. It’s worth considering the circumstances in which this becomes a force for stability, rather than the reverse.
Pure logic suggests that a post-Putin Russia would flourish if it were to impose on itself the European Union’s institutional systems (ironically just as the UK has outgrown them). They have proved an outstandingly successful anchor for political and social transition, even as their long-term sustainability comes into question.
Perhaps that’s why it seems such a remote prospect. Conversely, Ukraine’s adoption of these norms is taken for granted.
A peaceful and economically integrating Ukraine would have some of the best economic prospects in Europe. It would accelerate the current migration of economic growth and military capability to the Eastern half of the continent.
But paradoxically success will depend as much on rejection of aspects of the European Union regulatory model, as it does on acceptance of the basic institutional principles.
A developing Ukraine will be unlikely to develop post-war if it fails to frack some of Europe’s best gas reserves or adopts gold-plated environmental and agricultural rules. Like the UK, Ukraine will need to confront the unsuitability of the European model for its long-term development.
Moreover, it would be surprising if a country which has just bled out the flower of its manhood in the face of European political indifference did not have something new to say on issues as diverse as civic duty, social solidarity, gender equality, demographic replacement, immigration and the tradeoff between long-term growth and environmental purity.
Ukraine is likely to be confronting similar issues to us before too long but from a more impoverished starting point – in every way – and from a much tougher basis in experience. It is a chance to see if danger does bring clarity and realism closer to home. And whether that experience is a catalyst for other countries stuck in more placid and generous – but ultimately stagnant – ruts.
Point of Order is a blog focused on politics and the economy run by veteran newspaper reporters Bob Edlin and Ian Templeton
Thirdly, Europe has mostly chosen insignificance. It has left it to others to make the decisive contributions to a strategic border war which has already claimed half a million casualties. New Zealand does this too of course but it is further from the action.
While it is unclear when Putin will go and what aspects of his regime with him, his main support – at home and abroad – seems to be fear of the alternatives.
Hence the various arguments for postponing the replacement of a leader distinguished for consistently making the most destructive choices over his political lifetime.
Russia’s last twenty years seem to offer little hope of a happy outcome. But perhaps we ought to be more open to the possibility of optimism.
Can any successor regime claim legitimacy over Russia’s damaged fragments without a plausible electoral mandate?
Would a weakened Russia be able to ignore the forces which have helped half the former Soviet empire to climb out of the pit?
Russia’s political environment has been turned upside down by the diminution of its own armed forces and the addition of a powerful and truculent Ukrainian neighbour with a perfect right to interfere in the currently Russian-occupied territories. It’s worth considering the circumstances in which this becomes a force for stability, rather than the reverse.
Pure logic suggests that a post-Putin Russia would flourish if it were to impose on itself the European Union’s institutional systems (ironically just as the UK has outgrown them). They have proved an outstandingly successful anchor for political and social transition, even as their long-term sustainability comes into question.
Perhaps that’s why it seems such a remote prospect. Conversely, Ukraine’s adoption of these norms is taken for granted.
A peaceful and economically integrating Ukraine would have some of the best economic prospects in Europe. It would accelerate the current migration of economic growth and military capability to the Eastern half of the continent.
But paradoxically success will depend as much on rejection of aspects of the European Union regulatory model, as it does on acceptance of the basic institutional principles.
A developing Ukraine will be unlikely to develop post-war if it fails to frack some of Europe’s best gas reserves or adopts gold-plated environmental and agricultural rules. Like the UK, Ukraine will need to confront the unsuitability of the European model for its long-term development.
Moreover, it would be surprising if a country which has just bled out the flower of its manhood in the face of European political indifference did not have something new to say on issues as diverse as civic duty, social solidarity, gender equality, demographic replacement, immigration and the tradeoff between long-term growth and environmental purity.
Ukraine is likely to be confronting similar issues to us before too long but from a more impoverished starting point – in every way – and from a much tougher basis in experience. It is a chance to see if danger does bring clarity and realism closer to home. And whether that experience is a catalyst for other countries stuck in more placid and generous – but ultimately stagnant – ruts.
Point of Order is a blog focused on politics and the economy run by veteran newspaper reporters Bob Edlin and Ian Templeton
4 comments:
Ukraine’s soldiers chewing their way through Russian defenses, where are they chewing away, they haven't even got to Russens first line of defense, and have lost over 40,000 troops.
Right on Hazel.
I don't think I have ever read rubbish like this ever on this site. Many report the loses as numbering as many as 400,000+ to Ukraine. Victory and Ukraine are two words that can't be used together. Just as negotiated peace and the US can't be used in the same story, and that extends way further than Ukraine. This is a disaster for Ukraine and the sooner that a peace deal is sorted the better. I seem to be reading elsewhere also when it comes to Putin and his popularity in Russia.
David
Ukraine is the proxy (meat in the sandwich).
Russia is defending itself against NATO (The warmongering West)
NATO is getting it's arse kicked, and Russia is not even angry yet.
The Russian people love Putin, inflation is very low, employment high, shops full and cities clean. They are becoming the shining light for capitalism.
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